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Notable events involving Tigris include:

The history of HMS Tigris as compiled on this page is extracted from the patrol reports and logbooks (unfortunately not all logs are available) of HMS Tigris. Corrections and details regarding information from the enemy's side (for instance the composition of convoys attacked) is kindly provided by Mr. Platon Alexiades, a naval researcher from Canada.

This page was created in March 2012 and was last updated in May 2024.

Each year there is an annual Remembrance Service for the submarine and the crew lost at St Nicolas Church, Newbury, Berks, England on the Sunday nearest the 27 February.

HMS Tigris was adopted by the town of Newbury during World War II. Newbury held warship week from 7-14 Feb 1942 raising £431,243. Confirmation was received of the adoption and two plaques received in August 1942.

(1)

9 May 1940
Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) proceeded from the Chatham Dockyard to Sheerness. (2)

10 May 1940
Around 1100A/10, Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Sheerness for Portsmouth. She is escorted by HMS Pintail (Lt.Cdr. T.H. Hill-Walker, RN). (2)

11 May 1940
Around 0810A/11, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) arrived at Portsmouth (Fort Blockhouse, Haslar) from Sheerness for further outfitting.

Her escort, HMS Pintail (Lt.Cdr. T.H. Hill-Walker, RN) also entered Portsmouth but departed again and returned to Sheerness later the same day. (2)

12 May 1940
Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted trials in the Portsmouth area. (2)

15 May 1940
Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is docked at Portsmouth. (2)

4 Jun 1940
Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is undocked. (3)

22 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted D/G and compass swing trials off Portsmouth. (3)

23 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Portsmouth for Fowey. (3)

24 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) arrived at Fowey for a period of training. (3)

25 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted exercises off Fowey. (3)

26 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted exercises off Fowey. (3)

27 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted attack exercises off Fowey during which, the armed yacht HMS Warrior II (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN), acted as target. (3)

28 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Fowey for Portland. She was escorted by the armed yacht HMS Warrior II (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN). (3)

29 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) arrived at Portland for torpedo discharge trials. (3)

30 Jun 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted torpedo discharge trials off Portland. (3)

2 Jul 1940
Around 0530A/2, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Portland for Portsmouth (Fort Blockhouse / Haslar Creek) where she arrived around 1445A/2. (4)

5 Jul 1940
Around 2045A/5, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Portsmouth for Rothesay. She made the passage together with HMS H 32 (Lt. J.L. Livesey, RN) that was to proceed to Campbeltown. They were escorted by the armed yacht HMS Warrior II (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN). (4)

8 Jul 1940
Around 1230A/8, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) arrived at Rothesay for further training and trials in the Clyde area. (4)

9 Jul 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted sound trials in Loch Long. (4)

10 Jul 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) shifted from Rothesay to Arrochar. (4)

11 Jul 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted torpedo discharge trials off Arrochar. (4)

12 Jul 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted torpedo discharge trials off Arrochar. (4)

13 Jul 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted torpedo discharge trials off Arrochar. Upon completion, HMS Tigris, proceeded to Rothesay. (4)

16 Jul 1940
Around 0915A/16, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Rothesay for her 1st war patrol, escorted by HMS Northern Spray (Lt. H.P. Crail, RNR) until 2140A/17. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. (5)

16 Jul 1940

For the daily positions of HMS Tigris during her 1st war patrol see the map below.

26 Jul 1940
At 1000A/26, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted a merchant vessel of around 5000 tons leaving the Gironde and proceeding northwards close inshore. The ship had two mast and one funnel.

[We have been unable to identify this vessel.] (5)

28 Jul 1940
At 1230A/28, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted two identical merchant vessels of about 5000 tons leaving the Gironde. They had four goal post masts and one funnel. One was proceeding on course 340° and the other on course 300°.

[We have been unable to identify this vessel.] (5)

29 Jul 1940
At 1820A/29, while still on patrol off the Gironde, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN), sighted two cross Channel steamers.

[We have been unable to identify these vessels.] (5)

30 Jul 1940
At 1755A/30, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN), sighted three merchant vessels leaving the Gironde. Two were standard merchant vessels with 2 masts and one funnel. The third had goal post masts.

HMS Tigris closed at 15 knots on the surface but was forced to dive by what was assumed to be a pilot cutter. All three merchant vessels were seen to fly the French flag. They were proceeding at speeds of 12, 11 and 10 knots on course 325°.

HMS Tigris left patrol that evening.

[We have been unable to identify all vessels sighted.] (5)

2 Aug 1940
Around 0730A/2, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) arrived at Falmouth. (5)

3 Aug 1940
Around 1520A/3, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Falmouth for Holy Loch after having taken on board some engine spare parts that were sent over to Falmouth by Chatham Dockyard. HMS Tigris was escorted by HMS Manor (T/Lt. A. Rosling, RNVR). (5)

5 Aug 1940
Around 2100A/5, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) ended her 1st war patrol at Rothesay. (5)

15 Aug 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted engine and D/G trials in the Clyde area. (6)

17 Aug 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted D/G trials in the Clyde area. (6)

21 Aug 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted attack exercises in the Clyde area during which HMS Breda (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN) served as target. (6)

22 Aug 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted attack exercises in the Clyde area during which HMS Breda (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN) served as target. (6)

27 Aug 1940
Around 2000A/27, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Rothesay for her 2nd war patrol. She made the passage together with cable ship HMS Lasso (Capt.(Retd.) H.C.P. Pipon, RN). They were escorted by HMS Notts County (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) J.K. Pollock, RN) until 2130A/29. HMS Tigris was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. (5)

27 Aug 1940

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Tigris during her 2nd war patrol see the map below.

2 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) attacks German U-boat U-58 with one torpedo in the Bay of Biscay about 30 nautical miles west-south-west of Lorient, France in position 47°29'N, 04°04'W. The torpedo however missed the target despite the claim of a hit. U-58 had departed Lorient that day.

The Germans had seen HMS Tigris earlier but were unsure about it's identity and as U-38 and U-59 were expected to arrive at Lorient, they did not attack. When the submarine was encountered for a second time they it was seen to be British but it could not be attacked due to the lack of a stern torpedo tube in this type of U-boat. According to the Germans the torpedo fired at them prematured.

2231A/2 - Sighted a submarine only 500 yards away. Started attack.

2234A/2 - Fired one torpedo that was seen to hit 12 to 15 seconds after firing. As there were a lot of fishing vessels in the area that could pick up survivors made off to seaward at full speed. (7)

12 Sep 1940
At 1800A/12, in position 205° - Penmarch lighthouse - 17 nautical miles, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted five armed trawlers steering 060°. This must have been auxiliary minesweepers from the German 40th M/S Flotilla which were operating in this area on this day. (8)

14 Sep 1940
Around 0855A/14, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN), arrived at Falmouth. She departed Falmouth around 1800A/14 for Holy Loch escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). (5)

16 Sep 1940
Around 1000A/16, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) ended her 2nd war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

21 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted noise trials at Holy Loch. (9)

23 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted compass adjustment trials at Holy Loch. (9)

25 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted D/G trials off Helensburg. (9)

26 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted attack exercises in the Clyde area during which HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN) served as target. (9)

27 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is wiped at Holy Loch. (9)

28 Sep 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted compass adjustment trials at Holy Loch followed by D/G trials off Helensburg. (9)

29 Sep 1940

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Tigris during her 3rd war patrol see the map below.

29 Sep 1940
Around 0700A/29, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Holy Loch for her 3rd war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

Passage south through the Irish Sea was made togeter with HMS Trident (Lt.Cdr. G.M. Sladen, RN). They were escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). They parted company around 2215A/30 near Bishop Rock. (5)

2 Oct 1940
At 2140A/2, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) reports that she is missed by two torpedoes in the Bay of Biscay near position 46°40'N, 05°35'W. No German or Italian submarines carried out an attack on this day near this position so the attack appears to be bogus. (5)

5 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) attacked an Italian submarine with torpedoes in the Bay of Biscay off the Gironde estuary in position 45°39'N, 01°34'W.

These were the Italian submarines Maggiore Baracca and Reginaldo Giuliani that both arrived at Bordeaux the following day. They were escorted by the German minesweepers M-9 and M-13. It appears that Giuliani was the target of the attack. (Note that there were only two submarines present and not three as claimed by Lt.Cdr. Bone.)

0658A/5, - Sighted three Italian submarines at a range of 6000 to 8000 yards. Started attack with the second and third submarines as targets.

0708A/5 - Sighted two escort vessels, believed to be two former French Elan-class sloops/minesweepers, proceeding at high speed towards Tigris.

0710A/5 - Decided to concentrate on the third submarine.

0716A/5 - Fired four torpedoes from 2500 yards. Two explosions were heard after 2 minutes and 4 seconds and 2 minutes and 11 seconds giving a running range of 2800 yards. Only two submarines were seen shortly afterwards so a sinking was claimed.

0725A/5 to 0802A/5 - The escort vessels dropped 11 depth charges. None were close. (5)

9 Oct 1940
At 1240A/9, in appoximate position 45°43'N, 01°30'W, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted two armed trawlers apparently carrying out an A/S sweep in the Gironde estuary. This may have been the German auxiliary patrol vessels V 405 and V 406 which arrived at Bordeaux from a patrol off the Gironde around 1430B/9.

At 1730A/9, HMS Tigris encountered an armed trawler and a large motor boat carrying out an A/S sweep along the coast north of the Gironde estuary. A/S transmissions were picked up. [We have been unable to identify these vessels.] (10)

11 Oct 1940
At 2115A/11, when patrolling south of the Gironde estuary, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted three darkened ships about five nautical miles ahead. Visibility was bad due to rain and it could not be seen if they were north or southbound before they were lost from sight again. (5)

15 Oct 1940
At 0725A/15, in approximate position 45°37'N, 01°35'W, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN), sighted two A/S trawlers apparently sweeping out of the Grande Passe de L'Ouest (northern entrance to the Gironde estuary). HMS Tigris took avoiding action. The trawlers turned round at 1020A/15.

The German auxiliary patrol vessels V 405 and V 406 were on patrol off the Gironde estuary on this day and may have been the ships sighted.

HMS Tigris left patrol on surfacing at 1900A/15. (10)

16 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sank the French (in German service) coaster Cimcour (250 GRT, built 1931) with gunfire in the Bay of Biscay about 120 nautical miles west of the Gironde estuary in position 45°44'N, 03°45'W.

0155A/16 - Sighted a darkened ship bearing 355°. Closed. The contact was thought to be a trawler. As it closed to about 1000 yards it turned towards and it was thought it was trying to ram Tigris so fire was opened with the 4" gun. Two rounds hit her amidships and she appeared to settle. Ceased fire and cleared the area leaving it to a nearby trawler to pick up the survivors. (5)

18 Oct 1940
Around 0825A/18, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). (5)

19 Oct 1940
Around 1900A/19, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) ended her 3rd war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

25 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is docked in the graving dock at Ardrossan. (11)

28 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is undocked at Ardrossan and proceeded back to Holy Loch where on arrival compass adjustment trials were carried out. (11)

29 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) is wiped at Holy Loch. (11)

31 Oct 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted gunnery exercises in the Clyde area on a target that was being towed by HMS Breda (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN). (11)

4 Nov 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) conducted noise trials in Loch Long. On completion of the noise trials D/G trials were carried out off Helensburgh. (12)

6 Nov 1940

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Tigris during her 4th war patrol see the map below.

(5)

6 Nov 1940
Around 0930A/6, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Holy Loch in company with HMS Triumph (Lt.Cdr. W.J.W. Woods, RN) and escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN) for her 4th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. (5)

7 Nov 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) developed engine problems and has to proceed to Milford Haven for repairs arriving around 1445A/7.

She had parted company with the other two ships around 1330A/7. (5)

8 Nov 1940
With repairs to her Starboard engine completed HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) departed from Milford Haven around 1515A/8 to resume her patrol. About half an hour later HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN) joined. They parted company around 0715A/9 to the north-west of the Scilly Isles. (5)

12 Nov 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) proceeded to a position to try to intercept a damaged Italian submarine reported on passage to Bordeaux from a position to the south-south-west of Ireland. [See also the event for 13 November 1940.]

This might have referred to the Italian submarine Comandante Faà di Bruno which eventually disappeared without a trace. No signal had been received by the Italians from this submarine but perhaps the British did intercept a signal. (13)

13 Nov 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sank the French fishing vessel Charles Edmond (301 GRT) with gunfire about 70 nautical miles west of the Gironde estuary in position 45°41'N, 02°57'W.

2340A/12 - Sighted barque on a course of 110°. Closed to investigate. There appeared to be a small vessel following astern and thought that this might be the damaged Italian submarine Tigris had been warned about. Started attack.

0110A/13 - In attack position. The vessel following astern could no longer be seen. The weather was to bad for a gun attack so at ......

0122A/13 - Fired one torpedo from 800 yards which appeared to run under. Proceeded down wind and sea, manned the gun and opened slow and deliberate fire with High Explosive (HE) shells. The crew was seen to abandon ship. Due to the rough sea very few hits were obtained despite the close range. Decided to fire a second torpedo at the now stopped ship.

0211A/13 - Fired a second torpedo from 600 yards. This exploded at the correct interval but nothing happened and it was thought it had exploded on the bottom. As Tigris closed the target was seen to be on fire below and it was decided not to waste any more ammunition.

According to French sources the second torpedo did hit the target. (5)

20 Nov 1940
At 0844A/20, in approximate position 45°43'N, 01°43'W, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted two trawlers in line abreast on course 090° probably minesweeping from Grande Passe, as no A/S impulses were heard. (5)

23 Nov 1940
At 1620A/23, still patrolling of the Gironde to await an expected Italian submarine, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) sighted two A/S trawlers patrolling. A/S impulses were heard. The expected inbound Italian submarine must have been the Maggiore Baracca which arrived in the Gironde the following day. The two trawlers were most likely the German auxiliary patrol vessels V 402 and V 408 which were on patrol off the Gironde estuary on this day. (14)

24 Nov 1940
On surfacing at 1812A/24 after a day of submerged patrol on which nothing was seen, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, RN) set course to return to Holy Loch. (5)

27 Nov 1940
Around 0732A/27, near the Pendeen lighthouse, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS Surprise (Capt.(ret) E.Stubbs, RN). (5)

29 Nov 1940
Around 1015A/29, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN) ended her 4th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

12 Dec 1940
During 12/13 December 1940, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Trident (Lt.Cdr. G.M. Sladen, DSC, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area in. These included night and attack exercises.

On the 13th, HMS Breda (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN) and HrMs Z 8 (Lt.Cdr. P.A. de Boer, RNN) also joined the exercises. (15)

16 Dec 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN) conducted D/G trials off Helensburg. (15)

17 Dec 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN) conducted noise trials in the Clyde area. (15)

18 Dec 1940
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN) conducted D/G trials off Helensburg. (15)

21 Dec 1940

For the daily positions of HMS Tigris during her 5th war patrol see the map below.

21 Dec 1940
Around 0915A/21, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch escorted by HMS Stella Polaris (Skr.Lt. S.J. Ward, DSC, RD, RNR) for her 5th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

HMS Stella Polaris parted company around 0600A/23 near Land's End. (5)

10 Jan 1941
Around 0840A/10, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous near Trevose Head with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). (5)

11 Jan 1941
Around 1500A/11, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 5th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

23 Jan 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) conducted attack exercises in the Clyde area with the Dutch torpedo boat HrMs Z 8 (Lt.Cdr. P.A. de Boer, RNN). (16)

24 Jan 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) conducted gunnery exercises in the Clyde area on a target towed by HMS St. Martin. (16)

29 Jan 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) proceeded to Loch Long to be on standy during dive trials by HMS Torbay (Lt.Cdr. A.C.C. Miers, RN).

HMS Tigris returned to Holy Loch later the same day. (17)

3 Feb 1941
Around 0900A/3, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch, escorted by the Free French minesweeper FFS La Moqueuse, for her 6th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

The escort parted company around 0100A/5 to the south-east of the Scilly Isles. (5)

3 Feb 1941

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Tigris during her 6th war patrol see the map below.

10 Feb 1941
At 0615A/10, off Biarritz, in position 43°32'N, 01°40'W, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted, what was thought to be, the streaming light of a ship bearing 265° proceeding on course 090°. The lights were soon lost in the surrounding lights of a fishing fleet and were never recovered. (5)

11 Feb 1941
At 0255A/11, off Biarritz, in position 43°35'N, 01°44'W (43°35'N, 02°44'W is given in the patrol report but this is incorrect according to the logbook), HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted the lights of a merchant vessel bearing 265° proceeding on course 090°. HMS Tigris commenced to shadow the vessel but as visibility was deteriorating constant closing was necessary.

At 0355A/11, another lighted merchant vessel was seen bearing 270°. This suddenly appeared and passed close to the first one.

At 0410A/11, the target was lost in the fog. HMS Tigris made a drastic alteration to close and then turned parallel again after his HE could be plainly heard and held. Visibility got worse and worse until 0445A/11 when it was only 50 yards.

At 0510A/11, HE had been lost by now due to a problem with the Asdic and visibility was now only 20 yards so the chase was abandoned and HMS Tigris dived deep in position 43°30'N, 01°37'W.

[We have been unable to identify the vessels encountered.] (5)

12 Feb 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the French merchant Jacobsen (523 GRT, built 1923) in the Bay of Biscay about 5 nautical miles North-East of Biarritz, France in position 43°32'N, 01°42'W.

0445A/12 - Sighted a lighted merchant vessel enter San Sebastian and another vessel, taken to be a fisherman, was also seen. After a while this 'fisherman' was seen to be much larger than first thought. It looked like a laden tanker of about 1500 tons. Started attack.

0620A/12 - Fired two torpedoes from about 2500 yards. One hit was obtained amidships and a huge column of water rose up into the air. Tigris surfaced to clear the area after the ship had sunk. (5)

13 Feb 1941
At 0100A/13, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted a merchant vessel of about 3000 tons leaving Bilbao and proceeding to the eastwards. HMS Tigris commenced to shadow the ship.

Around 0615A/13, the ship entered San Sebastian. HMS Tigris then resumed patrol off Bayonne. Later she set course to patrol off the Gironde as ordered in FO(S)'s (Flag Officer Submarines) signal timed 1409A/13. (5)

19 Feb 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the French merchant Guilvinec (3273 GRT, built 1920) about 90 nautical miles south-west of the mouth of the Gironde estuary in position 44°48'N, 03°01'W.

0045A/19 - In position 44°47'N, 02°50´W sighted a single white light bearing 030°. It was first thought to be a fishing vessel but later it was seen to be a merchant vessel. Started attack.

0308A/19 - In position 44°48'N, 03°01'W fired six torpedoes from the internal bow tubes (tubes 1 to 6). Two hits were obtained. The ships lights went out and she was seen to settle immediately by the stern. (5)

20 Feb 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) left patrol to return to Holy Loch. (5)

23 Feb 1941
At 0730A/23, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, Free French minesweeper FFS La Moqueuse. (5)

24 Feb 1941
Around 1430A/24, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 6th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

6 Mar 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) conducted D/G trials off Helensburgh. (18)

12 Mar 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) is docked in the graving dock at Ardrossan. (18)

14 Mar 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) is undocked at Ardrossan following which she returned to Holy Loch. (18)

17 Mar 1941
For the daily and attack positions of HMS Tigris during her 7th war patrol see the map below.

17 Mar 1941
Around 1930A/17, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch, with HMS Union (Lt. R.M. Galloway, RN) escorted by the Free French minesweeper FFS La Moqueuse, for her 7th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. She is also to carry out a special operation. They parted company with the escort around 2100A/19 when off Land's End. (5)

30 Mar 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) carries out special operation ' European ' (SOE operation SAVANNA). Captain Appleyard (SOE), Capitaine Bergé, Adjutant Forman and Sergeant Le Tac are landed near St-Gilles-Croix-de-Vie. They are to attack the personnel of the German fire raising Squadron at Vannes. (5)

2 Apr 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the German naval tanker Thorn (5486 GRT, built 1932, former Norwegian Ruth) about 75 nautical miles South-West of St. Nazaire in position 46°36'N, 03°38'W.

The tanker was not escorted due to thus not being possible in the bad weather conditions and the Germans were initially unaware what had happened after the tanker failed to arrive at St. Nazaire on 3 April 1941. Survivors were picked up on the 4 and 5 April and also some landed by themselves on the French coast. It then became apparent that the ship had been sunk by an enemy submarine.

2235A/2 - Sighted a darkened ship bearing 235°. This soon proved to be a large tanker of 10000 to 12000 tons. Closed to attack with torpedoes.

2247A/2 - Fired four torpedoes from 2500 yards. Shortly after firing the enemy made a large alteration towards, almost certainly a zig-zag. The result was of course that all four torpedoes missed.

2250A/2 - Fired two more torpedoes from 1500 yards. Both missed. Manned the gun and gave chase.

2254A/2 - Opened fire with flash less HE shells from a range of 750 yards. Several hits were obtained. During the next 1.5 hours a running gun battle followed until the enemy's guns were knocked out be direct hits. The enemy made four attempts to ram Tigris, all were dodged.

0020A/3 - After hits on the waterline the tanker began to list heavily and when he lay stopped Lt.Cdr. Bone opened the range and fired a torpedo to finish the enemy off. One torpedo was fired that hit the enemy amidships. As the enemy was now considered a total loss Tigris cleared the area. (19)

3 Apr 1941
During the night of 3 / 4 April 1941, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) picks up the agents that had been landed on 30 March. They are all recovered except Sergeant Le Tac who does not show up at the rendezvous. The mission was unsuccessful as it was based on obsolete information but valuable information was obtained. (5)

5 Apr 1941
At 1200A/5, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted an armed trawler on course 180° at 10 knots. Then two more were seen and they formed up in line abreast formation and headed straight towards. A/S transmissions were picked up. HMS Tigris went deep to evade.

This were most likely the auxiliary minesweepers M 1605 which, at that very, moment was just being joined by the auxiliary submarine chasers UJ C and UJ D. These were searching in the area the tanker Thorn had been sunk during the night of 2/3 April. Actually M 1605 had picked up three survivors on this day.

[A position is not given in the patrol report and no log is available for this month.] (20)

10 Apr 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) left patrol to return to Holy Loch. (5)

13 Apr 1941
At 0530A/13, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr. G.W. Dobson, RNR). HMS Tuna (Lt.Cdr. M.K. Cavenagh-Mainwaring, DSO, RN) also joined company for the passage north. (5)

14 Apr 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 7th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

12 May 1941
Around 1900A/12, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch, escorted by the British minesweeper HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr. G.W. Dobson, RNR), for her 8th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. She is also to carry out special operation 'Explore'.

They parted company around 0930A/14.

[As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed.] (5)

14 May 1941
Around 1020A/14, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) arrived at Falmouth.

She left again around 2050A/14 escorted by HMS ML 181 until 2245A/14. (5)

18 May 1941
Around 1530A/18, south of the Gironde estuary HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted a German M-class minesweeper patrolling along the coast.

During the night of 18 / 19 May 1941, HMS Tigris closes the shore south of Arcachon to carry out Operation Explore, the pick up of French agents who had been sent to sabotage the electric transformer station at Pessac (SOE operation Josehine B.). No agents showed up at the rendezvous and the operation was abandoned. A second attempt would be made later. (5)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part I.

Departure of the Bismarck from the Baltic.

At 2130B/18 the German battleship Bismarck and the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen departed Gotenhafen for an anti-shipping raid in the North Atlantic. The following morning they were joined off Cape Arkona by the German destroyers Z 16 / Friedrich Eckhold and Z 23. They then proceeded through the Great Belt. The four ships were joined by a third destroyer, Z 10 / Hans Lody shortly before midnight on 19 May.

First reports of Bismarck and British dispositions 20-21 May 1941.

On 20 May 1941 two large warships with a strong escort were seen at 1500 hours northward out of the Kattegat. This information originated from the Swedish cruiser Gotland which had passed the Germans off the Swedish coast in the morning. The Naval Attaché at Stockholm received the news at 2100/20 and forwarded it to the Admiralty. At 0900/21 the Bismarck and her consorts entered Kors Fjord, near Bergen, Norway and anchored in nearby fiords. A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen at 1330/21 reported having seen two Hipper class heavy cruisers there. One of these ships was later identified on a photograph as being the Bismarck. This intelligence went out at once to the Home Fleet.

The ships of the Home Fleet were at this time widely dispersed on convoy duties, patrols, etc. Some of the units were ranging as far as Gibraltar and Freetown. The Commander-in-Chief, A/Admiral Sir John Tovey, was at Scapa Flow in his flagship, HMS King George V (Capt. W.R. Patterson, CVO, RN). With him were her newly commissioned sister ship HMS Prince of Wales (Capt. J.C. Leach, MVO, RN), the battlecruiser HMS Hood (Capt. R. Kerr, CBE, RN, with Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland, CB, RN, onboard), the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious (Capt. H.C. Bovell, RN), the light cruisers HMS Galatea (Capt. E.W.B. Sim, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral K.T.B. Curteis, CB, RN), HMS Aurora (Capt. W.G. Agnew, RN), HMS Kenya (Capt. M.M. Denny, CB, RN), HMS Neptune (Capt. R.C. O'Conor, RN) and the destroyers HMS Achates (Lt.Cdr. Viscount Jocelyn, RN), HMS Active (Lt.Cdr. M.W. Tomkinson, RN), HMS Antelope (Lt.Cdr. R.B.N. Hicks, DSO, RN), HMS Anthony (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Hodges, RN), HMS Echo (Lt.Cdr. C.H.deB. Newby, RN), HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN), HMS Icarus (Lt.Cdr. C.D. Maud, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi (Cdr. S.A. Buss, MVO, RN) and HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, RAN). HMS Victorious was under orders to escort troop convoy WS 8B from the Clyde to the Middle East. HMS Neptune was working up for service with the Mediterranean Fleet and was to escort convoy WS 8X from the Clyde to the Middle East on completion. She did not sail to operate against the Bismarck having only just began her post-refit work-up programme.

Rear-Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker (commanding the first Cruiser Squadron), with the heavy cruisers HMS Norfolk (Capt. A.J.L. Phillips, RN) (flag) and HMS Suffolk (Capt. R.M. Ellis, RN) was on patrol in the Denmark Straight. The light cruisers HMS Manchester (Capt. H.A. Packer, RN) and HMS Birmingham (Capt. A.C.G. Madden, RN) were patrolling between Iceland and the Faeroes. The battlecruiser HMS Repulse (Capt. W.G. Tennant, CB, MVO, RN) was at the Clyde to escort troop convoy WS 8B.

Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet

Admiral Tovey took the following action when he received the news the Bismarck had been spotted at Bergen. Vice-Admiral Holland with the Hood, Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra and Icarus was ordered to cover Rear Admiral Wake-Walker's cruisers in the Denmark Straight. His force departed Scapa Flow around 0100/22.

HMS Arethusa (Capt. A.C. Chapman, RN), which was taking the Vice-Admiral, Orkneys and Shetlands, to Reykjavik on a visit of inspection, was ordered to remain at Hvalfiord and placed at Rear-Admiral Wake-Walkers disposal. HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham were ordered to top off with fuel at Skaalefiord and them to resume their patrol. The other ships that remained at Scapa Flow were brought to short notice for steam.

The Free French submarine FFS Minerve (Lt. P.M. Sonneville), which was on patrol off south-west Norway was ordered to proceed to position 61°53'N, 03°15'E and HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) was ordered to proceed to position 62°08'N, 05°08'E which is to the west of Stadtlandet.

The sailing of HMS Repulse and HMS Victorious with troop convoy WS 8B was cancelled and the ships were placed at the disposal of Admiral Tovey.

A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen reported that the German ships were gone. This information reached Admiral Tovey at 2000/22. HMS Suffolk which had been fuelling at Hvalfiord was ordered to rejoin HMS Norfolk in the Denmark Strait. HMS Arethusa was ordered to join HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham to form a patrol line between Iceland and the Faeroes. Vice-Admiral Holland, on his way to Iceland was told to cover the patrols in Denmark Strait north of 62°N. Admiral Tovey would cover the patrols south of 62°N.

Commander-in-Chief leaves Scapa Flow on 22 May 1941

The King George V, with Admiral Tovey on board, departed Scapa Flow at 2245/22. With the King George V sailed, HMS Victorious, HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione (Capt. G.N. Oliver, RN), HMS Windsor (Lt.Cdr. J.M.G. Waldegrave, DSC, RN), HMS Active, HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Intrepid (Cdr. R.C. Gordon, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi, HMS Lance (Lt.Cdr. R.W.F. Northcott, RN) and HMAS Nestor. HMS Lance however had to return to Scapa Flow due to defects.

At A.M. 23 May they were joined off the Butt of Lewis by HMS Repulse escorted by HMS Legion (Cdr. R.F. Jessel, RN), HMCS Assiniboine (A/Lt.Cdr. J.H. Stubbs, RCN) and HMCS Saguenay (Lt. P.E. Haddon, RCN) coming from the Clyde area which they departed on 22 May.

The Commander-in-Chief was 230 miles north-west of the Butt of Lewis in approximate position 60°20'N, 12°30'W when at 2032/23 a signal came in from HMS Norfolk that she had sighted the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait.

HMS Suffolk and HMS Norfolk made contact with the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait on 23 May 1941.

At 1922/23 HMS Suffolk sighted the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in position 67°06'N, 24°50'W. They were proceeding to the south-west skirting the edge of the ice in Denmark Strait. HMS Suffolk immediately sent out an enemy report and made for the mist to the south-east. HMS Norfolk then commenced closing and sighted the enemy at 2030 hours. They were only some six nautical miles off and the Bismarck opened fire. HMS Norfolk immediately turned away, was not hit and also sent out an enemy report.

Although HMS Suffolk had sighted the enemy first and also sent the first contact report this was not received by the Commander-in-Chief. The enemy was 600 miles away to the north-westward.

Vice-Admiral Holland had picked up the signal from the Suffolk. He was at that moment about 300 nautical miles away. Course was changed to intercept and speed was increased by his force to 27 knots.

Dispositions, 23 May 1941.

At the Admiralty, when the Norfolk's signal came in, one of the first considerations was to safeguard the convoys at sea. At this time there were eleven crossing the North-Atlantic, six homeward and five outward bound. The most important convoy was troop convoy WS 8B of five ships which had left the Clyde the previous day for the Middle East. She was at this moment escorted by the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), light cruiser (AA cruiser) HMS Cairo (A/Capt. I.R.H. Black, RN) and the destroyers HMS Cossack (Capt. P.L. Vian, DSO, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, DSC, RN), HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN), ORP Piorun (Kmdr.por. (Cdr.) E.J.S. Plawski), HMCS Ottawa (Cdr. E.R. Mainguy, RCN), HMCS Restigouche (Cdr. H.N. Lay, RCN) and the escort destroyer HMS Eridge (Lt.Cdr. W.F.N. Gregory-Smith, RN). HMS Repulse was also intended to have sailed with this convoy but she had joined the Commander-in-Chief instead.

Force H was sailed around 0200/24 from Gibraltar to protect this important convoy on the passage southwards. Force H was made up of the battlecruiser HMS Renown (Capt Sir R.R. McGrigor, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. L.E.H. Maund, RN), light cruiser HMS Sheffield (Capt. C.A.A. Larcom, RN) and the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Foresight (Cdr. J.S.C. Salter, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Hesperus (Lt.Cdr. A.A. Tait, RN).

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk shadowing Bismarck 23 / 24 May 1941.

During the night of 23 / 24 May 1941 HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk hung on to the enemy, The Norfolk on their port quarter, Suffolk on their starboard quarter. All through the night they sent signals with updates on the position, course and speed of the enemy. At 0516 hours HMS Norfolk sighted smoke on her port bow and soon HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales came in sight.

HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales 23 / 24 May 1941.

At 2054/23 the four remaining escorting destroyers were ordered to follow at best speed in the heavy seas if they were unable to keep up with the capital ships which were proceeding at 27 knots. Two destroyers, HMS Antelope and HMS Anthony had been ordered to proceed to Iceland to refuel at 1400/23. The destroyers all managed to keep up for now and at 2318 hours they were ordered to form a screen ahead of both capital ships. At 0008/24 speed was reduced to 25 knots and course was altered to due north at 0017 hours. It was expected that contact with the enemy would be made at any time after 0140/24. It was just now that the cruisers lost contact with the enemy in a snowstorm and for some time no reports were coming in. At 0031 hours the Vice-Admiral signalled to the Prince of Wales that if the enemy was not in sight by 0210 hours he would probably alter course to 180° until the cruisers regained touch. He also signalled that he intended to engage the Bismarck with both capital ships and leave the Prinz Eugen to Norfolk and Suffolk.

The Prince of Wales' Walrus aircraft was ready for catapulting and it was intended to fly it off, but visibility deteriorated and in the end it was defuelled and stowed away at 0140 hours. A signal was then passed to the destroyers that when the capital ships would turn to the south they were to continue northwards searching for the enemy. Course was altered to 200° at 0203/24. As there was now little chance of engaging the enemy before daylight the crews were allowed to rest.

At 0247/24 HMS Suffolk regained touch with the enemy and by 0300 hours reports were coming in again. At 0353 hours HMS Hood increased speed to 28 knots and at 0400/24 the enemy was estimated to be 20 nautical miles to the north-west. By 0430 hours visibility had increased to 12 nautical miles. At 0440 hours orders were given to refuel the Walrus of HMS Prince of Wales but due to delays due to water in the fuel it was not ready when the action began and it was damaged by splinters and eventuelly jettisoned into the sea.

At 0535/24 hours a vessel was seen looming on the horizon to the north-west, it was the Bismarck. She was some 17 nautical miles away bearing 330°. Prinz Eugen was ahead of her but this was not immediately realised and as the silhoutte of the German ships was almost similar the leading ship was most likely thought to be the Bismarck on board HMS Hood.

Battle of the Denmark Strait, action with the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Loss of HMS Hood.

At 0537/24 HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were turned together 40° to starboard towards the enemy. At 0549 hours course was altered to 300° and the left hand ship was designated as the target. This was a mistake as this was the Prinz Eugen and not the Bismarck. This was changed to the Bismarck just before fire was opened at 0552 hours. At 0554 hours the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen also opened fire. In the meantime Prince of Wales had also opened fire at 0053 hours. Her first salvo was over. The sixth salvo was a straddle. The Norfolk and Suffolk were too far astern of the enemy to take part in the action.

At 0555 hours Hood and Prince of Wales turned two points to port. This opened up Prince of Wales' A arcs as her ninth salvo was fired.

Shortly before 0605 hours Hood signalled that another turn of two points to port had to be executed. Bismarck had just fired her fifth salvo when the Hood was rent in two by a huge explosion rising apparently between the after funnel and the mainmast. The fore part began to sink seperately, bows up, whilst the after part remained shrouded in a pall of smoke. Three or four minutes later, the Hood had vanished between the waves leaving a vast cloud of smoke drifting away to the leeward. She sank in position 63°20'N, 31°50'W (the wreck was found in 2001 in approximate position 63°22'N, 32°17'W, the exact position has not been released to the public.)

The Prince of Wales altered course to starboard to avoid the wreckage of the Hood. The Bismarck now shifted fire from her main and secondary armament to her. Range was now 18000 yards. Within a very short time she was hit by four 15" and three 6" shells. At 0602 hours a large projectile wrecked the bridge, killing or wounding most of the personnel and about the same time the ship was holed underwater aft. It was decided temporarily to discontinue the action and at 0613 hours HMS Prince of Wales turned away behind a smoke screen. The after turret continued to fire but it soon malfunctioned and was out of action until 0825 hours. When the Prince of Wales ceased firing the range was 14500 yards. She had fired 18 salvos from the main armament and five from the secondary. The Bismarck made no attempt to follow or continue the action. She had also not escaped unscatched and had sustained two severe hits.

Such was the end of the brief engagement. The loss by an unlucky hit of HMS Hood with Vice-Admiral Holland, Captain Kerr and almost her entire ships company was a grievous blow, but a great concentration of forces was gathering behind the Commander-in-Chief, and Admiral Somerville with Force H was speeding towards him from the south.

The chase

When the Hood blew up, HMS Norfolk was 15 nautical miles to the northward coming up at 28 knots. By 0630/24 she was approaching HMS Prince of Wales and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, signalling his intention to keep in touch, told her to follow at best speed. The destroyers that had been with HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were still to the northward. They were ordered to search for survivors but only HMS Electra found three. The Prince of Wales reported that she could do 27 knots and she was told to open out to 10 nautical miles on a bearing of 110° so that HMS Norfolk could fall back on her if she was attacked. Far off the Prinz Eugen could be seen working out to starboard of the Bismarck while the chase continued to the southward.

At 0757 hours, HMS Suffolk reported that the Bismarck had reduced speed and that she appeared to be damaged. Shortly afterwards a Sunderland that had taken off from Iceland reported that the Bismarck was leaving behind a broad track of oil. The Commander-in-Chief with HMS King George V was still a long way off, about 360 nautical miles to the eastward, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the bridge of HMS Norfolk had to make an important decision, was he to renew the action with the help of the Prince of Wales or was he to make it his business to ensure that the enemy could be intercepted and brought to action by the Commander-in-Chief. A dominant consideration in the matter was the state of the Prince of Wales. Her bridge had been wrecked, she had 400 tons of water in her stern compartments and two of her guns were unserverable and she could go no more then 27 knots. She had only been commissioned recently and barely a week had passed since Captain Leach had reported her ready for service. Her turrets were of a new and an untried model, liable for 'teething' problems and evidently suffering from them, for at the end of the morning her salvoes were falling short and wide. It was doubted if she was a match for the Bismarck in her current state and it was on these grounds that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker decided that he would confine himself to shadowing and that he would not attempt to force on an action. Soon after 1100/24 visibility decreased and the Bismarck was lost out of sight in mist and rain.

Measures taken by the Admiralty, 24 May 1941.

After the loss of HMS Hood the following measures were taken by the Admiralty. To watch for an attempt by the enemy to return to Germany, HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa had been ordered at 0120/24 to patrol off the north-east point of Iceland. They were told to proceed to this location with all despatch.

HMS Rodney (Capt. F.H.G. Dalrymple-Hamilton, RN), which with four destroyers was escorting the troopship Britannic (26943 GRT, built 1930) westward, was ordered at 1022/24 to steer west on a closing course and if the Britannic could not keep up she was to leave her with one of the destroyers. Rodney was about 550 nautical miles south-east of the Bismarck. At 1200/24 she left the Britannic in position 55°15'N, 22°25'W and left HMS Eskimo (Lt.Cdr. E.G. Le Geyt, RN) with her. HMS Rodney then proceeded with HMS Somali (Capt. C. Caslon, RN), HMS Tartar (Cdr. L.P. Skipwith, RN) and HMS Mashona (Cdr. W.H. Selby, RN) westwards on a closing course.

Two other capital ships were in the Atlantic; HMS Ramillies (Capt. A.D. Read, RN) and HMS Revenge (Capt. E.R. Archer, RN). The Ramillies was escorting convoy HX 127 from Halifax and was some 900 nautical miles south of the Bismarck. She was ordered at 1144/24 to place herself to the westward of the enemy and leaving her convoy at 1212/24 in position 46°25'N, 35°24'W, she set course to the north. HMS Revenge was ordered to leave Halifax and close the enemy.

Light cruiser HMS Edinburgh (Capt. C.M. Blackman, DSO, RN) was patrolling in the Atlantic between 44°N and 46°N for German merchant shipping and was ordered at 1250/24 to close the enemy and take on relief shadower. At 1430/24 she reported her position as 44°17'N, 23°56'W and she was proceeding on course 320° at 25 knots.

Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was ordered to continue shadowing even if he ran short of fuel so to bring the Commander-in-Chief into action.

The Bismack turns due south at 1320 hours on 24 May 1941.

In the low state of visibility, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy falling back and attacking them. At 1320/24 the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen altered course to the south and reduced speed. HMS Norfolk sighted them through the rain at a range of only 8 nautical miles. Norfolk had to quickly turn away under the cover of a smoke screen.

It was at 1530/24 when HMS Norfolk received a signal made by the Commander-in-Chief at 0800/24 from which it was estimated that the Commander-in-Chief would be near the enemy at 0100/25. This was later changed to 0900/25.

At 1545/24, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was asked by the Admiralty to answer four questions;
1) State the remaining percentage of the Bismarck's fighting efficiency.
2) What amout of ammunition had the Bismarck expended.
3) What are the reasons for the frequent alterations of course by the Bismarck.
4) What are your intentions as regards to the Prince of Wales' re-engaging the Bismarck.

The answers by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker were as follows.
1) Uncertain but high.
2) About 100 rounds.
3) Unaccountable except as an effort to shake off HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk.
4) Consider it wisely for HMS Prince of Wales to not re-engage the Bismarck until other capital ships are in contact, unless interception failed. Doubtful if she has the speed to force an action.

The afternoon drew on towards evening. Still the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen held on to the south while the Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales were still keeping her in sight.

At 1711/24 in order to delay the enemy if possible, by attacking him from astern, the Prince of Wales was stationed ahead of the Norfolk. The enemy was not in sight from the Norfolk at that time, but the Suffolk was still in contact.

At 1841/24 the Bismarck opened fire on the Suffolk. Her salvoes fell short, but one or two shorts came near enough to cause some minor damage to her hull plating aft. HMS Suffolk replied with nine broadsides before turning away behind a smoke screen.

On seeing the Suffolk being attacked, HMS Norfolk turned towards and she and HMS Prince of Wales opened fire, the latter firing 12 salvoes. By 1856 hours the action was over. Two of the guns on the Prince of Wales malfuntioned again. After the action the cruisers started to zig-zag due to fear for German submarines.

British dispositions at 1800 hours on 24 May 1941.

From the Admiralty at 2025/24, there went out a signal summarising the situation at 1800/24. The position, course and speed of the Bismarck was given as 59°10'N, 36°00'W, 180°, 24 knots with HMS Norfolk, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales still in touch. The Commander-in-Chiefs estimated position at 1800/24 was 58°N, 30°W, with HMS King George V and HMS Repulse. HMS Victorious was with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya). They had parted company with the Commander-in-Chief at 1509/24. Heavy cruiser HMS London (Capt. R.M. Servaes, CBE, RN) was in position 42°45'N, 20°10'W and had been ordered to leave her convoy and close the enemy. HMS Ramillies was in estimated position 45°45'N, 35°40'W. She had been ordered to place herself to the west of the enemy. HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa were returning from their position off the north-east of Iceland to refuel. HMS Revenge had left Halifax and was closing convoy HX 128. HMS Edinburgh was in approximate position 45°15'N, 25°10'W. She had been ordered to close and take over stand by shadower.

Evening of 24 May 1941.

At 2031/24 HMS Norfolk received a signal sent by the Commander-in-Chief at 1455/24 stating that aircraft from HMS Victorious might make an attack at 2200/24 and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker now waited for an air attack which he expected at 2300 hours. By that time Bismarck had been lost from sight but at 2330/24 HMS Norfolk briefly sighted her at a distance of 13 nautical miles. At 2343/24 aircraft from HMS Victorious were seen approaching. They circled round HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Norfolk and the latter was able to direct them to the enemy. At 0009/25 heavy anti-aircraft gunfire was seen and the Bismarck was just visible as the aircraft attacked.

HMS Victorious and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron detached by the Commander-in-Chief.

At 1440/24 the Commander-in-Chief ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione) and HMS Victorious to a position within 100 nautical miles from Bismarck and to launch a torpedo bombing attack and maintain contact as long as possible. The object of the torpedo bombing attack was to slow the enemy down. On board the Victorious were only 12 Swordfish torpedo bombers and 6 Fulmar fighters. Victorious was only recently commissioned and her crew was still rather green. She had on board a large consignment of crated Hurricane fighters for Malta which were to be delivered to Gibraltar.

At 2208/24 HMS Victorious commenced launching 9 Swordfish in position 58°58'N, 33°17'E. Two minutes later al were on their way to find the Bismarck. The Squadron was led by Lt.Cdr.(A) E. Esmonde, RN.

HMS Victorious aircraft attack the Bismarck.

When the Swordfish took off from HMS Victorious the Bismarck was estimated to be in position 57°09'N, 36°44'W and was steering 180°, speed 24 knots. At 2330/24 they sighted the Bismarck but contact was lost in the bad weater. Shortly afterwards the Swordfish sighted HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk. HMS Norfolk guided them to the enemy which was 14 nautical miles on her starboard bow. At 2350 hours a vessel was detected ahead and the squadron broke cloud to deliver an attack. To their surprise they found themselves over a United States Coastguard cutter. The Bismarck was 6 nautical miles to the southward and on sighting the aircraft opened up a heavy barrage fire. Lt.Cdr. Esmonde pressed home his attack, 8 of the Swordfish were able to attack, the other had lost contact in the clouds.

The 8 planes attacked with 18" torpedoes, fitted with Duplex pistols set for 31 feet. At midnight three Swordfish attacked simultaneously on the port beam. Three others made a longer approach low down attacking on the port bow a minute later. One took a longer course, attacking on the port quarter. One went round and attacked on the starboard bow a couple of minutes after midnight. At least one hit was claimed on the starboard side abreast the bridge. The Germans however state that no hit was scored but that the violent maneuvering of the ship to avoid the attack, together with the heavy firing by the Bismarck caused the leak in no.2 boiler room to open up. No.2 boiler room was already partially flooded and now had to be abandoned.

All Swordfish from the striking had returned to HMS Victorious by 0201/25. Two Fulmars launched at 2300/24 for shadowing failed to find their ship in the darkness due to the failure of Victorious' homing beacon. Their crews were in the end picked up from the chilly water.

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk loose contact at 0306/25.

While the aircraft from HMS Victorious were making their attack, HMS Norfolk sighted a ship to the south-west and gave the order to open fire. HMS Prince of Wales was able to identify it in time as an American coast guard cutter, but in the movements prepartory to opening fire HMS Norfolk lost touch with the enemy for a time and it was not until 0116/25 that she suddenly sighted the Bismarck only 8 nautical miles away. There followed a brief exchange of fire. HMS Norfolk and HMS Prince of Wales turned to port to bring their guns to bear and the latter was ordered to engage. It was then 0130/25. The Prince of Wales fired two salvoes at 20000 yards by radar. The Bismarck answered with two salvoes which fell a long way short. The light was failing and the enemy was again lost to sight. HMS Suffolk, which had to most reliable RDF set was told to act independently so as to keep in touch.

Around 0306/25 the Suffolk lost touch with the Bismarck. At 0552/25 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker asked if HMS Victorious could launch aircraft for a search at dawn.

Search measures, 25 May 1941.

With the disappearance of the Bismarck at 0306/25 the first phase of the pursuit ended. The Commander-in-Chief, in HMS King George V with HMS Repulse in company was then about 115 nautical miles to the south-east. At 0616/25, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker signalled that it was most probable that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen made a 90° turn to the west or turned back and 'cut away' to the eastward astern of the cruisers. Suffolk was already searching to the south-west and Norfolk was waiting for daylight to do the same. Prince of Wales was ordered to join the King George V and Repulse.

Force H was still on a course to intercept the Bismarck while steaming on at 24 knots. The Rear-Admiral commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron in HMS Galatea had altered course at 0558/25 to 180° for the position where the enemy was last seen and the Victorious was getting 8 aircraft ready to fly off at 0730/25 for a search to the eastward. This plan however was altered on orders being recieved from the Commander-in-Chief to take the cruisers and Victorious and carry out a search to the north-west of the Bismarck's last reported position. Five Fulmars had already been up during the night, two of them had not returned to the ship. The search therefore had to be undertaken by Swordfish, the only aircraft available. At 0810/25, seven Swordfish were flown off from position 56°18'N, 36°28'W to search between 280° and 040° up to 100 nautical miles. The search was supplemented by Victorious herself as well as the cruisers from the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione) which were spread some miles apart.

DF position of the Bismarck of 0852/25.

HMS King George V was still proceeding to the south-west when at 1030/25 the Commander-in-Chief recieved a signal from the Admiralty that the Bismarck's position had been obtained by DF (direction finding) and that it indicated that the Bismarck was on a course for the North Sea by the Faeroes-Iceland passage. To counter this move by the enemy the Commander-in-Chief turned round at 1047/25 and made for the Faeroes-Iceland passage at 27 knots. HMS Repulse was no longer in company with HMS King George V, she had been detached at 0906/25 for Newfoundland to refuel. Suffolk also turned to the eastward to search, her search to the south-west had been fruitless. The search by HMS Victorious, her aircraft and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to the north-west also had no result. Six Swordfish were landed on by 1107/25, one failed to return. HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora and HMS Kenya now turned towards the DF position of the Bismarck to search in that direction. HMS Hermione had to be detached to Hvalfiord, Iceland to refuel as she was by now down to 40%. The other cruisers slowed down to 20 knots to economise their remaining fuel supply wich was also getting low. At this moment HMS King George V had about 60% remaining.

Events during 25 May 1941.

At 1100/25, HMS King George V, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales were proceeding to the north-east in the direction of the enemy's DF signal. HMS Rodney was in position 52°34'N, 29°23'W some 280 nautical miles to the south-eastward on the route towards the Bay of Biscay. On receiving the Commander-in-Chiefs signal of 1047/25 she too proceeded to the north-east.

Meanwhile to Admiralty had come to the conclusion that the Bismarck most likely was making for Brest, France. This was signalled to the Commander-in-Chief at 1023/25 to proceed together with Force H and the 1st Cruiser Squadron on that assumption.

In the absence however of definite reports it was difficult to be certain of the position of the enemy. The DF bearings in the morning had not been very definite. At 1100/25, HMS Renown (Force H), was in position 41°30'N, 17°10'W was ordered to act on the assumption the enemy was making for Brest, France. She shaped course accordingly and prepared a comprehensive sheme of air search. At 1108/25, HMS Rodney, was told to act on the assumption that the enemy was making for the Bay of Biscay. At 1244/25 the Flag Officer Submarines ordered six submarines to take up intercepting positions about 120 nautical miles west of Brest. The submarines involved were HMS Sealion (Cdr. B. Bryant, DSC, RN), HMS Seawolf (Lt. P.L. Field, RN), HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) from the 5th Submarine Flottilla at Portsmouth, HMS Pandora (Lt.Cdr. J.W. Linton, DSC, RN), which was on passage to the U.K. from the Mediterranean to refit, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN), from the 3rd Submarine Flottilla at Holy Loch and HMS H 44 (Lt. W.N.R. Knox, DSC, RN), a training boat from the 7th Submarine Flotilla at Rothesay which happened to be at Holyhead. Seawolf, Sturgeon and Tigris were already on patrol in the Bay of Biscay, Sealion departed Portsmouth on the 25th as did H 44 but she sailed from Holyhead. Pandora was on passage to the U.K. to refit and was diverted.

At 1320/25 a good DF fix located an enemy unit within a 50 mile radius from position 55°15'N, 32°00'W. This was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief at 1419/25 and it was received at 1530/25. It was only in the evening that it was finally clear to all involved that Bismarck was indeed making for a French port. Air searches had failed to find her during the day. (21)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part II.

26 May 1941.

By now the question of fuel was becoming acute. For four days ships had been steaming at high speeds and the Commander-in-Chief was faced with the reality of fuel limits. HMS Repulse had already left for Newfoundland, HMS Prince of Wales had by now been sent to Iceland to refuel. HMS Victorious and HMS Suffolk had been forced to reduce speed to economise their fuel.

Coastal Command started air searches along the route towards the Bay of Biscay by long range Catalina flying boats. Lack of fuel was effecting the destroyer screens of the capital ships. There was no screen available for HMS Victorious. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla, escorting troop convoy WS 8B, was ordered at 0159/26 to join the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and HMS Rodney as was HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.P. Thew, RN) which sailed from Londonderry. Leaving the convoy the 4th D.F. proceeded to the north-east. Force H in the meantime was also approaching the immediate area of operations. These forces were to play an important part in the final stages of the chase of the Bismarck.

Force H, 26 May 1941.

HMS Renown, HMS Ark Royal and HMS Sheffield were having a rough passage north in heavy seas, high wind, rain and mist. Their escorting destroyers had already turned back towards Gibraltar at 0900/25. At dawn on the 26th there was half a gale blowing from the north-west. At 0716/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a security patrol in position 48°26'N, 19°13'W to search to the north and to the west just in case the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had departed Brest to come to the aid of the Bismarck. At 0835/26 there followed an A/S patrol of ten Swordfish. All planes had returned by 0930. None had seen anything.

Bismarck sighted at 1030/26.

It was at 1030/26 that one of the long range Catalina's of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck in position 49°30'N, 21°55'W. It was received in HMS King George V at 1043 hours and in HMS Renown in 1038 hours. It placed the enemy well to the westward of the Renown. It was confirmed within the hour when two Swordfish from the Ark Royal which reported the Bismarck in position 49°19'N, 20°52'W some 25 miles east of the position given by the Catalina. The Commander-in-Chief was at that moment about 130 miles to the north of the Bismarck but it was soon clear that the Bismarck had too great a lead to permit her being overtaken unless her speed could be reduced. Nor was the question one merely of distance and speed. The Bismarck was approaching a friendly coast and could run her fuel tanks nearly dry and was sure of air protection, while the British ships would have a long journey back to base in the face of air and submarine attack. HMS Renown was ahead of the Bismarck but it was important that she did not engage the Bismarck unless the latter was already heavily engaged by the better armoured HMS King George V and HMS Rodney.

When the Catalina found the Bismarck at 1030 hours, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was steering east to join the Commander-in-Chief. They seem to have crossed astern of the enemy's track about 0800/26. The Catalina's report reached Capt. Vian in HMS Cossack at 1054/26 and 'knowing that the Commander-in-Chief would order him to intercept the enemy' Capt. Vian altered course to the south-east.

First attack by aircraft from the Ark Royal.

At 1315/26 HMS Sheffield was detached to the southward with orders to close and shadow the enemy, who was estimated to be 40 nautical miles south-west of the Renown. The visual signal ordering this movement was not repeated to HMS Ark Royal, an omission which had serious consequenses for the aircraft that were to take off did not know that HMS Sheffield had parted company.

At 1450/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a striking force of 14 Swordfish aircraft with the orders to proceed to the south and attack the Bismarck with torpedoes. Weather and cloud conditions were bad and a radar contact was obtained on a ship some 20 nautical miles from the estimated position of the enemy that had been given to the leader shortly before takeoff. At 1550 hours they broke through the clouds and fired 11 torpedoes. Unfortunately the supposed enemy was HMS Sheffield which managed to avoid all torpedoes. The Bismarck at that time was some 15 nautical miles to the southward. The striking force then returned an all aircraft had landed on by 1720/26.

At 1740/26, HMS Sheffield, sighted the Bismarck in position 48°30'N, 17°20'W and took station about 10 nautical miles astern and commenced shadowing the enemy.

Ark Royal's second attack, 2047/26.

The first striking force on its way back sighted the 4th Destroyer Flotilla 20 nautical miles west of Force H. As soon as the aircraft from the first strike had landed they were refuelled and rearmed as fast as possible. Take off started at 1910/26, a total of 15 Swordfish were launched. Reports coming in from HMS Sheffield placed the Bismarck at 167°, 38 nautical miles from the Ark Royal. The striking force was ordered to contact HMS Sheffield who was told to use DF to guide them in.

At 1955/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted but soon lost in the bad weather conditions. She was found again at 2035 hours, she guided the Swordfish in and directed them by visual signal on the enemy bearing 110°, 12 nautical miles. The force took departure for the target in subflights in line astern at 2040/26.

At 2047/26 no.1 subflight of three Swordfish dived through the clouds and sighted the Bismarck 4 nautical miles off to the south-east. One Swordfish of no.3 subflight was with them. Approaching again just inside the cloud they made their final dive at 2053/26 on the port beam under a very intense and accurate fire from the enemy. They dropped four torpedoes of which one was seen to hit. No.2 subflight, made up of two Swordfish, lost touch with no.1 subflight in the clouds, climed to 9000 feet, then dived on a bearing obtained by radar and then attacked from the starboard beam, again under heavy and intense fire. They dropped two torpedoes for one possible hit. The third plane of this subflight had lost touch with the other two and had returned to HMS Sheffield to obtained another range and bearing to the enemy. It then flew ahead of the enemy and carried out a determined attack from his port bow under heavy fire and obtained a torpedo hit on the port side amidships.

Subflight no.4 followed subflight no.3 into the clouds but got iced up at 6600 feet. It then dived through the clouds and was joined by no.2 aircraft from subflight no.3. The Bismarck was then sighted engaging subflight no.2 to starboard. The four aircraft then went into the clouds and cicled the German battleships stern and then dived out of the clouds again and attack simultaneously from the port side firing four torpedoes. All however missed the Bismarck. They came under a very heavy and fierce fire from the enemy and one of the aircraft was heavily damaged, the pilot and air gunner being wounded.

The two aircraft of subflight no.5 lost contact with the other subflights and then with each other in the cloud. They climbed to 7000 feet where ice began to form. When coming out of the cloud at 1000 feet aircraft 4K sighted the Bismarck down wind, she then went back into the cloud under fire from the enemy. She saw a torpedo hit on the enemy's starboard side, reached a position on the starboard bow, withdrew to 5 miles, then came in just above the sea and just outside 1000 yards fired a torpedo which did not hit. The second plane of this flight lost his leader diving through the cloud, found himself on the starboard quarter and after two attempts to attack under heavy fire was forced to jettison his torpedo.

Of the two Swordfish of subflight no.6 one attacked the Bismarck on the starboard beam and dropped his torpedo at 2000 yards without success. The second plane lost the enemy, returned to the Sheffield for a new range and bearing and after searching at sea level attacked on the starboard beam but was driven off by intense fire. The attack was over by 2125/26. Thirteen torpedoes had been fired and it was thought two hits and one probable hit had been obtained. Two torpedoes were jettisoned. The severe nature and full effect of the damage done was at first not fully realised. Actually the Bismarck had received a deadly blow. The last of the shadowing aircraft to return had seen her make two complete circles. One torpedo had struck her on the port side amidships doing little damage but th other torpedo that hit was on the starboard quarter damaging her propellors, wrecking her steering gear and jambing her rudders, it was this torpedo hit that sealed her fate.

HMS Sheffield was still shadowing astern when at 2140/26 the Bismarck turned to port and fired six accurate salvoes of 15". None actually hit Sheffield but a near miss killed three men and seriously injured two. HMS Sheffield turned away and while doing so she sighted HMS Cossack and the other destroyers from the 4th DF approaching from the westward. She then gave them the approximate position of the Bismarck. At 2155/26, HMS Sheffield lost touch with the Bismarck. The destroyers continued to shadow and eventually attack. Meanwhile HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal shaped course for the southward to keep the road clear for the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and for HMS Rodney. Also in the Ark Royal aircraft were being got ready for an attack on the Bismarck at dawn.

Bismarck, 26 May 1941.

The Bismarck could no longer steer after the torpedo hit aft. The steering motor room was flooded up to the main deck and the rudders were jambed. Divers went down to the steering room and managed to centre one rudder but the other remained immovable. She was by this time urgently in need of fuel. It was hoped by the Germans that while she was nearing the French coast strong forces of aircraft and submarines would come to her assistance.

At 2242/26, Bismarck sighted the British destroyers. A heavy fire was opened on them. Their appearence greatly complicated the situation. Before their arrival however, Admiral Lütjens seems to have made up his mind as one hour earlier he had signalled to Berlin 'ship out of control. We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.'

The fourth Destroyer Flotilla makes contact, 26 May 1941.

Just as the sun was setting, Captain Vian (D.4) in HMS Cossack with HMS Maori, HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and the Polish destroyer ORP Piorun arrived on the scene.

Shortly after 1900/26 HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal were sighted to the northward. Ark Royal was just about to fly off the second striking force. The destroyers continued on the the south-east. At 2152/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted and from her Captain Vian obtained the approximate position of the enemy.

The destroyers were spread 2.5 nautical miles apart on a line bearing 250° - 070° in the order from north-east to south-west, Piorun, Maori, Cossack, Sikh, Zulu. During the latter stages of the approach speed was reduced and the flotilla manoeuvred so as to avoid making a high speed end-on contact.

At 2238/26, ORP Piorun on the port wing reported the Bismarck 9 nautical miles distant, bearing 145° and steering to the south-eastward.

Destroyers shadowing, late on 26 May 1941.

At the time the Piorun reported being in contact with the Bismarck the destroyers were steering 120°. All were at once ordered to take up shadowing positions. Four minutes later the Bismarck opened a heavy fire with her main and secondary armaments on the Piorun and Maori. Two attempts were made by these ships to work round to the northward of the enemy but they were silhouetted against the north-western horizon making them easy to spot. The Bismarck's fire was unpleasantly accurate, through neither destroyer was actually hit. The Commanding Officer of the Maori then decided to work round to the southward and altered course accordingly.

The Piorun closed the range and herself opened fire from 13500 yards but after firing three salvoes, she was straddled by a salvo which fell about 20 yards from the ships side. She then ceased fire and turned away to port while making smoke. During this engagement she lost touch with the other destroyers and later also with the Bismarck. She remained under fire for about one hour but was not hit. She worked round to the north-east of the Bismarck but eventually lost touch with her prey at 2355/26.

The other destroyers, meanwhile, had been working round to the southward of the enemy to take up shadowing positions to the eastward of him. Soon after the initial contact it was evident the the Bismarck's speed had been so seriously reduced that interception by the battlefleet was certain, provided that contact could be held. In these circumstances Captain Vian defined his object at firstly, to deliver the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief at the time he desired, and secondly, to sink or immoblise her with torpedoes during the night but not with to great a risk for the destroyers. Accordingly at 2248/26 as signal was made to all ordering them to shadow and this operation was carried out through the night, though torpedo attacks were carried out later under the cover of darkness.

As darkness came on, the weather deteriorated and heavy rain squalls became frequent. Visibility varied between 2.5 nautical miles and half a mile but the Bismarck, presumably using radar, frequently opened up accurate fire outside these ranges.

About half an hour after sunset, the destroyers were ordered at 2324/26 to take up stations prepartory to carrying out a synchronised torpedo attack. This was subsequently cancelled on account of the adverse weather conditions and they were ordered to attack independently as opportunity offered. At about 2300 hours the Bismarck altered course to the north-westward.

At this time HMS Zulu was in touch with her and kept her under observation from the southward. At 2342 hours the Bismarck opened fire on HMS Cossack, then about 4 miles to the south-south-west and shot away her aerials. The Cossack turned away under the cover of smoke, shortly afterwards resuming her course to the eastward.

A few minutes later, at 2350 hours, HMS Zulu came under heavy fire from the Bismarck's 15" guns. The first three salvoes straddled wounding an officer and two ratings. Drastic avoiding action was taken as a result of which Zulu lost touch. HMS Sikh, however, who had lost sight of the enemy half an hour previously, had observed her firing at HMS Cossack and now succeeded in shadowing from astern until 0020/27 when the enemy made a large alteration to port and commenced firing at her. HMS Sikh altered course to port, intending to fire torpedoes, but the view of the Torpedo Control Officer was obscured by shell splashes and Sikh then withdrew to the southward.

Destroyer night torpedo attacks, 26/27 May 1941.

HMS Zulu, after her escape at 2345/26, had steered to the northward and at 0030/27 fell in with HMS Cossack. Shortly afterwards she sighted ORP Piorun. On receipt of a signal from Captain Vian, timed 0040/27, to take any opporunity to fire torpedoes, HMS Zulu altered course to the westward,and at 0100/27 sighted the Bismarck steering 340°.

Positions of the destroyers was now as follows; to the north-eastward of the enemy, HMS Cossack was working round to the north and west. HMS Maori, since losing touch, had been making to the westward. She was now to the south-west of the Bismarck. HMS Sikh was some distance to the southward, not having received any information regarding the position of the Bismarck since 0025/27. HMS Zulu was astern of the enemy and in contact. Range was only 5000 yards. Bismarck finally spotted Zulu and at once opened fire with her main and secondary armament and straddled Zulu. She fired four torpedoes at 0121/27 but no hits were observed and they are believed to have missed ahead. Zulu then ran out to the northward in order to be clear of the other destroyers. Shortly afterwards they widnessed a successful attack by HMS Maori.

HMS Maori had seen the Bismarck opening fire on the Zulu at 0107/27. Maori then closed to 4000 yards on Bismarck's port quarter apparently undetected. When abeam of the enemy, who then appeared to be altering course to starboard Maori fired a star shell to see what he was about. Two minutes later, at 0137/27, two torpedoes were fired and course was altered towards the Bismarck with the intention of attacking again from her starboard bow once the enemy had steadied on her new course. Whilst Maori was turning a torpedo hit was observed on the enemy. A bright glow illuminated the waterline of the enemy battleship from stem to stern. Shortly afterwards there appeared between the bridge and the stem a glare that might have been a second hit. The enemy immediately opened up a very heavy fire with both main and secondairy armaments and quick firing guns. As the Maori was being straddled, she turned away, and increased to full speed. Shots continued to fall on both sides of the ship until the range had been opened up to 10000 yards. Maori was not actually hit. Meanwhile HMS Cossack had been creeping up from the north-eastward and at 0140/27, only three minutes after Maori had fired two torpedoes, Cossack launched three torpedoes from 6000 yards. Bismarck stood out plainly, silhoutted by the broadsides she was firing at the Maori. One torpedo was seen to hit. Flames blazed on the forecastle of the Bismarck after this hit but they were quickly extinguished. Probably as a consequence of the torpedo hits the Bismarck stopped dead in the water, this was reported by HMS Zulu at 0148/27. After about one hour the Bismarck got underway again. On receipt of this report, HMS Sikh, who was closing the scene of the action from the southward, made an attack. Four torpedoes were fired at 0218/27 at the stopped battleship. It is believed that one hit was obtained. After this attack Sikh remained in radar contact with the enemy until 0359/27 when contact was lost.

Around 0240/27 the Bismarck was underway again, proceeding very slowly to the north-westward. At 0335/27, HMS Cossack made another attack firing her last remaining torpedo from a range of 4000 yards. It missed. HMS Cossack then came under a heavy fire. She withdrew to the northward under the cover of smoke, altering to a westerly course shortly afterwards.

At 0400/27 all destroyers had lost touch with the enemy. HMS Cossack was then to the north-west and HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and HMS Maori were between the south-west and south-east of the Bismarck. All destroyers now endeavoured to regain contact.

Touch with the enemy was not regained until shortly before 0600 hours. By that time ORP Piorun, which was running short of fuel, had been ordered to proceed to Plymouth.

Destroyers shadowing, morning twilight, 27 May 1941, final attack.

Touch was regained by HMS Maori at 0550/27 when she sighted the Bismarck zigzagging slowly on a base course of 340° at about 7 knots. Maori commenced shadowing until daylight. At 0625 hours, HMS Sikh was also in contact when the Bismarck emerged from a rain squal 7000 yards on her starboard bow. By then it was nearly full daylight but to the surprise of the crew of the Sikh she got away with it without being fired at.

Shortly before sunrise a final torpedo attack was carried out by HMS Maori, which fired two torpedoes at 0656/27 from 9000 yards. Both missed. The Bismarck opened fire and straddled Maori which escaped at 28 knots.

At daylight the destroyers were stationed in four sectors from which they were able to keep the enemy under continuous observation until the arrival of the Battle Fleet at 0845 hours.

Force H, 26/27 May 1941.

While the destroyers were shadowing the Bismarck, the pursuing forces were drawing steadily closer. To the north was the Commander-in-Chief with the King George V and the Rodney with the Norfolk closing on them. In the south HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. B.C.S. Martin, RN) was coming up, while Force H was waiting for the dawn. When Captain Vian's destroyers got in touch at 2251/26 the Renown and Ark Royal were north-west of the enemy. It was not possible to attack with aircraft during the night but all preparations were made to attack at dawn with 12 Swordfish. Course was shaped to the northward and then to the west for a time and at 0115/27 Force H turned south. Shortly afterwards instructions were received from the Commander-in-Chief to keep not less then 20 miles to the southward of the Bismarck so as to leave a clear approach for the Battle Fleet. Force H accordingly continued to the southward during the night. Bursts of starshell and gunfire could be seen during the night while the destroyers attacked. At 0509/27 an aircraft was flown off from HMS Ark Royal to act as a spotter for HMS King George V but it failed to find the Bismarck in the bad weather. The striking of force of 12 Swordfish was ready but due to the bad weather to strike was cancelled.

At 0810/27, HMS Maori was sighted. She reported the Bismarck 11 miles to the north of her. The made the enemy 17 miles to the north of HMS Renown so course was shaped to the south-west. At 0915/27 heavy gunfire could be heard and the striking force was flown off. They found the Bismarck at 1016/27. By then the battle was almost over, her guns were silenced and she was on fire. They saw her sink. At 1115/27 they had all landed back on HMS Ark Royal. A German Heinkel aircraft dropped a couple of bombs near HMS Ark Royal when they were landing on.

HMS Norfolk, 26/27 May 1941.

When the Catalina report (1030/26) came in, HMS Norfolk altered course to the south-west and increased speed to 27 knots. At 2130/26 the Bismarck was still some 160 nautical miles to the southward and speed was increased to 30 knots. At 2228/26 the report on the torpedo hit by the aircraft from Ark Royal came in and the Norfolk turned to the southward, continuing to close the enemy. At 0753/27 Norfolk sighted the Bismarck. She did not open fire and was lost to sight after ten minutes. At 0821/27, HMS King George V, was sighted to the westward, 12 nautical miles away. The position of the enemy was passed to the Commander-in-Chief. The action opened at 0847/27 at which time HMS Norfolk was then some 10 nautical miles from the Commander-in-Chief and due north of the Bismarck. HMS Norfolk had seen the beginning and was now to see the end.

HMS Dorsetshire, 26/27 May 1941.

On 26 May 1941, HMS Dorsetshire, was with convoy SL 74 proceeding from Freetown to the U.K. When she received the sighting report from the Catalina at 1056/26 she was some 360 nautical miles to the south of the Bismarck. She then left the protection of the convoy to the Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) and set course for the northward to take up the possible task of shadowing. By 2343/26 it became clear from reports that the Bismarck was making no ground to the eastward and that at 0230/27 she appeared to be laying stopped. Due to the heavy seas HMS Dorsetshire was forced to reduce speed to 25 knots and later even to 20 knots. At 0833/27 a destroyer was sighted ahead at a range of 8 nautical miles, it was HMS Cossack which reported the enemy at a range of 6 nautical miles. At 0850/27 the flashes of the Bismarck's guns could be seen to the westward. HMS Dorsetshire arrived at the scene of the action in the nick of time.

HMS King George V and HMS Rodney, 26/27 May 1941.

During 26 May 1941 the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V had been making hard to the south-east at 25 knots. He had been joined by HMS Rodney at 1806/26. They were then some 90 nautical miles north of the Bismarck. Fuel was a matter of grave anxiety. At noon on the 26th, HMS King George V, had only 32% remaining and HMS Rodney reported that she had to return at 0800/27. Speed had to be reduced on this account to 22 knots at 1705/26. In these circumstances it was no longer possible to hope to intercept the enemy, and the Commander-in-Chief decided that unless the enemy's speed had been reduced by 2400/26, he must turn at that hour. The only hope lay in the Bismarck being slowed up by the Swordfish attacking from HMS Ark Royal. A report came in that the striking force had left. Then at 2132/26, HMS Sheffield, reported that the enemy was steering 340° followed by 000° four minutes later. These reports indicated that the Bismarck was not able to hold her course and that her steering gear must have been damaged. It might still be possible to intercept her.

The Commander-in-Chief turned to the south at once hoping to make contact from the eastward in the failing light. Due to the bad weather conditions and visibility the Commander-in-Chief decided to haul off the the eastward and northward and then work round to engage from the westward at dawn. He turned eastward at 2306/26. During the night reports from Captain Vian's destroyers came in confirming the northerly course of the Bismarck. At 0236/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered Captain Vian that the destroyers were to fire star-shell every half hour, but frequent rain squalls prevented these from being seen and they tended to attrack the enemy's fire. The Bismarck was still a formidable opponent for at 0353/27 Captain Vian reported that during the last hour she had done 8 nautical miles and that she was still capable of heavy and accurate fire. The Commander-in-Chief decided not to make a dawn approach but to wait until daylight while approaching from the west taking advantage of wind, sea and light. At 0529/27 HMS Rodney reported sighting HMS Norfolk to the eastward by DF. It was light at 0600 hours. At 0820 hours HMS Norfolk was sighted on the port bow of HMS King George V. She signalled 'enemy 130°, 16 nautical miles'. At 0843/27 looming on the starboard bow there emerges out of a rain squall the dark grey blot of a large ship. 'Enemy in sight'.

Bismarck 26/27 May 1941.

The Bismarck after altering course to the north-west had been labouring along with a jambed rudder, steering an erratic course at 8 knots. During the night the attacking destroyers were met with heavy and accurate salvoes. Sixteen torpedoes were fired at her. Early in the morning a glare of star-shell burst over her, lighting her up. Three torpedoes followed from a destroyer on the port bow (HMS Maori) of which one hit on the port side amidships. Three minutes later three more came from the starboard side (these were fired by HMS Cossack) of which one hit on the starboard bow. The damage that was sustained from these torpedo hits is not known. The Bismarck lay stopped for over one hour. At 0140/27 a message was received that a large number of Junkers bombers were coming to her aid as were U-boats but the Bismarck was beyond their help besides that the aircraft did not find her. One U-boat (U-556, which was out of torpedoes) on its way back from the Atlantic joined her and was within sight during the night. Another (U-74) arrived at 0600/27 but had been damaged in a depth charge attack and could do nothing as well. In the Bismarck the crew was exhausted and men were falling asleep at their posts. It was under these conditions that at 0840/27 two British battleships were seen to approach from the westward.

Situation before the action, 27 May 1941.

A north-westerly gale was blowing when dawn broke with a good light and clear horizon to the north-eastward. Reports received during the night indicated that, despite reduced speed and damaged rudders, Bismarck's armament was functioning effectively. Given the weather conditions the Commander-in-Chief decided to approach on a west-north-westerly bearing and, if the enemy continued his northerly course, to deploy to the southward on opposite course at a range of about 15000 yards. Further action was to be dictated by events.

Between 0600 and 0700 hours a series of enemy reports from HMS Maori which was herself located by DF bearings. This enabled HMS King George V to plot her position relatively to the Bismarck which had apparently settled down on a course of 330° at 10 knots. At 0708/27, HMS Rodney, was ordered to keep station 010° from the flagship. HMS Norfolk came in sight to the eastward at 0820/27 and provided a visual link between the Commander-in-Chief and the enemy. After the line of approach had been adjusted by two alterations of course, the Bismarck was sighted at 0843/27 bearing 118°, range about 25000 yards. Both British battleships was then steering 110° almost directly towards the enemy in line abreast formation, 8 cables apart.

Commencement of action 0847/27.

HMS Rodney opened fire at 0847/27, her first salvo sending a column of water 150 feet into the air. HMS King George V opened fire one minute later. Bismarck opened fire at 0850 hours after turning to open up A arcs. The first German salvo was short. The third and fourth salvoes straddled and nearly hit, but the Rodney manoeuvered succesfully to avoid them and the nearest fell 20 yards short. At 0854/27, HMS Norfolk joined in, but the target was not clearly visible and she opened fire without obtaining a range.

Observers state that the German gunnery was accurate at first, but commenced to deteriorate after 8 to 10 salvoes. The first hit on the Bismarck was believed to be scored by the Rodney at 0854 hours with her third salvo. Both British battleships made small alterations of course away from the enemy shortly after opening fire, the King George V to increase her distance from the Rodney and the latter to open her A arcs. From then onwards they manoeuvered independently although HMS Rodney conformed to the Flagship's general movements. The Bismarck's secondary armament came into action during this phase. HMS Rodney opened fire with her secondary armament at 0858 hours.

Run to the southward.

HMS King George V deployed to the southward at 0859/27 when the Bismarck was 16000 yards distant. HMS Rodney, 2.5 nautical miles to the northward, followed suit a minute or two later. Cordite smoke was hanging badly with the following wind and spotting was most difficult. Considerable smoke interference was therefore experienced on the southerly course which was partly overcome by radar. The Bismarck had transferred her fire to the King George V shortly after the turn but except for an occasional splash the latter hardly knew that she was under fire. At 0902/27, HMS Rodney saw a 16” shell hit the Bismarck on the upper deck forward, apparently putting the forward turrets out of action. At 0904 hours, HMS Dorsetshire joined in the firing from the eastwards from a range of 20000 yards but observation of the target was difficult and she had to check fire from 0913 to 0920 hours. Between 0910 and 0915 hours the range in King George V was more or less steady at 12000 yards.

The fate of the Bismarck was decided during this phase of the action although she did not sink until later. Around 0912 hours, the Bismarck was hit on her forward control position. During the run to the south HMS Rodney fired six torpedoes from 11000 yards and HMS Norfolk four from 16000 yards. No hits were obtained. The King George V’s secondary battery came into action at 0905 hours but this increased the smoke interference and was accordingly ordered to cease fire after two or three minutes.

Run to the northward.

At 0916/27 the Bismarck’s bearing was drawing rapidly aft and HMS Rodney turned 16 points to close and head her off. The King George V followed a minute or so later and both ships re-opened fire at ranges from 8600 and 12000 yards respectively. The Bismarck shifted her target to the Rodney about this time. A near miss damaged the sluice of her starboard torpedo tube. Most of the enemy’s guns had however been silenced at this time. Only one turret from her main armament was firing at this time as was part of her secondary armament. A fire was blazing amidships and she had a heavy list to port. During the run to the north HMS Rodney obtained a very favourable position on the Bismarck’s bow from which she poured in a heavy fire from close range. She also fired two torpedoes from 7500 yards but no hits were obtained.

HMS King George V’s position, further to leeward, was less favourable. Her view was obscured by smoke and splashes surrounding the target and her radar had temporarily broken down. Mechanical failures in the 14” turrets constituted, however, a more serious handicap at this stage. ‘A’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets were out of action for 30, 7 and a unspecified short period, respectively. This resulted in reduction of firepower of 80% for 7 minutes and 40% for 23 minutes which might have had serious effects under less favourable conditions. There were also several defects of individual guns in addition to those effecting the turrets.

At 0925/27, HMS King George V, altered outwards to 150° and reduced speed to avoid getting too far ahead of the Bismarck. She closed in again at 1005 hours, fired several salvoes from a range of only 3000 yards and then resumed her northerly course. Meanwhile HMS Rodney was zigzagging across the Bismarck’s line of advance at a range of about 4000 yards firing her main and secondary armaments. She also fired four torpedoes, one of which is thought to have hit. By 1015 hours the Bismarck was no more than a wreck. All her guns were silenced, her mast had been blown away, she was a black ruin, pouring high into the air a great cloud of smoke and flame. Men were seen jumping overboard at this time and the Captain of the King George V later remarked had he known it he would have ceased fire.

End of the action.

The Commander-in-Chief was confident that the enemy could never get back to harbour, and as both battleships were running short of fuel and as further gunfire was unlikely to hasten the Bismarck’s end, the Commander-in-Chief signalled the King George V and Rodney to steer 027° at 1015/27 in order to break off the action and return to base. At 1036/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered HMS Dorsetshire to use her torpedoes, if she had any, on the enemy. In the meantime HMS Norfolk had been closing the target but due to the movements of the King George V and Rodney, had not fired her torpedoes until 1010 hours when she fired four torpedoes from 4000 yards and two possible hits were reported. The Dorsetshire was then approaching a mile or so to the southward, and anticipating the Commander-in-Chief’s signal at 1025 hours fired two torpedoes from 3600 yards into the enemy’s starboard side. She then steamed round the Bismarck’s bow and at 1036 hours fired another torpedo but now into her port side from 2600 yards. This was the final blow, the Bismarck heeled over quickly to port and commenced to sink by the stern. The hull turned over keel up and disappeared beneath the waves at 1040/27.

The Dorsetshire then closed and signalled to one of HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft to carry out a close A/S patrol while she was to pick up survivors assisted by HMS Maori. After 110 men had been picked up by both ships from the water both ships got underway again as a submarine was suspected to be in the area.

Damage to the Bismarck.

Survivors have told the story of terrible damage inflicted on her. The fore turrets seem to have been knocked out at 0902 hours. The fore control position was knocked out around 0912 hours. The after control position followed about 0915 hours. The after turrets were at that moment still in action. Then the aftermost gun turret was disabled by a direct hit on the left gun which burst sending a flash right through the turret. ‘C’ turret was the last one in action.

One survivor stated that around 0930 hours a shell penetrated the turbine room and another one entered a boiler room. A hit in the after dressing station killed all the medical staff and wounded that were in there at that moment. The upper deck was crowded with killed and wounded men and the seas surging in washed them overboard. Conditions below were even more terrible. Hatches and doors were jammed by concussion and blocked with wreckage. The air was thick with smoke and even more smoke was coming in from great holes in the upper deck. By 1000 hours all heavy guns were out of action and 10 minutes later the all secondary guns were also silent.

Commander-in-Chief returns.

As HMS King George V and HMS Rodney turned northwards they were joined by HMS Cossack, HMS Sikh and HMS Zulu at by 1600/28 more detroyers had joined the screen (HMS Maori, HMS Jupiter, HMS Somali, HMS Eskimo, HMS Punjabi, HMAS Nestor, HMS Inglefield, HMS Lance, HMS Vanquisher (Cdr. N.V. Dickinson, DSC, RN), HMCS St. Clair (Lt.Cdr. D.C. Wallace, RCNR), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr. (Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN) and HMS Ripley (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Agnew, RN). Heavy air attacks were expected that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared, one of which bombed the screen while another one jettisoned her bombs on being attacked by a Blenheim fighter. The destroyers HMS Mashona and HMS Tartar, 100 nautical miles to the southward, were not so furtunate. They were attacked in position 52°58’N, 11°36’W at 0955/28 by German aircraft. HMS Mashona was hit and sank at noon with the loss of 1 officer and 45 men. The Commander-in-Chief reached Loch Ewe at 1230/29. Vice-Admiral Somerville with Force H was on his way back to Gibraltar. HMS Renown, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Sheffield made rendezvous at 0800/29 with the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, DSC and Bar, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Wishart (Cdr. E.T. Cooper, RN). At 1605/29, HMS Forester and HMS Fury were detached to hunt a submarine further to the west. Force H, minus the two destroyers that had been detached, arrived at Gibraltar around 2030/29.

End of ‘Operation Rheinübung’.

The Bismarck’s consort, heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, was not heard off until 4 June 1941 when aircraft reported her having arrived at Brest. After leaving the Bismarck at 1914/24, the Prinz Eugen’s primary need was to replenish her fuel stock. She set course for a rendez-vous with two tankers, the Spichern (9323 GRT, built 1935, former Norwegian Krossfonn) and the Esso Hamburg (9849 GRT, built 1939) which were position to the north-west of the Azores. All next day the German cruiser made her way southwards, and at 0906/26 , some 600 nautical miles west-north-west of the Azores she sighted the Spichern and refuelled. Two reconnaissance ships had also been ordered into this area, the Gonzenheim and the Kota Pinang. On the 28th Prinz Eugen fuelled from the Esso Hamburg. She then proceeded southwards to carry out cruiser warfare against independently routed ships in the area to the north and west of the Cape Verde Islands but an inspection of her engines the next day showed that an extensive overhaul was needed. Her Commanding Officer then decided to break off the action and course was set for Brest, France where she arrived at 2030/1 June.

A German reconnaissance ship, a supply vessel and two tankers were intercepted by Royal Navy warships and sunk by their own crew or sunk with gunfire. Also two tankers were captured. These were in chronological order; tanker Belchen (6367 GRT, built 1932, former Norwegian Sysla) by gunfire from HMS Kenya and HMS Aurora on 3 June 1941 in the Greenland area in approximate position 59°00'N, 47°00'W.
On 4 June the tanker Esso Hamburg by HMS London and HMS Brilliant (Lt.Cdr. F.C. Brodrick, RN) in position 07°35'N, 31°25'W,
tanker Gedania (8966 GRT, built 1920) was captured in the North Atlantic in position 43°38'N, 28°15'W by naval auxiliary (Ocean Boarding Vessel) HMS Marsdale (Lt.Cdr. D.H.F. Armstrong, RNR), she was put into service with the MOWT as Empire Garden, reconnaissance vessel Gonzenheim (4000 GRT, built 1937, former Norwegian Kongsfjord) was scuttled by her own crew after being sighted by HMS Esperance Bay ((Capt.(ret) G.S. Holden, RN) and intercepted by HMS Nelson (Capt. G.J.A. Miles, RN) and finally ordered to be boarded by HMS Neptune in position 43°29'N, 24°04'W. The next day (5 June) supply vessel Egerland (10040 GRT, built 1940) was intercepted by HMS London and HMS Brilliant in approximate position 07°00'N, 31°00'W. On 12 June, HMS Sheffield, intercepted tanker Friedrich Breme (10397 GRT, built 1936) in position 49°48'N, 22°20'W and finally on 15 June, HMS Dunedin (Capt. R.S. Lovatt, RN), captured the tanker Lothringen (10746 GRT, built 1940, former Dutch Papendrecht) in position 19°49'N, 38°30'W which had first been sighted by an aircraft from HMS Eagle (Capt. E.G.N. Rushbrooke, DSC, RN). The Lothringen was sent to Bermuda and was put into service by the MOWT as Empire Salvage. (21)

21 May 1941
At 1045A/21, off the French west coast about halfway between the Gironde estuary and the Spanish border HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted a merchant vessel in ballast thought to be of about 3000 tons. She was escorted by three M-class minesweepers. She was not attacked. As the weather conditions were favourable HMS Tigris intended to try to pick up French agents who had been sent to sabotage the electric transformer station at Pessac (SOE operation Josehine B.) the following night, the ships were not attacked.

At 1145A/21, a heavy explosion was heard.

The ships sighted must have been the German merchant vessel Dresden (5567 GRT, built 19397) which was on passage from Saint-Jean-de-Luz to Royan. She was escorted by the minesweepers M 32, M 24 and M 18. Two depth charges had been dropped for intimidation purposes at 1143 hours which may have been the heavy explosion heard by HMS Tigris.

The Dresden came from Brasil and in the Atlantic had met the German raiders Atlantis and Kormoran. On board were crewmembers and passengers from ships that had been sunk by the Atlantis.

At 1215A/21, a corvette type vessel and seven ML type vessels were seen in line abreast stearing 190°. HMS Tigris took avoiding action.

At 1330A/21, the ships sighted at 1215A/21, turned to port presumably for a return sweep further inshore.

At 1408A/21, three trawlers were seen in line abreast on course 010°. HMS Tigris took avoiding action.

At 1455A/21, the trawlers were seen to turn 180° for a return sweep.

It was considered too much a coincidence for this concentration of A/S vessels near the rendezvous position with the agents and it was decided to abandon the operation to extract them. (22)

25 May 1941
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) was ordered to 47°17' N, 08°10' W to form a patrol line to intercept the German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen believed to be heading for Brest. Nothing was seen as Bismarck was sunk 400 miles west of Brest. (5)

27 May 1941
When it was learnt that the Bismarck was sunk, the patrol line was altered and HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) was ordered to in 46°25' N, 05°48' W to intercept Prinz Eugen but the latter managed to slip by and arrived at Brest on 1 June. (5)

31 May 1941
Around 0530A/31, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). (5)

1 Jun 1941
Around 1045A/1, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 8th war patrol at Holy Loch.

18 Jun 1941
Around 1130A/18, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch, escorted during her passage through the Irish Sea by the Free French minesweeper FFS La Moqueuse, for her 9th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

They parted company around 2330A/19, near the Scilly Isles.

[As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed.] (5)

5 Jul 1941
The Italian submarine Michele Bianchi is most likely torpedoed and sunk in the Bay of Biscay about 150 nautical miles West-South-West of the Gironde estuary in approximate position 45°03'N, 04°01'W by the British submarine HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN).

0941A/5 - The officer of the watch, Lt. N.J. Coe, RNR, sighted what he thought was a surface vessel escorted by two trawlers. Cdr. Bone was called to the control room. Three minutes later the target was identified as an Italian submarine. The masts thought to be of two trawlers were actually the two radio antennas of the submarine. Tigris turned to close the target at high speed.

0958A/5 - Six torpedoes were fired from 3000 yards. After nearly three minutes two hits were heard.

1014A/5 - Cdr. Bone wanted to surface to investigate the area for survivors but a Ju-88 aircraft was seen to approach. Cdr. Bone took Tigris deep.

No hits were observed (only heard). It is quite possible that Bianchi was indeed hit and sunk but there is no definite proof.

9 Jul 1941
At 0343A/9, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr. G.W. Dobson, RNR). (5)

10 Jul 1941
Around 0750A/10, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 9th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

26 Jul 1941
Around 1605A/26, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch for Polyarnoe, Russia. She was escorted out by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN).

[As no log is available no map can be displayed.] (23)

4 Aug 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) arrived at Polyarnoe. (24)

11 Aug 1941
Around 0900C/11, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Polyarnoe for her 10th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Northern Norway.

[As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed.] (5)

13 Aug 1941
At 0953C/13, in the Svaerholthavet area, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted what were thought to be a destroyer of the 1936 type (Karl Galster type as discribed in the patrol report) and a 1923 type torpedo boat ((Mowe type as discribed in the patrol report) proceeding westwards at high speed.

This must have been the German destroyers Z 20 / Karl Galster and Z 7/ Hermann Shoemann which were on passage from Kirkeness to Honningsvag.

At 1032C/13, two A/S trawlers were sighted patrolling in the area.

These were most probably the A/S trawler UJ 1707 and A/S whaler V 6103 / Nordlicht which were on A/S patrol in this area.

At 1400C/14, two destroyers / torpedo boats, presumably the same as had been seen before were proceeding eastwards with a merchant vessel in company.

This must have been the Z 20 / Karl Galster and Z 7/ Hermann Shoemann again which were now escorting the transport August Bolten (3665 GRT, built 1937) on their way to Kirkenes. It is possible the A/S whaler V 6101 / Nordkap was also present though she fell behind with engine trouble for a while before she was able to rejoin the convoy. (25)

15 Aug 1941
At 1310C/15, in the Ingoya area, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN), sighted a merchant vessel at a range of 12000 yards. It was proceeding to the south-west. It was thought to be of around 5000 tons. [We have been unable to identify this vessel, possibly it was Norwegian.]

At 1455C/15, a 500 tons merchant vessel hugging the coast near Ingoya was seen. It was proceeding southwards having come from the west. It was not attacked in the hope bigger prey would come and not to give away the submarines position. [We have been unable to identify this vessel, possibly it was Norwegian.]

At 1505C/15, three westbound merchant vessel escorted by two A/S trawlers were seen. Range was about 12000 yards. It was thought the merchant vessels were in ballast. This must have been the German transports August Bolten (3665 GRT, built 1937), Hercules (2883 GRT, built 1929) and Ilona Siemers (3243 GRT, built 1923) escorted by the A/S whalers V 6101 / Nordkap and V 6109 / Nordwind. (26)

17 Aug 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian passenger / cargo ship Haakon Jarl (1492 GRT, built 1904, offsite link) near Svaerholt, Norway in position 71°03'N, 26°43'E.

Three were killed and thirteen survivors were later picked up.

The German A/S trawler UJ 1707 and A/S whaler V 6103 / Nordlicht were sent out from Honningsvag to hunt the enemy submarine.

0735C/17 - In position 71°02'N, 26°46'E sighted a merchant vessel of about 3000 tons. Started attack.

0812C/17 - Fired four torpedoes from 4500 yards. One hit was obtained and the ship was seen to sink after 90 seconds. (26)

18 Aug 1941
At 1240C/18, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO. DSC, RN) sighted what was thought to be a motor launch type vessel approaching from the westward. It them made a circle around the submerged submarine at a range of 500 yards and then returned the way it came.

This may have been a motor minesweeper (R-boat) as both R 159 and R 158 from the 7th R-boat flotilla were conducting an A/S patrol near Honningsvag on this day. (27)

19 Aug 1941
At 0655C/19, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO. DSC, RN) sighted two destroyers and two A/S trawlers proceeding westwards, apparently on an A/S sweep. [These was a lot of enemy shipping in this area around this time but we have been unable to identify an enemy force of this composition westbound at this time. The destroyer Z 20 / Karl Galster, A/S trawlers UJ 1707 and UJ 1708 and the R-boats R 152 and R 158 were escorting a convoy made up of the transports Levante (German, 4769 GRT, built 1939) and Bretagne (Norwegian (under German control, 3285 GRT, built 1937) eastbound around this time.]

At 0930C/19, two A/S trawlers were seen proceeding westwards apparently on an A/S sweep. These were most likely UJ 1707 and UJ 1708 which had parted company with the westbound convoy and were now awaiting an eastbound convoy.

At 1130C/19, two A/S trawlers approached from the south-west on a northerly course. They then turned east and came straight towards leaving HMS Tigris no other choice then to go deep. These were most likely UJ 1707 and UJ 1708 again.

At 1345C/19, HMS Tigris returned to periscope depth and sighted the German minelayer Bremse, a destroyers, an A/S trawler and at least one merchant vessel to the eastwards proceeding eastwards. Heavy rain made observation difficult. The ships seen were part of a convoy on passage to Kirkenes. It was made up of the transports Barmbeck (German, 2446 GRT, built 1929), Donau II (German, 2931 GRT, built 1939), Rotenfels (German, 7851 GRT, built 1927) and Sivas (German, 3831 GRT, built 1928). They were escorted by the above mentioned Bremse, destroyers Z 7/ Hermann Shoemann, Z 20 / Karl Galster, A/S trawlers UJ 1707, UJ 1708, V 6110 / Franke and the A/S whaler V 6107 / Polarkreis. (28)

21 Aug 1941
Around 1600C/21, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO. DSC, RN) left patrol to return to Polyarnoe. (5)

24 Aug 1941
Around 1500C/24, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO. DSC, RN) ended her 10th war patrol at Polyarnoe. She was escorted in by the Russian destroyer Uritsky. (5)

3 Sep 1941
Around 1830C/3, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) departed from Polyarnoe for her 11th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Northern Norway.

[As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed.] (5)

10 Sep 1941
At 1500C/10, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted masts and smoke near Loppa. By 1615C/10, the ship had come in sight and appeared to be making for the, very narrow, channel to the south of Silda.

At 1715C/10, a ship was seen as it cleared the land well up Soroy Sund. Plot showed the ship must at least have done 14 knots. During this time aircraft had been patrolling north of Silda all the time.

At 1830C/10, four trawlers were seen proceeding down Soroy Sund coming from the North.

[We have been unable to identify the vessels sighted.] (5)

11 Sep 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) patrolled in the area north of Brynnilen / west of Loppa.

At 0535C/11, the masts of a north / east bound ship were sighted to the north. Attendant smoke indicated that escorts might be present.

A convoy made up of the transports Bessheim (Norwegian (in German control), 1774 GRT, built 1912) and Voringen (Norwegian (in German control), 402 GRT, built 1891) was en-route from Tromso, where they had departed around 2330B/10, to Alta, where they arrived around 1100B/11. They were escorted by the A/S whaler Polarfront and the motor minesweeper R 162. This may have been the convoy sighted.

At 1015C/11, two minesweepers were seen proceeding southwards. These must have been the M 29 and M 17 returning to Tromso from Alta which they had departed around 0500B/11. They arrived at Tromso around 1400B/11.

(29)

13 Sep 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian passenger ship Richard With (905 BRT, built 1909) off the Rolvsoy Fjord about 11 nautical miles north-east of Hammerfest, Norway in position 70°50'N, 23°57'E.

From the crew of 26 and 71 passengers there only 13 survivors.

1115C/13 - Sighted a Southbound ship of about 2000 tons near Breisund. Started attack.

1203C/13 - Fired two torpedoes from 1500 yards. One hit was obtained and the ship sank immediately. Survivors were seen on four rafts and these were seen to be picked up by a fishing vessel that was in the area. Tigris then retired to the seaward. (5)

14 Sep 1941
At 1130C/14, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted a ship of about 8000 tons coming from the direction of Rolvsoy. It was escorted by three A/S trawlers. An attack was started.

At 1200C/14, the attack was broken off when it was seen that the target was a properly marked hospital ship.

This must have been the German hospital ship Birka (1000 GRT, built 1937) escorted by the A/S trawlers UJ 1701 and UJ 1403. Perhaps another A/S vessel was also present. (30)

17 Sep 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) fires four torpedoes at the transport Bessheim (Norwegian (in German control), 1774 GRT, built 1912) off the Kvænangen Fjord in position 70°21'N, 21°10'E. All torpedoes missed their target.

The above mentioned Bessheim was in convoy with the transport Kong Ring (Norwegian (in German service), 2034 GRT, built 1929). Escorts were the motor minesweepers (R-boats) R 152 and R 154. They had departed Tromso around 0600B/17. Bessheim to proceed to Hammerfest (arrived around 2010B/17) escorted by R 154 while Kong Ring was to proceed to Alta (arrived around 1800B/17) escorted by R 152.

1200C/17 - Sighted a HE-115 aircraft patrolling. This most likely indicated the arrival of a convoy.

1304C/17 - Caught a glimpse of a merchant ship of about 3000 tons. This was Northbound. Tigris turned on a firing course but there was no time to take ranges. Four torpedoes were fired and one possible hit was claimed. The ship was in convoy with one other ship and they were escorted by a motor torpedo boat. (31)

18 Sep 1941
Around 1410A/21, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) sighted a minesweeper sweeping between Brynilen and Loppa. [We have been unable to identify this vessel.] (5)

21 Sep 1941
Around 1015A/21, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN) ended her 11th war patrol at Polyarnoe. (5)

6 Oct 1941
Around 1930C/6, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) departed from Polyarnoe for her 12th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Northern Norway.

[As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed.] (5)

11 Oct 1941
While patrolling in Svaerholthavet, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) attacked a German convoy made up of three small merchant vessels escorted by four trawlers. Four torpedoes were fired at the two rear ships of the convoy but no hits were obtained.

The composition of this convoy was the German merchant vessels Sonnenfelde (865 GRT, built 1922) and Andromeda (658 GRT, built 1910) and the Norwegian merchant vessel (in German service Kaupanger (1584 GRT, built 1930). They were escorted by the German auxiliary submarine chasers UJ-1211 and UJ-1416 and the auxiliary patrol vessel V 6102 / Nordlicht. The convoy was on passage from Hammerfest (departed around 0700B/10) to Kirkeness (arrived around 0630B/12). The attack was apparently not observed.

0800C/11 - Sighted an eastbound convoy of 3 small merchant vessels escorted by four trawlers, started attack.

0921C/11 - Fired four torpedoes against the rear merchant ships. Due to the bad weather range could not be taken but was estimated at about 3000 yards. Shortly after firing trim was lost so the result was not observed. (32)

14 Oct 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) attacked a German convoy off Svaerholt, Norway. During the attack one torpedo was fired to early by accident. The attack was broken off.

The composition of this convoy was as follows; transports Hartmut (German, 2713 GRT, built 1938) and Mar del Plata (German (former Belgian), 7340 GRT, built 1938). Escort was provided by the German destroyer Z 20 / Karl Galster and the German minesweepers M 18 and M 22. They were en-route from Tromso to Kirkeness but had anchored in the Lafjord during the night of 13/14 October.

Later on the same day Tigris attacks another convoy off the Laksfjord in position 71°03'N, 27°10'E. Tigris fired five torpedoes but missed the transports Tugela (Norwegian (in German service), 5559 GRT, built 1921) and Havbris (Norwegian (in German service), 1316 GRT, built 1919) (all offsite links). The composition of this convoy was as follows; the above mentioned transports as well as the Mimona (Norwegian (in German service), 1147 GRT, built 1919). They were escorted by the German auxiliary submarine chasers UJ 1211 and UJ 1416 and the auxiliary patrol vessel V 6103 / Nordlicht. No hits were obtained despite that Cdr. Bone claimed to have hit and sunk the second ship.

0755C/14 - Sighted a convoy of two merchant vessel, one of 3000 tons and one of 8000 tons. They were escorted by one destroyer and two M-class minesweepers. Started attack.

Loss of trim resulted in Cdr. Bone missing his D.A. (director angle). Port rudder was ordered to get the D.A. on again. The rating at the torpedo order instruments put the switch to 'Fire' by mistake when Cdr. Bone gave the final 'Standby' order. After realising his mistake the rating at once put the switch to 'Stop' and then to 'Off'. This was however to late and one torpedo was fired. When Cdr. Bone sighted the torpedo track through the periscope he immediately ordered 'Stop firing'. It was by then too late to shoot a fresh salvo of torpedoes. The torpedo fired off course did not hit anything nor did it explode at the end of its run.

--------------------------------------------

1040C/14 - Sighted three medium seized merchant vessel escorted by four trawlers. Two HE-115 aircraft were approaching from the Eastward. Started attack.

1103C/14 - Fired three torpedoes at the 2nd ship (range 1500 yards) and two torpedoes at the 3rd ship (range 4000 yards). The second ship was hit before firing at the 3rd. Tigris went deep immediately after firing the last two torpedoes as the escorting trawlers counter-attacked immediately. Their hunt lasted for two hours but was ineffective. Only 8 single depth charges were dropped.

As all torpedoes had been expended HMS Tigris left patrol to return to Polyarnoe. (5)

16 Oct 1941
Around 1030C/16, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) ended her 12th war patrol at Polyarnoe. (5)

20 Oct 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) departed from Polyarnoe for Holy Loch.

As no log is available no map can be displayed. (24)

28 Oct 1941
Around 1000A/28, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) arrived at Holy Loch. She was escorted in by HMS Breda (Capt.(Retd.) A.E. Johnston, RN). (23)

9 Nov 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) proceeded from Holy Loch to Rothesay where she was to be docked in AFD 7. (33)

16 Nov 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) returned to Holy Loch from Rothesay. (34)

10 Dec 1941
Around 1755A/10, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) departed from Holy Loch for Scapa Flow. She was escorted by HMS Wellard (Lt. S.F. Fell, RANVR). (23)

12 Dec 1941
Around 0930A/12, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow for a few days of W/T exercises. (23)

13 Dec 1941
During 13/14 December 1941, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) conducted W/T trials off Scapa Flow.

15 Dec 1941
During 15/16 December 1941, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) conducted W/T trials off Scapa Flow.

16 Dec 1941
Around 1600A/16, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) departed from Scapa Flow for her 13th war patrol. She is to patrol of Northern Norway to cover the Lofoten raids (Operation Anklet).

As no log is available and the patrol report holds no daily positions no map can be displayed. (5)

17 Dec 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) is recalled to Scapa Flow. Tigris reversed course and arrived back at Scapa Flow around 1500A/17. (5)

19 Dec 1941
Around 0930A/19, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) departed from Scapa Flow to resume her 13th war patrol. (5)

25 Dec 1941
HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) acted as beacon for Operation 'Anklet' (raid on the Lofotens) from 2330A/25 to 0130A/26. (5)

10 Jan 1942
At 1230A/10, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, RN), made rendezvous with her escort towards Holy Loch, HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (5)

12 Jan 1942
Around 1345A/12, HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN) ended her 13th war patrol at Holy Loch. (5)

30 Jan 1942
Around 1000A/30, HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) departed from Holy Loch for her 14th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Central Norway (Trondheim area) as the German battleship Tirpitz had moved from the Baltic to Norway.

She was escorted out by HMS Hugh Walpole (T/Lt. J. Mackenzie, RNR) until 1600/1.

[no log is available so no map can be displayed.] (5)

13 Feb 1942
Around 2030A/13, HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) left patrol to return to Lerwick. (35)

15 Feb 1942
Around 1200A/15, HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) ended her 14th war patrol at Lerwick. She departed later this day (around 1800A/15) for Holy Loch together with HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN). They are escorted by HMS Beaumaris (Lt.Cdr. D.S. Campbell, RNVR). (35)

18 Feb 1942
Around 1100A/18, HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) arrived at Holy Loch. (24)

20 Feb 1942
Around 0945A/20, HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) departed from Holy Loch for Plymouth. She was escorted by the British corvette HMS Petunia (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Rayner, RD, RNR). Trident was to refit at the Devonport Dockyard. (36)

22 Feb 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt. L.W. Napier, RN) arrived at Plymouthw where she to refit at the Devonport Dockyard. (24)

21 Jul 1942
With her refit completed, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN), departed from Plymouth for Holy Loch. She was escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN).

23 Jul 1942
Around 0800A/23, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Holy Loch for a period of trials and training. (37)

27 Aug 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) is docked at Ardrossan. She was undocked later the same day. (24)

31 Aug 1942
Around 0630A/31, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) departed from Holy Loch for Lerwick. She makes the passage together with HMS P 614 (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) and HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN).

The submarines were escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (35)

2 Sep 1942
Around 0800A/2, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Lerwick. She departed Lerwick around 1700A/2 for her 15th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Northern Norway to provide cover for Convoy PQ 18 to northern Russia.

[no log is available so no map can be displayed.] (5)

10 Sep 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) fires five torpedoes at the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper (thought to be battleship Tirpitz) in approximate position 69°12'N, 15°18'E. All torpedoes fired missed the target.

The enemy force consisted, besides of the above mentioned heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, light cruiser Koln. They were escorted by the destroyers Z 4 / Richard Beitzen, Z 23, Z 27, Z 29 and Z 30.

1330A/10 - While in position 034°, Anda Lighthouse, 9.8 nautical miles (approximately 69°12'N, 15°18'E) sighted a HE-115 aircraft flying across the entrance to Gavl Fjord. Shortly afterwards she was seen to fly to the South until out of sight.

1340A/10 - Sighted the fore-top of a German heavy ship bearing 190°, range about 9 to 10 nautical miles. One HE-115 aircraft was seen to fly overhead. Started overhead. 1345A/10 - It was now seen that the enemy force consisted of three heavy ships. The masts of several destroyers were now also visible. The very calm sea made the use of the periscope restricted to the absolute minimum.

The single HE 115 aircraft was circling ahead of the ships and was now getting very close so at 1346 hours went to 40 feet.

1349A/10 - Returned to periscope depth. It was seen that the enemy main units were in line abreast.

1351A/10 - The HE-115 aircraft was now almost directly overhead so went to 40 feet again.

1354A/10 - The aircraft had now gone past. It was not seen again. Continued the attack.

1414A/10 - Fired five torpedoes against the Tirpitz (this was actually the Admiral Hipper) from 7000 yards. Enemy speed was 28 knots. No hits were obtained. One of the torpedoes exploded shortly after firing (most likely when the pistol was armed). The four other exploded in the wake of the German task force. (5)

20 Sep 1942
At 0018A/20, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) left patrol to return to Lerwick.

At 1908A/20, HMS Tigris changed course to proceed to patrol in zones K 153 and K 154 (near Andenes, Norway to the north of Harstad) as ordered in FO(S)'s signal timed 1800A/20. (5)

27 Sep 1942
At 2037A/27, on surfacing after a day's submerged patrol, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) left patrol to return to Lerwick as ordered in FO(S)'s signal timed 1926A/26. (5)

1 Oct 1942
Around 1905A/1, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) ended her 15th war patrol at Lerwick. She departed for Methil around 2015A/1, escorted by HMS Loch Monteith (T/Lt. K.W. Richardson, RNR). (5)

3 Oct 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Methil. (24)

4 Oct 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) departed Methil for Sheerness. She made the pasage in convoy FS 25. (35)

6 Oct 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Sheerness. She then proceeded to Chatham Dockyard for repairs and the fitting of RDF (radar). (24)

6 Nov 1942
With her repairs completed, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) departed from Sheerness for Portsmouth. (35)

7 Nov 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Portsmouth. She departed for Gibraltar around 1345A/7. En-route she is diverted for a short patrol in the Bay of Biscay to intercept a German blockade breaker but she sighted nothing. (35)

15 Nov 1942
Around 1300A/15, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived at Gibraltar. (24)

25 Nov 1942
Around 1600A/25, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) departed from Gibraltar for her 16th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean). She is to perform an anti-U-boat patrol to the south-west of Sardinia. (5)

29 Nov 1942
Around 2300A/29, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived in position Z (38°01'N, 07°30'E). She then commenced to patrol within 20 nautical miles from this position. (5)

5 Dec 1942
At 0055A/5, in position 37°56'N, 07°37'E, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) picked up HE at 220 revs. bearing 110°.

At 0057A/5, the HE was crossing to the south-west. All torpedo tubes were made ready and course was altered to close.

At 0104A/5, what are thought to be three destroyers were seen to pass ahead at an estimated range of 5 nautical miles. Their course was about 230° at about 22 knots.

At 0118A/5, HE faded out on bearing 230°.

Most likely this was 'Force Q' which conducted an anti-shipping raid during the night of 4/5 December 1942. Force Q at that time was made up of the light cruisers HMS Aurora (Capt. W.G. Agnew, CB, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral C.H.J. Harcourt, CBE, RN), HMS Argonaut (Capt. E.W.L. Longley-Cook, RN) and the destroyers HMS Eskimo (Capt. J.W.M. Eaton, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Tartar (Cdr. St.J.R.J. Tyrwhitt, DSC, RN).

At 1638A/5, HMS Tigris received Capt. S 8's signal timed 0940A/5, ordering her to shift patrol to the Naples area. Course was altered to comply. (5)

6 Dec 1942
The Italian submarine Porfido was torpedoed and sunk about 90 nautical miles north-north-east off Bone (Annaba), Algeria in position 38°10'N, 08°35'E by the British submarine HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN).

0143A/6 - In position 38°10'N, 08°35'E the Officer of the Watch (Lt. R.G. Sampson, RN) sighted a vessel broad on the Port bow. This he instantly and correctly judged to be a submarine end-on. Lieutenant Sampson immediately swung Tigris towards under full helm(she was doing 12.5 knots), gave the alarm and reduced speed. At the moment Lt.Cdr. Colvin arrived on the bridge the two submarines were practically head on, range about 1200 yards. It was obvious that the other vessel was a submarine steering towards. As P 219 was known to be returning from patrol and might very well be the submarine encountered an immediate attack was out of the question.

0145A/6 - Stopped both engines and when about to make the challenge when the other submarine altered course to port. Range was 600 yards and Lt.Cdr. Colvin was now able to identify the submarine as enemy. She closely resembled a German type 7 U-boat.

0146A/6 - Fired two torpedoes from 600 yards. The first torpedo ran under the stern of the enemy the second torpedo hit between the conning tower and the stern. Tigris closed the scene and rescued one Italian officer and three ratings. (5)

8 Dec 1942
Around 1350A/8, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) arrived in her patrol area near Naples. (5)

9 Dec 1942
At 1415A/9, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN), which was patrolling near Ischia Island, picked up HE and saw a motor A/S boat appear over the horizon coming out of the direction of Ventotene Island. The boat crossed to the south of HMS Tigris but then turned straight towards. HMS Tigris then went to 120 feet. The MASB , which up to then had been doing around 15 knots stopped on the submarines starboard beam and remained there for about 15 minutes. It then passed directly overhead and then stopped on the port beam.

HMS Tigris then lost depth control and took a bow down angle. The dive could only be checked at 300 feet but after 3 minutes started to sink deeper to 350 feet. This all made quite a bit of noise and the enemy surely must have picked it up. There was no other choice then to blow ballast and after some time a stable trim was caught and held at 90 feet. The enemy dropped three depth charges but these were only small and were also dropped astern.

[We have been unable to identify this 'MAS(B)-boat'.]

At 1847A/9, HMS Tigris received Capt. S 10's signal timed 1240A/9 ordering submarines on patrol near Naples to new positions. HMS Tigris was to patrol in position 258° - Punta Carena (Capri Island) - 10 nautical miles until 1100B/9. Course was set accordingly. (5)

10 Dec 1942
At 0750A/10, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) sighted two masts about 8 nautical miles to the eastward. A ship was rounding Carena Point bound north. HE was picked up at 180 revs. It appeared to be a small ship and may even have been an auxiliary schooner.

At 1205A/10, HMS Tigris, received Capt. S 10's signal timed 1051A/10, ordering her to patrol in position 300°- Carena Point - 14 nautical miles. Course was set accordingly.

At 1415A/10, an auxiliary A/S schooner was sighted to the north t a range of 4 nautical miles. She was steering west. Course was altered to pass astern of the schooner. Later HMS Tigris altered course to the west to avoid ending up in one of the other submarines billet. Range to the A/S schooner was kept at a minimum of 4 nautical miles.

At 1752A/10, when about to surface, the A/S schooner, which had been laying stopped to listen, was heard to start it engine(s).

At 1800A/10, the schooner was seen to close HMS Tigris on bearing 035°.

At 1810A/10, the bearing of the schooners HE was steady on 35°. Revs. were counted at 220. HMS Tigris turned away to port at slow speed and went to 70 feet.

At 1821A/10, the schooner was very close. Revs. were now counted as 130.

At 1843A/10, HE faded out on bearing 230°. HMS Tigris subsequently surfaced at 1859A/10.

At 1920A/10, Turbine HE was picked up at 200 revs. bearing 045°. On this bearing the land background of Ischia Island made it impossible to see clearly whereas Tigris was silhouetted against the light horizon with a setting moon. Tigris therefore dived. HE was not heard again but Tigris remained dived to allow the moon to set.

At 2040A/10, Tigris surfaced in position 232° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 6.5 nautical miles. Course was then set to position 260° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 7 nautical miles where it was hoped to be able to charge undisturbed and where the point of arrival of inward bound shipping as mentioned in Capt. S 8's signal timed 1258A/5 could also be covered.

[We have been unable to identify these small vessels.] (5)

11 Dec 1942
At 0137A/10, diesel HE at 180 revs. was picked up by HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN). This was thought to be an A/S schooner passing to the southward.

At 0200A/10, HMS Tigris completed charging. Course was then set on 090° to proceed to the patrol position.

At 0357A/10, a darkened vessel was seen to the south steering to the north-west. HMS Tigris turned towards to close.

At 0405A/10, the vessel was seen to be an A/S schooner. HMS Tigris altered away and resumed her original course.

At 0408A/10, faint HE was picked up on bearing 070° but nothing was visible against the land background of Ischia Island. HMS Tigris altered course to 025°.

At 0438A/10, definite HE was picked up bearing 075°. Diesel at 140 revs.

At 0441A/10, HE was increasing on the same bearing. HMS Tigris dived in position 225° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 4 nautical miles and altered course to 320°. HE continued to be heard on the same bearing until around 0530A/10. The vessel appeared to be circling. Perhaps it was HMS P 247 (Lt. M.G.R. Lumby, DSC, RN).

0630A/10, HMS Tigris altered course to 180° to close the patrol position.

At 0645A/10, two A/S schooners were seen to the southward. HMS Tigris therefore retired to the northwards. These two schooners patrolled to the south and east of Imperatore Lighthouse throughout the day. HMS Tigris therefore patrolled to the north of the route between Ischia and Ventotene Island.

At 1818A/10, HMS Tigris surfaced in position 335° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 12.5 nautical miles. Nothing further had been seen all day.

[We have been unable to identify these small vessels.] (5)

12 Dec 1942
At 0510A/12, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) dived in position 337° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 11 nautical miles. She then set course to the south, skirting the west coast of Ischia Island about 4 to 5 nautical miles from the shore to proceed to the patrol position. Again two A/S schooners were seen on the line of advance. HMS Tigris then commenced to work round them to the west and the south.

At 1900A/12, HMS Tigris surfaced in position 337° - Imperatore Lighthouse - 13 nautical miles. Course was then set to the south-west to charge.

At 2200A/12, HMS Tigris set course for Algiers as ordered in Capt. S 10's signal timed 1950A/11.

[We have been unable to identify these small vessels.] (5)

16 Dec 1942
Around 1140A/16, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) ended her 16th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean) at Algiers. She was escorted in by HMS Stornoway (T/A/Lt.Cdr. C.R. Fraser, RNR) which had joined at 0925A/16. (5)

27 Dec 1942
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) departed from Algiers for Malta. (24)

2 Jan 1943
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) arrived at Malta. At Malta HMS Tigris is docked before she proceeded on her next patrol. [Dates not known to us.] (24)

14 Jan 1943
Around 1300A/14, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) departed from Malta for her 17th war patrol (2nd in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off the West coast of Greece and the lower Adriatic.

[No log is available so no map can be displayed.] (5)

21 Jan 1943
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the Italian merchant Citta di Genova (5413 GRT, built 1930) in the Strait of Otranto about 25 nautical miles west of Saseno Island in position 40°32'N, 18°45'E.

The Citta di Genova, which was en-route from Patras to Bari, was carrying 200 military personnel and 158 Greek PoWs. 173 men are killed or missing, the survivors are picked up by the auxiliary Eolo and a fishing vessel.

1030A/21, Sighted a 3-masted schooner of about 500 tons proceeding on course 110° at 7 knots. It was a tempting gunnery target but Lt.Cdr. Colvin decided not to do so in the hope something bigger would show up. A dummy attack with the stern tube was then made on her.

1250A/21 - Sighted a medium seized merchant vessel bearing 116°. Distance was about 5 nautical miles. Started attack.

1313A/21 - In position in position 40°32'N, 18°45'E fired four torpedoes from 1200 yards. One torpedo was seen to hit the ship under the funnel 63 seconds after firing the first torpedo. The ship swung 90° to Starboard and lost way. Boats were lowered very promptly and the target was seen to settle down slightly on an even keel with no list.

1315A/21 - Tigris turned to port to retire.

1320A/21 - The target appeared not to be settling any deeper so decided to finish her off with another torpedo.

1325A/21 - Fired the stern tube. The target was hit 78 seconds later and she immediately dipped sharply by the bows. The whole after part lifted clear of the water. She went down in a vertical dive 90 seconds later. (5)

23 Jan 1943
At 1030A/23, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) which was patrolling near Bar, sighted what was thought to be an ex Yugoslav torpedo boat approaching from the north-west at about 12 knots. She stopped several times for about 20 minutes dropping listening charges.

This was was most probably the T 1 (ex-Yugoslav) who sailed from Teodo at 0710B/23 and arrived at Durazzo at 1520B/23.

At 1045A/23, the torpedo boat dropped a listening charge about 2 miles to the north-west and then went past about a mile to the seaward of HMS Tigris.

At 1120A/23, the torpedo boat was lost from sight to the south-east.

At 1140A/23, a small northbound coaster, in ballast and of about 600 tons, was sighted passing to the inshore of HMS Tigris.

At 1230A/23, a small northbound coaster, in ballast and of about 900 tons, was sighted passing to the inshore of HMS Tigris.

Both coasters were suitable gun targets but Lt.Cdr. Colvin decided not to engage with the gun in the hope something bigger would show up. (5)

24 Jan 1943
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) fires four torpedoes against the Italian water tanker Cassala (1771 GRT, built 1902) near Ulcinj, Montenegro, Yugoslavia in position 41°55'N, 19°08'E. All torpedoes missed their target.

Cassala was escorted by the Italian (former Yugoslav) torpedo boat T 1 and proceeding from Durazzo to Teodo. The torpedo boat combed the tracks and dropped all her sixteen depth charges in three runs, claiming the submarine sunk.

1057A/24 - Sighted a merchant vessel of about 2500 tons, escorted by a Partenope class destroyer approaching from the South-East. Range was about 6000 yards. Started attack.

1113A/24 - In position 41°55'N, 19°08'E fired four torpedoes from 3000 yards. All missed as it appeared the targets speed was overestimated. Tigris went to 80 feet after firing. Tigris was hunted by the destroyer for about half an hour in which 14 depth charges were dropped single or in pairs.

1330A/24 - Came to periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Went deep again and retired to seaward. (5)

27 Jan 1943
Around 1220A/27, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) received Capt. S 10's signal timed 1051A/27 ordering her to patrol in the Cape Dukato area on the west coast of Greece.

On surfacing at 2000A/27, course was set to comply with these orders. (5)

28 Jan 1943
At 0930A/28, when in position 40°32'N, 18°46'E, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) sighted a convoy bearing 190° at a range of about 10 nautical miles. The convoy was proceeding on an estimated course of 290° and was made up of merchant vessel of about 4000 tons and four smaller vessels of which only some masts and smoke could be seen. No air escort was seen.

This convoy was most probably the one made up of the transports Ascianghi (Italian, 610 GRT, built 1921), Apuania (Italian, 275 GRT, built 1917), Vesta (Italian 3351 GRT, built 1923) and Raffio (Italian, 316 GRT, built 1912) escorted by the auxiliary Rovigno. They sailed from Valona at 0500B/28 and arrived at Brindisi at 1400B/28. (5)

30 Jan 1943
At 1200A/30, while patrolling in the Cape Dukato area, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) sighted the mast of a small vessel leaving Denata Bay steering northwards close inshore. Nothing further was seen for the remainder of the day.

On surfacing HMS Tigris set course for the Straits of Otranto. (5)

31 Jan 1943
At 0445A/31, in position 40°20'N, 18°57'E, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) sighted a small vessel fairly close on the port bow, bearing 330°. Visibility was poor. HMS Tigris dived. HE was heard to cross ahead, 60 revs, reciprocating. It faded out on bearing 070°. It was at first thought to have been a patrol vessel but more likely it was a small ship bound for Corfu.

At 1250A/31, HMS Tigris sighted smoke bearing 320°. This turned out to be three small trawler-type vessels, apparently in line abreast, steering a course of 115° along the Brindisi - Corfu route at not more then 5 knots. Avoiding action was taken by HMS Tigris which remained at periscope depth. The vessels passed three nautical miles to the northward at 1430A/31.

On surfacing at 1840A/31, HMS Tigris set course to return to the Cape Dukato area.

[We have been unable to identify the small vessels sighted on this day.] (5)

1 Feb 1943
On surfacing at 1810A/1, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) left the Cape Dukato area to return to Malta. (5)

4 Feb 1943
Around 1130A/4, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) ended her 17th war patrol (2nd in the Mediterranean) at Malta. She was escorted in by HMS Hythe (Lt.Cdr. L.B. Miller, RN). (5)

18 Feb 1943
HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, DSC, RN) departed from Malta for her 18th war patrol (3rd in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in the Tyrrhenian Sea off Naples, Italy.

[No log is available so no map can be displayed.] (38)

22 Feb 1943
At 2330B/22, the Italian merchant vessel, Teramo (1599 GRT, built 1920, former French Marie-Therese le Borgne) reports being attacked by a submarine with gunfire and torpedoes in 41°21'N, 12°53'E (near Cape Circeo). The torpedo boat Cigno sails from Naples to her assistance. If this attack was genuine there is a remote possibility that the attacker was HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. G.R. Colvin, RN) but the place of the attack is well to the north of her patrol area making this unlikely.

27 Feb 1943
The auxiliary submarine chaser UJ 2201 (Flotilla leader) is towing to Naples UJ 2209, which had been damaged by air attack, in company with UJ 2210 when, at 1047B/27 February, in Quadrat CJ 6782 (south of Capri, approximately 40°27'N, 014°18'E), UJ 2201 detects a submarine echo at over 3000 meters. UJ 2210 (Leutnant zur See der Reserve Otto Pollmann) is ordered to investigate. At 1053B/27, the submarine chaser obtains a good echo at a distance of 2400 meters bearing 110° and turns sharply to starboard. The echo is clear at it appears the submarine is trying to take evasive action at 6 knots. Contact is lost at a distance of 180 meters but at 1114B/27, UJ 2210 drops a first pattern of five depth charges set at 70, 70, 90, 120 and 120 meters. More depth charges will follow and contact will be renewed and finally after a last pattern of 15 depth charges dropped at 1234B/27, an oil slick is observed. The hunt is finally ended at 1530B/27 when contact was lost. It is believed that this attack accounted for HMS Tigris.

Six officers and fifty-six ratings are missing after the submarine failed to return from patrol.

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