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Notable events involving Sturgeon include:

The history of HMS Sturgeon as compiled on this page is extracted from the patrol reports and logbooks of HMS Sturgeon found at the British National Archives at Kew, London.

This page was last updated in January 2022.

23 Aug 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Portland for Dundee. She made the passage together with HMS Spearfish (Lt. J.H. Eaden, RN) and HMS Swordfish (Lt. C.B. Crouch, RN). (1)

25 Aug 1939
At 0700 hours, HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN), left her sister ships and set course for her patrol area to the south-west of Stavanger, Norway. When the war with Germany commenced this became her 1st war patrol.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

4 Sep 1939
While on the return passage to Dundee HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) was bombed in error by a British aircraft at 1620 hours in position 56º34'N, 01º04'W. At 1642 hours the aircraft dropped another bomb much closer but fortunately Sturgeon was not damaged. (1)

5 Sep 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) ended her 1st war patrol at Dundee. (1)

13 Sep 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Dundee for her 2nd war patrol. She was ordered to patrol to the south-west of Stavanger, Norway.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

14 Sep 1939

HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) fired three torpedoes against wat was thought to be an enemy submarine but was in fact the British submarine HMS Swordfish (Lt. C.B. Crouch, RN) in the North Sea about 50 nautical miles east-south-east of Aberdeen, Scotland in position 56°22'N, 01°28'W. Fortunately all torpedoes missed. HMS Swordfish ended her 1st war patrol at Dundee later the same day.

0043 hours - In position 56°22'N, 01°28'W sighted an enemy submarine bearing 115°, range 1500 yards, enemy course 340°, enemy speed 12.5 knots. Started attack.

0055 hours - The enemy was seen to dive. Fired three torpedoes. The first passed over the stern of the enemy, the other two missed astern.

(1)

21 Sep 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) ended her 2nd war patrol at Dundee. (1)

8 Oct 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Dundee for her 3rd war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Skagerrak.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

14 Oct 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) fired three torpedoes against German U-boat U-23 in the Skagerrak about 20 nautical miles west-north-west of Skagen, Denmark in position 57°49'N, 09°59'E. All torpedoes missed their target.

1435 hours - Sighted a vessel bearing 000°. Enemy course 110°. Range 4500 yards. Identified the target as a German submarine. Started attack.

1452 hours - Fired three torpedoes. Lost trim on firing and went deep to prevent Sturgeon from broaching.

1457 hours - Heard distinct explosion.

1501 hours - Heard two more explosions. Sturgeon meanwile had returned to periscope depth. The uboat was not seen again. (1)

16 Oct 1939
At 1910 hours, HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN), hit bottom at 60 feet damaging her Asdic dome. (1)

21 Oct 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) ended her 3rd war patrol at Rosyth. (1)

27 Oct 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) is docked in the floating dock (AFD 3) at the Rosyth Dockyard. (2)

10 Nov 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) is undocked. (3)

11 Nov 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Rosyth for her 4th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Heligoland Bight. Later she patrolled off the west coast of Denmark.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

20 Nov 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) torpedoed and sank the German armed trawler V 209 / Gauleiter Telschow (428 GRT, built 1937) about 50 nautical miles north-west of Heligoland in position 54°34'N, 06°28'E. The second trawler was V 209 / R. Walther Darré.

1330 hours - Sighed a pair of armed trawlers bearing 070°, range 2.5 nautical miles. Position was 54°34'N, 06°28'E.

1400 hours - Started attack on these trawlers.

1555 hours - Fired two torpedoes at the first trawler.

1556 hours - Fired two torpedoes at the second trawler.

1558 hours - Heard a loud explosion. The result was not observed. (1)

29 Nov 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) ended her 4th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

13 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Blyth for her 5th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off the British east coast.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

15 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) ended her 5th war patrol at Blyth after having been recalled. (1)

17 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) departed Blyth for her 6th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off the west coast of Denmark.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

20 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) was ordered to patrol in the Skagerrak. (1)

21 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, RN) was ordered to return to her original patrol area. (1)

30 Dec 1939
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 6th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

21 Jan 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 7th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the North Sea.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

23 Jan 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was ordered to patrol off north-west Denmark. (1)

31 Jan 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 7th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

12 Feb 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) shifted from Blyth to Wallsend where she was to refit. (4)

26 Feb 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was docked at Wallsend. (4)

14 Apr 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was undocked. (5)

24 Apr 1940
With her refit completed HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) shifted from Wallsend to Blyth. (5)

30 Apr 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 8th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol to the south-west of Stavanger, Norway.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

6 May 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was ordered to a new patrol area, to the north-west of Terschelling, Netherlands. (1)

11 May 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 8th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

22 May 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 9th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol to the north-west of Terschelling, Netherlands.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

5 Jun 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 9th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

9 Jun 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 10th war patrol. She was ordered perform a local patrol as it was feared that German warships might perform a raid along the British east coast. (1)

10 Jun 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 10th war patrol at Blyth after having been recalled. (1)

26 Jun 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 11th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Texel, The Netherlands.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

30 Jun 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) hit bottom at 50 feet sustaining some damage. (1)

11 Jul 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 11th war patrol at Blyth. Later the same day was docked in No.5 dock. (6)

14 Jul 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was undocked. (6)

27 Jul 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 12th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Texel, The Netherlands.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

4 Aug 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) attacked the German auxiliary patrol vessel V 811 / Hugo Homann in tow of tug Memmert. They were escorted by two auxiliary AA vessels FL 21 and FL 24. V 811 had been mined and damaged on 5 May 1940 and was towed to Den Helder, Netherlands for repairs. No torpedo hits were obtained.

1239 hours - In position 53°15'N, 04°36'E fired six torpedoes at two small merchant vessels (three torpedoes at each). Enemy course was 210°, speed 8 knots. Range on firing was 1200 yards. No hits were obtained.

The convoy was in line ahead in the order merchant vessel, tug and towed merchant vessel with the escort of three 'armed tugs' disposed on either bow of the leading ship and astern.

Following the attack the escort dropped six depth charges of which two were close. The hunt by the escorts lasted for about 30 minutes. (1)

9 Aug 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 12th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

27 Aug 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 13th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Skagerrak.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

2 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) torpedoed and sank the German troop transport Pionier (3264 GRT, built 1934) about 15 nautical miles north of Skagen, Denmark in position 57°56'N, 10°46'E. Pioneer was escorted by the torpedo-boat T 4.

1953 hours - In position 57°56'N, 10°46'E fired two torpedoes at a 10000 tons transport ship escorted by two torpedo-boats and one float plane. Range was 6000 yards. Enemy course 360°, speed 15 knots. Shortly before fring a concentration of smaller merchant vessels was seen beyond the large transport. Lt. Gregory decided to fire the remaining four torpedoes of the salvo at these ships.

1958 hours - An explosion was heard and a dense column of black smoke was seen to rise from the target. Soon afterwards she was seen to be on fire.

The smaller merchant vessels were seen to scatter and in the end no torpedoes were fired at these ships. (1)

10 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) fires 6 torpedoes against German U-boat U-43. All torpedoes missed their target although the British thought to have obtained one hit and that they had sunk the submarine. Position of the attack was 57°14'N, 06°04'E.

1333 hours - Heard faint HE bearing 055°. Came to 22 feet and at ...

1335 hours - Sighted a large German u-boat on the surface. Range was 5000 yards. Started attack.

1348 hours - In position 57°14'N, 06°04'E fired six torpedoes from 7000 yards.

1354 hours - Heard a loud explosion. HE of the submarine ceased.

1355 hours - No sign of the submarine. The remaining five torpedoes were heard to explode at the end of their run. (1)

13 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 13th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

14 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was docked at Blyth. (7)

21 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was undocked. (7)

29 Sep 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 14th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off the western entrance to the Skagerrak.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

9 Oct 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) was ordered to patrol off Lister, Norway. (1)

14 Oct 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 14th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

26 Oct 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) departed Blyth for her 15th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Skagerrak to the east of 08°E.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

3 Nov 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) attacked a merchant vessel with three torpedoes near Larvik Norway. No hits were obtained. Shortly afterwards another merchant vessel was sighted and attacked. in the attack Sturgeon torpedoed and sank the Danish merchant Sigrun (1337 GRT, built 1904) about 10 nautical miles east-south-east of Larvik, Norway in position 58°59'N, 10°22'E. Sigrun was on passage from Oslo to Porsgrunn.

0946 hours - In position 58°59'N, 10°23'E fired three torpedoes at a merchant vessel of 2000 tons from 4000 yards. No hits were obtained. All torpedoes were heard to explode 7 to 8 minutes after firing.

0952 hours - Sighted another 2000 tons merchant vessel. Started attack.

1010 hours - In position 58°59'N, 10°22'E fired the three remaining torpedoes in the tubes from 4000 yards. One hit was obtained. The other two torpedoes were heard to explode after about 7 minutes.

1014 hours - The vessel was seen to be down by the bow and a lot of smoke was hanging around her.

1021 hours - The vessel was not seen anymore. She must have gone down. Two A/S trawler now were seen coming towards the area of the attack from the eastward. A counter attack was then started in which 32 depth charges were dropped. The hunt lasted for 1 hour and 15 minutes. No damage was done by this counter attack. (1)

4 Nov 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) attacked the Norwegian merchant vessel Ulv (938 GRT, built 1921, offsite link) with two torpedoes about 5 nautical miles south-east of Risør, Norway in position 58°41'N, 09°21'E. No hits were obtained.

Sturgeon than proceeded to a new patrol area, between Lister and Obrestad.

1527 hours - In position 58°41'N, 09°21'E fired two torpedoes at the Norwegian merchant Ulv from 1000 yards. No hits were obtained.

1530 hours - The target was observed to have turned away. One torpedo was heard to detonate on hitting the land. (1)

6 Nov 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) torpedoed and sank the Norwegian merchant Delfinus (1294 GRT, built 1912, offsite link) south-west of Varhaug, Norway in position 58°34'N, 05°37'E.

1455 hours - Fired two torpedoes at the Norwegian merchant Delfinus from 1000 yards. On hit was obtained.

1502 hours - Only 10 feet of the stern of the target remained out of the water.

1506 hours - The target had sunk. (1)

9 Nov 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. G.D.A. Gregory, DSO, RN) ended her 15th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

28 Nov 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Blyth for her 16th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol of Bergen, Norway.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

11 Dec 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 16th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

31 Dec 1940
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Blyth for her 17th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Bud / Stadlandet, Norway.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

13 Jan 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 17th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

6 Feb 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Blyth for her 18th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Lister, Norway.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

12 Feb 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was ordered to patrol off Bergen. (1)

23 Feb 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 18th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

25 Feb 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was docked at Blyth. (8)

5 Mar 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was undocked. (9)

11 Mar 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Blyth for her 19th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Stadlandet / Bud area, Norway. Later she was ordered to patrol off Obrestad and even later off Lister.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

20 Mar 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) attacked a southbound merchant vessel with two torpedoes near Obrestad, Norway. No hits were obtained.

1405 hours - Sighted a southbound merhant vessel. Started attack.

1410 hours - Visibility decreased, abandoned attack.

1510 hours - Sighted merchant vessel of about 3000 tons bearing 058°, range 3 nautical miles. Enemy course was 140°. Started attack.

1529 hours - In position 58°35'N, 05°23'E, fired two torpedoes from 4500 yards. No hits were obtained. The torpedoes were heard to explode after 8 minutes when they most likely hit the shore. (1)

25 Mar 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 19th war patrol at Blyth. (1)

4 Apr 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Blyth for Portsmouth. Passage was made in coastal convoys. (10)

9 Apr 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) arrived at Portsmouth. (10)

12 Apr 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Portsmouth for her 20th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

30 Apr 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 20th war patrol at Portsmouth. (1)

2 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was docked at Portsmouth. (11)

4 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was undocked. (11)

14 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) conducted exercises off Portsmouth. (11)

16 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Portsmouth for Dartmouth where she was to participate in A/S exercises. (11)

17 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) arrived at Dartmouth. En-route A/S exercises were carried out with HMS Cossack (Capt. P.L. Vian, DSO and Bar, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. H.T. Armstrong, RN), HMS Sikh (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, RN) and HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN).

In the afternoon HMS Sturgeon conducted A/S exercises with ML 160 and ML 177. (12)

18 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Dartmouth with two ML's. (12)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part I.

Departure of the Bismarck from the Baltic.

At 2130B/18 the German battleship Bismarck and the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen departed Gotenhafen for an anti-shipping raid in the North Atlantic. The following morning they were joined off Cape Arkona by the German destroyers Z 16 / Friedrich Eckhold and Z 23. They then proceeded through the Great Belt. The four ships were joined by a third destroyer, Z 10 / Hans Lody shortly before midnight on 19 May.

First reports of Bismarck and British dispositions 20-21 May 1941.

On 20 May 1941 two large warships with a strong escort were seen at 1500 hours northward out of the Kattegat. This information originated from the Swedish cruiser Gotland which had passed the Germans off the Swedish coast in the morning. The Naval Attaché at Stockholm received the news at 2100/20 and forwarded it to the Admiralty. At 0900/21 the Bismarck and her consorts entered Kors Fjord, near Bergen, Norway and anchored in nearby fiords. A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen at 1330/21 reported having seen two Hipper class heavy cruisers there. One of these ships was later identified on a photograph as being the Bismarck. This intelligence went out at once to the Home Fleet.

The ships of the Home Fleet were at this time widely dispersed on convoy duties, patrols, etc. Some of the units were ranging as far as Gibraltar and Freetown. The Commander-in-Chief, A/Admiral Sir John Tovey, was at Scapa Flow in his flagship, HMS King George V (Capt. W.R. Patterson, CVO, RN). With him were her newly commissioned sister ship HMS Prince of Wales (Capt. J.C. Leach, MVO, RN), the battlecruiser HMS Hood (Capt. R. Kerr, CBE, RN, with Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland, CB, RN, onboard), the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious (Capt. H.C. Bovell, RN), the light cruisers HMS Galatea (Capt. E.W.B. Sim, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral K.T.B. Curteis, CB, RN), HMS Aurora (Capt. W.G. Agnew, RN), HMS Kenya (Capt. M.M. Denny, CB, RN), HMS Neptune (Capt. R.C. O'Conor, RN) and the destroyers HMS Achates (Lt.Cdr. Viscount Jocelyn, RN), HMS Active (Lt.Cdr. M.W. Tomkinson, RN), HMS Antelope (Lt.Cdr. R.B.N. Hicks, DSO, RN), HMS Anthony (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Hodges, RN), HMS Echo (Lt.Cdr. C.H.deB. Newby, RN), HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN), HMS Icarus (Lt.Cdr. C.D. Maud, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi (Cdr. S.A. Buss, MVO, RN) and HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, RAN). HMS Victorious was under orders to escort troop convoy WS 8B from the Clyde to the Middle East. HMS Neptune was working up for service with the Mediterranean Fleet and was to escort convoy WS 8X from the Clyde to the Middle East on completion. She did not sail to operate against the Bismarck having only just began her post-refit work-up programme.

Rear-Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker (commanding the first Cruiser Squadron), with the heavy cruisers HMS Norfolk (Capt. A.J.L. Phillips, RN) (flag) and HMS Suffolk (Capt. R.M. Ellis, RN) was on patrol in the Denmark Straight. The light cruisers HMS Manchester (Capt. H.A. Packer, RN) and HMS Birmingham (Capt. A.C.G. Madden, RN) were patrolling between Iceland and the Faeroes. The battlecruiser HMS Repulse (Capt. W.G. Tennant, CB, MVO, RN) was at the Clyde to escort troop convoy WS 8B.

Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet

Admiral Tovey took the following action when he received the news the Bismarck had been spotted at Bergen. Vice-Admiral Holland with the Hood, Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra and Icarus was ordered to cover Rear Admiral Wake-Walker's cruisers in the Denmark Straight. His force departed Scapa Flow around 0100/22.

HMS Arethusa (Capt. A.C. Chapman, RN), which was taking the Vice-Admiral, Orkneys and Shetlands, to Reykjavik on a visit of inspection, was ordered to remain at Hvalfiord and placed at Rear-Admiral Wake-Walkers disposal. HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham were ordered to top off with fuel at Skaalefiord and them to resume their patrol. The other ships that remained at Scapa Flow were brought to short notice for steam.

The Free French submarine FFS Minerve (Lt. P.M. Sonneville), which was on patrol off south-west Norway was ordered to proceed to position 61°53'N, 03°15'E and HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) was ordered to proceed to position 62°08'N, 05°08'E which is to the west of Stadtlandet.

The sailing of HMS Repulse and HMS Victorious with troop convoy WS 8B was cancelled and the ships were placed at the disposal of Admiral Tovey.

A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen reported that the German ships were gone. This information reached Admiral Tovey at 2000/22. HMS Suffolk which had been fuelling at Hvalfiord was ordered to rejoin HMS Norfolk in the Denmark Strait. HMS Arethusa was ordered to join HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham to form a patrol line between Iceland and the Faeroes. Vice-Admiral Holland, on his way to Iceland was told to cover the patrols in Denmark Strait north of 62°N. Admiral Tovey would cover the patrols south of 62°N.

Commander-in-Chief leaves Scapa Flow on 22 May 1941

The King George V, with Admiral Tovey on board, departed Scapa Flow at 2245/22. With the King George V sailed, HMS Victorious, HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione (Capt. G.N. Oliver, RN), HMS Windsor (Lt.Cdr. J.M.G. Waldegrave, DSC, RN), HMS Active, HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Intrepid (Cdr. R.C. Gordon, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi, HMS Lance (Lt.Cdr. R.W.F. Northcott, RN) and HMAS Nestor. HMS Lance however had to return to Scapa Flow due to defects.

At A.M. 23 May they were joined off the Butt of Lewis by HMS Repulse escorted by HMS Legion (Cdr. R.F. Jessel, RN), HMCS Assiniboine (A/Lt.Cdr. J.H. Stubbs, RCN) and HMCS Saguenay (Lt. P.E. Haddon, RCN) coming from the Clyde area which they departed on 22 May.

The Commander-in-Chief was 230 miles north-west of the Butt of Lewis in approximate position 60°20'N, 12°30'W when at 2032/23 a signal came in from HMS Norfolk that she had sighted the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait.

HMS Suffolk and HMS Norfolk made contact with the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait on 23 May 1941.

At 1922/23 HMS Suffolk sighted the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in position 67°06'N, 24°50'W. They were proceeding to the south-west skirting the edge of the ice in Denmark Strait. HMS Suffolk immediately sent out an enemy report and made for the mist to the south-east. HMS Norfolk then commenced closing and sighted the enemy at 2030 hours. They were only some six nautical miles off and the Bismarck opened fire. HMS Norfolk immediately turned away, was not hit and also sent out an enemy report.

Although HMS Suffolk had sighted the enemy first and also sent the first contact report this was not received by the Commander-in-Chief. The enemy was 600 miles away to the north-westward.

Vice-Admiral Holland had picked up the signal from the Suffolk. He was at that moment about 300 nautical miles away. Course was changed to intercept and speed was increased by his force to 27 knots.

Dispositions, 23 May 1941.

At the Admiralty, when the Norfolk's signal came in, one of the first considerations was to safeguard the convoys at sea. At this time there were eleven crossing the North-Atlantic, six homeward and five outward bound. The most important convoy was troop convoy WS 8B of five ships which had left the Clyde the previous day for the Middle East. She was at this moment escorted by the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), light cruiser (AA cruiser) HMS Cairo (A/Capt. I.R.H. Black, RN) and the destroyers HMS Cossack (Capt. P.L. Vian, DSO, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, DSC, RN), HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN), ORP Piorun (Kmdr.por. (Cdr.) E.J.S. Plawski), HMCS Ottawa (Cdr. E.R. Mainguy, RCN), HMCS Restigouche (Cdr. H.N. Lay, RCN) and the escort destroyer HMS Eridge (Lt.Cdr. W.F.N. Gregory-Smith, RN). HMS Repulse was also intended to have sailed with this convoy but she had joined the Commander-in-Chief instead.

Force H was sailed around 0200/24 from Gibraltar to protect this important convoy on the passage southwards. Force H was made up of the battlecruiser HMS Renown (Capt Sir R.R. McGrigor, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. L.E.H. Maund, RN), light cruiser HMS Sheffield (Capt. C.A.A. Larcom, RN) and the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Foresight (Cdr. J.S.C. Salter, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Hesperus (Lt.Cdr. A.A. Tait, RN).

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk shadowing Bismarck 23 / 24 May 1941.

During the night of 23 / 24 May 1941 HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk hung on to the enemy, The Norfolk on their port quarter, Suffolk on their starboard quarter. All through the night they sent signals with updates on the position, course and speed of the enemy. At 0516 hours HMS Norfolk sighted smoke on her port bow and soon HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales came in sight.

HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales 23 / 24 May 1941.

At 2054/23 the four remaining escorting destroyers were ordered to follow at best speed in the heavy seas if they were unable to keep up with the capital ships which were proceeding at 27 knots. Two destroyers, HMS Antelope and HMS Anthony had been ordered to proceed to Iceland to refuel at 1400/23. The destroyers all managed to keep up for now and at 2318 hours they were ordered to form a screen ahead of both capital ships. At 0008/24 speed was reduced to 25 knots and course was altered to due north at 0017 hours. It was expected that contact with the enemy would be made at any time after 0140/24. It was just now that the cruisers lost contact with the enemy in a snowstorm and for some time no reports were coming in. At 0031 hours the Vice-Admiral signalled to the Prince of Wales that if the enemy was not in sight by 0210 hours he would probably alter course to 180° until the cruisers regained touch. He also signalled that he intended to engage the Bismarck with both capital ships and leave the Prinz Eugen to Norfolk and Suffolk.

The Prince of Wales' Walrus aircraft was ready for catapulting and it was intended to fly it off, but visibility deteriorated and in the end it was defuelled and stowed away at 0140 hours. A signal was then passed to the destroyers that when the capital ships would turn to the south they were to continue northwards searching for the enemy. Course was altered to 200° at 0203/24. As there was now little chance of engaging the enemy before daylight the crews were allowed to rest.

At 0247/24 HMS Suffolk regained touch with the enemy and by 0300 hours reports were coming in again. At 0353 hours HMS Hood increased speed to 28 knots and at 0400/24 the enemy was estimated to be 20 nautical miles to the north-west. By 0430 hours visibility had increased to 12 nautical miles. At 0440 hours orders were given to refuel the Walrus of HMS Prince of Wales but due to delays due to water in the fuel it was not ready when the action began and it was damaged by splinters and eventuelly jettisoned into the sea.

At 0535/24 hours a vessel was seen looming on the horizon to the north-west, it was the Bismarck. She was some 17 nautical miles away bearing 330°. Prinz Eugen was ahead of her but this was not immediately realised and as the silhoutte of the German ships was almost similar the leading ship was most likely thought to be the Bismarck on board HMS Hood.

Battle of the Denmark Strait, action with the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Loss of HMS Hood.

At 0537/24 HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were turned together 40° to starboard towards the enemy. At 0549 hours course was altered to 300° and the left hand ship was designated as the target. This was a mistake as this was the Prinz Eugen and not the Bismarck. This was changed to the Bismarck just before fire was opened at 0552 hours. At 0554 hours the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen also opened fire. In the meantime Prince of Wales had also opened fire at 0053 hours. Her first salvo was over. The sixth salvo was a straddle. The Norfolk and Suffolk were too far astern of the enemy to take part in the action.

At 0555 hours Hood and Prince of Wales turned two points to port. This opened up Prince of Wales' A arcs as her ninth salvo was fired.

Shortly before 0605 hours Hood signalled that another turn of two points to port had to be executed. Bismarck had just fired her fifth salvo when the Hood was rent in two by a huge explosion rising apparently between the after funnel and the mainmast. The fore part began to sink seperately, bows up, whilst the after part remained shrouded in a pall of smoke. Three or four minutes later, the Hood had vanished between the waves leaving a vast cloud of smoke drifting away to the leeward. She sank in position 63°20'N, 31°50'W (the wreck was found in 2001 in approximate position 63°22'N, 32°17'W, the exact position has not been released to the public.)

The Prince of Wales altered course to starboard to avoid the wreckage of the Hood. The Bismarck now shifted fire from her main and secondary armament to her. Range was now 18000 yards. Within a very short time she was hit by four 15" and three 6" shells. At 0602 hours a large projectile wrecked the bridge, killing or wounding most of the personnel and about the same time the ship was holed underwater aft. It was decided temporarily to discontinue the action and at 0613 hours HMS Prince of Wales turned away behind a smoke screen. The after turret continued to fire but it soon malfunctioned and was out of action until 0825 hours. When the Prince of Wales ceased firing the range was 14500 yards. She had fired 18 salvos from the main armament and five from the secondary. The Bismarck made no attempt to follow or continue the action. She had also not escaped unscatched and had sustained two severe hits.

Such was the end of the brief engagement. The loss by an unlucky hit of HMS Hood with Vice-Admiral Holland, Captain Kerr and almost her entire ships company was a grievous blow, but a great concentration of forces was gathering behind the Commander-in-Chief, and Admiral Somerville with Force H was speeding towards him from the south.

The chase

When the Hood blew up, HMS Norfolk was 15 nautical miles to the northward coming up at 28 knots. By 0630/24 she was approaching HMS Prince of Wales and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, signalling his intention to keep in touch, told her to follow at best speed. The destroyers that had been with HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were still to the northward. They were ordered to search for survivors but only HMS Electra found three. The Prince of Wales reported that she could do 27 knots and she was told to open out to 10 nautical miles on a bearing of 110° so that HMS Norfolk could fall back on her if she was attacked. Far off the Prinz Eugen could be seen working out to starboard of the Bismarck while the chase continued to the southward.

At 0757 hours, HMS Suffolk reported that the Bismarck had reduced speed and that she appeared to be damaged. Shortly afterwards a Sunderland that had taken off from Iceland reported that the Bismarck was leaving behind a broad track of oil. The Commander-in-Chief with HMS King George V was still a long way off, about 360 nautical miles to the eastward, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the bridge of HMS Norfolk had to make an important decision, was he to renew the action with the help of the Prince of Wales or was he to make it his business to ensure that the enemy could be intercepted and brought to action by the Commander-in-Chief. A dominant consideration in the matter was the state of the Prince of Wales. Her bridge had been wrecked, she had 400 tons of water in her stern compartments and two of her guns were unserverable and she could go no more then 27 knots. She had only been commissioned recently and barely a week had passed since Captain Leach had reported her ready for service. Her turrets were of a new and an untried model, liable for 'teething' problems and evidently suffering from them, for at the end of the morning her salvoes were falling short and wide. It was doubted if she was a match for the Bismarck in her current state and it was on these grounds that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker decided that he would confine himself to shadowing and that he would not attempt to force on an action. Soon after 1100/24 visibility decreased and the Bismarck was lost out of sight in mist and rain.

Measures taken by the Admiralty, 24 May 1941.

After the loss of HMS Hood the following measures were taken by the Admiralty. To watch for an attempt by the enemy to return to Germany, HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa had been ordered at 0120/24 to patrol off the north-east point of Iceland. They were told to proceed to this location with all despatch.

HMS Rodney (Capt. F.H.G. Dalrymple-Hamilton, RN), which with four destroyers was escorting the troopship Britannic (26943 GRT, built 1930) westward, was ordered at 1022/24 to steer west on a closing course and if the Britannic could not keep up she was to leave her with one of the destroyers. Rodney was about 550 nautical miles south-east of the Bismarck. At 1200/24 she left the Britannic in position 55°15'N, 22°25'W and left HMS Eskimo (Lt.Cdr. E.G. Le Geyt, RN) with her. HMS Rodney then proceeded with HMS Somali (Capt. C. Caslon, RN), HMS Tartar (Cdr. L.P. Skipwith, RN) and HMS Mashona (Cdr. W.H. Selby, RN) westwards on a closing course.

Two other capital ships were in the Atlantic; HMS Ramillies (Capt. A.D. Read, RN) and HMS Revenge (Capt. E.R. Archer, RN). The Ramillies was escorting convoy HX 127 from Halifax and was some 900 nautical miles south of the Bismarck. She was ordered at 1144/24 to place herself to the westward of the enemy and leaving her convoy at 1212/24 in position 46°25'N, 35°24'W, she set course to the north. HMS Revenge was ordered to leave Halifax and close the enemy.

Light cruiser HMS Edinburgh (Capt. C.M. Blackman, DSO, RN) was patrolling in the Atlantic between 44°N and 46°N for German merchant shipping and was ordered at 1250/24 to close the enemy and take on relief shadower. At 1430/24 she reported her position as 44°17'N, 23°56'W and she was proceeding on course 320° at 25 knots.

Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was ordered to continue shadowing even if he ran short of fuel so to bring the Commander-in-Chief into action.

The Bismack turns due south at 1320 hours on 24 May 1941.

In the low state of visibility, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy falling back and attacking them. At 1320/24 the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen altered course to the south and reduced speed. HMS Norfolk sighted them through the rain at a range of only 8 nautical miles. Norfolk had to quickly turn away under the cover of a smoke screen.

It was at 1530/24 when HMS Norfolk received a signal made by the Commander-in-Chief at 0800/24 from which it was estimated that the Commander-in-Chief would be near the enemy at 0100/25. This was later changed to 0900/25.

At 1545/24, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was asked by the Admiralty to answer four questions;
1) State the remaining percentage of the Bismarck's fighting efficiency.
2) What amout of ammunition had the Bismarck expended.
3) What are the reasons for the frequent alterations of course by the Bismarck.
4) What are your intentions as regards to the Prince of Wales' re-engaging the Bismarck.

The answers by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker were as follows.
1) Uncertain but high.
2) About 100 rounds.
3) Unaccountable except as an effort to shake off HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk.
4) Consider it wisely for HMS Prince of Wales to not re-engage the Bismarck until other capital ships are in contact, unless interception failed. Doubtful if she has the speed to force an action.

The afternoon drew on towards evening. Still the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen held on to the south while the Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales were still keeping her in sight.

At 1711/24 in order to delay the enemy if possible, by attacking him from astern, the Prince of Wales was stationed ahead of the Norfolk. The enemy was not in sight from the Norfolk at that time, but the Suffolk was still in contact.

At 1841/24 the Bismarck opened fire on the Suffolk. Her salvoes fell short, but one or two shorts came near enough to cause some minor damage to her hull plating aft. HMS Suffolk replied with nine broadsides before turning away behind a smoke screen.

On seeing the Suffolk being attacked, HMS Norfolk turned towards and she and HMS Prince of Wales opened fire, the latter firing 12 salvoes. By 1856 hours the action was over. Two of the guns on the Prince of Wales malfuntioned again. After the action the cruisers started to zig-zag due to fear for German submarines.

British dispositions at 1800 hours on 24 May 1941.

From the Admiralty at 2025/24, there went out a signal summarising the situation at 1800/24. The position, course and speed of the Bismarck was given as 59°10'N, 36°00'W, 180°, 24 knots with HMS Norfolk, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales still in touch. The Commander-in-Chiefs estimated position at 1800/24 was 58°N, 30°W, with HMS King George V and HMS Repulse. HMS Victorious was with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya). They had parted company with the Commander-in-Chief at 1509/24. Heavy cruiser HMS London (Capt. R.M. Servaes, CBE, RN) was in position 42°45'N, 20°10'W and had been ordered to leave her convoy and close the enemy. HMS Ramillies was in estimated position 45°45'N, 35°40'W. She had been ordered to place herself to the west of the enemy. HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa were returning from their position off the north-east of Iceland to refuel. HMS Revenge had left Halifax and was closing convoy HX 128. HMS Edinburgh was in approximate position 45°15'N, 25°10'W. She had been ordered to close and take over stand by shadower.

Evening of 24 May 1941.

At 2031/24 HMS Norfolk received a signal sent by the Commander-in-Chief at 1455/24 stating that aircraft from HMS Victorious might make an attack at 2200/24 and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker now waited for an air attack which he expected at 2300 hours. By that time Bismarck had been lost from sight but at 2330/24 HMS Norfolk briefly sighted her at a distance of 13 nautical miles. At 2343/24 aircraft from HMS Victorious were seen approaching. They circled round HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Norfolk and the latter was able to direct them to the enemy. At 0009/25 heavy anti-aircraft gunfire was seen and the Bismarck was just visible as the aircraft attacked.

HMS Victorious and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron detached by the Commander-in-Chief.

At 1440/24 the Commander-in-Chief ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione) and HMS Victorious to a position within 100 nautical miles from Bismarck and to launch a torpedo bombing attack and maintain contact as long as possible. The object of the torpedo bombing attack was to slow the enemy down. On board the Victorious were only 12 Swordfish torpedo bombers and 6 Fulmar fighters. Victorious was only recently commissioned and her crew was still rather green. She had on board a large consignment of crated Hurricane fighters for Malta which were to be delivered to Gibraltar.

At 2208/24 HMS Victorious commenced launching 9 Swordfish in position 58°58'N, 33°17'E. Two minutes later al were on their way to find the Bismarck. The Squadron was led by Lt.Cdr.(A) E. Esmonde, RN.

HMS Victorious aircraft attack the Bismarck.

When the Swordfish took off from HMS Victorious the Bismarck was estimated to be in position 57°09'N, 36°44'W and was steering 180°, speed 24 knots. At 2330/24 they sighted the Bismarck but contact was lost in the bad weater. Shortly afterwards the Swordfish sighted HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk. HMS Norfolk guided them to the enemy which was 14 nautical miles on her starboard bow. At 2350 hours a vessel was detected ahead and the squadron broke cloud to deliver an attack. To their surprise they found themselves over a United States Coastguard cutter. The Bismarck was 6 nautical miles to the southward and on sighting the aircraft opened up a heavy barrage fire. Lt.Cdr. Esmonde pressed home his attack, 8 of the Swordfish were able to attack, the other had lost contact in the clouds.

The 8 planes attacked with 18" torpedoes, fitted with Duplex pistols set for 31 feet. At midnight three Swordfish attacked simultaneously on the port beam. Three others made a longer approach low down attacking on the port bow a minute later. One took a longer course, attacking on the port quarter. One went round and attacked on the starboard bow a couple of minutes after midnight. At least one hit was claimed on the starboard side abreast the bridge. The Germans however state that no hit was scored but that the violent maneuvering of the ship to avoid the attack, together with the heavy firing by the Bismarck caused the leak in no.2 boiler room to open up. No.2 boiler room was already partially flooded and now had to be abandoned.

All Swordfish from the striking had returned to HMS Victorious by 0201/25. Two Fulmars launched at 2300/24 for shadowing failed to find their ship in the darkness due to the failure of Victorious' homing beacon. Their crews were in the end picked up from the chilly water.

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk loose contact at 0306/25.

While the aircraft from HMS Victorious were making their attack, HMS Norfolk sighted a ship to the south-west and gave the order to open fire. HMS Prince of Wales was able to identify it in time as an American coast guard cutter, but in the movements prepartory to opening fire HMS Norfolk lost touch with the enemy for a time and it was not until 0116/25 that she suddenly sighted the Bismarck only 8 nautical miles away. There followed a brief exchange of fire. HMS Norfolk and HMS Prince of Wales turned to port to bring their guns to bear and the latter was ordered to engage. It was then 0130/25. The Prince of Wales fired two salvoes at 20000 yards by radar. The Bismarck answered with two salvoes which fell a long way short. The light was failing and the enemy was again lost to sight. HMS Suffolk, which had to most reliable RDF set was told to act independently so as to keep in touch.

Around 0306/25 the Suffolk lost touch with the Bismarck. At 0552/25 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker asked if HMS Victorious could launch aircraft for a search at dawn.

Search measures, 25 May 1941.

With the disappearance of the Bismarck at 0306/25 the first phase of the pursuit ended. The Commander-in-Chief, in HMS King George V with HMS Repulse in company was then about 115 nautical miles to the south-east. At 0616/25, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker signalled that it was most probable that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen made a 90° turn to the west or turned back and 'cut away' to the eastward astern of the cruisers. Suffolk was already searching to the south-west and Norfolk was waiting for daylight to do the same. Prince of Wales was ordered to join the King George V and Repulse.

Force H was still on a course to intercept the Bismarck while steaming on at 24 knots. The Rear-Admiral commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron in HMS Galatea had altered course at 0558/25 to 180° for the position where the enemy was last seen and the Victorious was getting 8 aircraft ready to fly off at 0730/25 for a search to the eastward. This plan however was altered on orders being recieved from the Commander-in-Chief to take the cruisers and Victorious and carry out a search to the north-west of the Bismarck's last reported position. Five Fulmars had already been up during the night, two of them had not returned to the ship. The search therefore had to be undertaken by Swordfish, the only aircraft available. At 0810/25, seven Swordfish were flown off from position 56°18'N, 36°28'W to search between 280° and 040° up to 100 nautical miles. The search was supplemented by Victorious herself as well as the cruisers from the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione) which were spread some miles apart.

DF position of the Bismarck of 0852/25.

HMS King George V was still proceeding to the south-west when at 1030/25 the Commander-in-Chief recieved a signal from the Admiralty that the Bismarck's position had been obtained by DF (direction finding) and that it indicated that the Bismarck was on a course for the North Sea by the Faeroes-Iceland passage. To counter this move by the enemy the Commander-in-Chief turned round at 1047/25 and made for the Faeroes-Iceland passage at 27 knots. HMS Repulse was no longer in company with HMS King George V, she had been detached at 0906/25 for Newfoundland to refuel. Suffolk also turned to the eastward to search, her search to the south-west had been fruitless. The search by HMS Victorious, her aircraft and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to the north-west also had no result. Six Swordfish were landed on by 1107/25, one failed to return. HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora and HMS Kenya now turned towards the DF position of the Bismarck to search in that direction. HMS Hermione had to be detached to Hvalfiord, Iceland to refuel as she was by now down to 40%. The other cruisers slowed down to 20 knots to economise their remaining fuel supply wich was also getting low. At this moment HMS King George V had about 60% remaining.

Events during 25 May 1941.

At 1100/25, HMS King George V, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales were proceeding to the north-east in the direction of the enemy's DF signal. HMS Rodney was in position 52°34'N, 29°23'W some 280 nautical miles to the south-eastward on the route towards the Bay of Biscay. On receiving the Commander-in-Chiefs signal of 1047/25 she too proceeded to the north-east.

Meanwhile to Admiralty had come to the conclusion that the Bismarck most likely was making for Brest, France. This was signalled to the Commander-in-Chief at 1023/25 to proceed together with Force H and the 1st Cruiser Squadron on that assumption.

In the absence however of definite reports it was difficult to be certain of the position of the enemy. The DF bearings in the morning had not been very definite. At 1100/25, HMS Renown (Force H), was in position 41°30'N, 17°10'W was ordered to act on the assumption the enemy was making for Brest, France. She shaped course accordingly and prepared a comprehensive sheme of air search. At 1108/25, HMS Rodney, was told to act on the assumption that the enemy was making for the Bay of Biscay. At 1244/25 the Flag Officer Submarines ordered six submarines to take up intercepting positions about 120 nautical miles west of Brest. The submarines involved were HMS Sealion (Cdr. B. Bryant, DSC, RN), HMS Seawolf (Lt. P.L. Field, RN), HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) from the 5th Submarine Flottilla at Portsmouth, HMS Pandora (Lt.Cdr. J.W. Linton, DSC, RN), which was on passage to the U.K. from the Mediterranean to refit, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN), from the 3rd Submarine Flottilla at Holy Loch and HMS H 44 (Lt. W.N.R. Knox, DSC, RN), a training boat from the 7th Submarine Flotilla at Rothesay which happened to be at Holyhead. Seawolf, Sturgeon and Tigris were already on patrol in the Bay of Biscay, Sealion departed Portsmouth on the 25th as did H 44 but she sailed from Holyhead. Pandora was on passage to the U.K. to refit and was diverted.

At 1320/25 a good DF fix located an enemy unit within a 50 mile radius from position 55°15'N, 32°00'W. This was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief at 1419/25 and it was received at 1530/25. It was only in the evening that it was finally clear to all involved that Bismarck was indeed making for a French port. Air searches had failed to find her during the day. (13)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part II.

26 May 1941.

By now the question of fuel was becoming acute. For four days ships had been steaming at high speeds and the Commander-in-Chief was faced with the reality of fuel limits. HMS Repulse had already left for Newfoundland, HMS Prince of Wales had by now been sent to Iceland to refuel. HMS Victorious and HMS Suffolk had been forced to reduce speed to economise their fuel.

Coastal Command started air searches along the route towards the Bay of Biscay by long range Catalina flying boats. Lack of fuel was effecting the destroyer screens of the capital ships. There was no screen available for HMS Victorious. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla, escorting troop convoy WS 8B, was ordered at 0159/26 to join the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and HMS Rodney as was HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.P. Thew, RN) which sailed from Londonderry. Leaving the convoy the 4th D.F. proceeded to the north-east. Force H in the meantime was also approaching the immediate area of operations. These forces were to play an important part in the final stages of the chase of the Bismarck.

Force H, 26 May 1941.

HMS Renown, HMS Ark Royal and HMS Sheffield were having a rough passage north in heavy seas, high wind, rain and mist. Their escorting destroyers had already turned back towards Gibraltar at 0900/25. At dawn on the 26th there was half a gale blowing from the north-west. At 0716/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a security patrol in position 48°26'N, 19°13'W to search to the north and to the west just in case the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had departed Brest to come to the aid of the Bismarck. At 0835/26 there followed an A/S patrol of ten Swordfish. All planes had returned by 0930. None had seen anything.

Bismarck sighted at 1030/26.

It was at 1030/26 that one of the long range Catalina's of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck in position 49°30'N, 21°55'W. It was received in HMS King George V at 1043 hours and in HMS Renown in 1038 hours. It placed the enemy well to the westward of the Renown. It was confirmed within the hour when two Swordfish from the Ark Royal which reported the Bismarck in position 49°19'N, 20°52'W some 25 miles east of the position given by the Catalina. The Commander-in-Chief was at that moment about 130 miles to the north of the Bismarck but it was soon clear that the Bismarck had too great a lead to permit her being overtaken unless her speed could be reduced. Nor was the question one merely of distance and speed. The Bismarck was approaching a friendly coast and could run her fuel tanks nearly dry and was sure of air protection, while the British ships would have a long journey back to base in the face of air and submarine attack. HMS Renown was ahead of the Bismarck but it was important that she did not engage the Bismarck unless the latter was already heavily engaged by the better armoured HMS King George V and HMS Rodney.

When the Catalina found the Bismarck at 1030 hours, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was steering east to join the Commander-in-Chief. They seem to have crossed astern of the enemy's track about 0800/26. The Catalina's report reached Capt. Vian in HMS Cossack at 1054/26 and 'knowing that the Commander-in-Chief would order him to intercept the enemy' Capt. Vian altered course to the south-east.

First attack by aircraft from the Ark Royal.

At 1315/26 HMS Sheffield was detached to the southward with orders to close and shadow the enemy, who was estimated to be 40 nautical miles south-west of the Renown. The visual signal ordering this movement was not repeated to HMS Ark Royal, an omission which had serious consequenses for the aircraft that were to take off did not know that HMS Sheffield had parted company.

At 1450/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a striking force of 14 Swordfish aircraft with the orders to proceed to the south and attack the Bismarck with torpedoes. Weather and cloud conditions were bad and a radar contact was obtained on a ship some 20 nautical miles from the estimated position of the enemy that had been given to the leader shortly before takeoff. At 1550 hours they broke through the clouds and fired 11 torpedoes. Unfortunately the supposed enemy was HMS Sheffield which managed to avoid all torpedoes. The Bismarck at that time was some 15 nautical miles to the southward. The striking force then returned an all aircraft had landed on by 1720/26.

At 1740/26, HMS Sheffield, sighted the Bismarck in position 48°30'N, 17°20'W and took station about 10 nautical miles astern and commenced shadowing the enemy.

Ark Royal's second attack, 2047/26.

The first striking force on its way back sighted the 4th Destroyer Flotilla 20 nautical miles west of Force H. As soon as the aircraft from the first strike had landed they were refuelled and rearmed as fast as possible. Take off started at 1910/26, a total of 15 Swordfish were launched. Reports coming in from HMS Sheffield placed the Bismarck at 167°, 38 nautical miles from the Ark Royal. The striking force was ordered to contact HMS Sheffield who was told to use DF to guide them in.

At 1955/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted but soon lost in the bad weather conditions. She was found again at 2035 hours, she guided the Swordfish in and directed them by visual signal on the enemy bearing 110°, 12 nautical miles. The force took departure for the target in subflights in line astern at 2040/26.

At 2047/26 no.1 subflight of three Swordfish dived through the clouds and sighted the Bismarck 4 nautical miles off to the south-east. One Swordfish of no.3 subflight was with them. Approaching again just inside the cloud they made their final dive at 2053/26 on the port beam under a very intense and accurate fire from the enemy. They dropped four torpedoes of which one was seen to hit. No.2 subflight, made up of two Swordfish, lost touch with no.1 subflight in the clouds, climed to 9000 feet, then dived on a bearing obtained by radar and then attacked from the starboard beam, again under heavy and intense fire. They dropped two torpedoes for one possible hit. The third plane of this subflight had lost touch with the other two and had returned to HMS Sheffield to obtained another range and bearing to the enemy. It then flew ahead of the enemy and carried out a determined attack from his port bow under heavy fire and obtained a torpedo hit on the port side amidships.

Subflight no.4 followed subflight no.3 into the clouds but got iced up at 6600 feet. It then dived through the clouds and was joined by no.2 aircraft from subflight no.3. The Bismarck was then sighted engaging subflight no.2 to starboard. The four aircraft then went into the clouds and cicled the German battleships stern and then dived out of the clouds again and attack simultaneously from the port side firing four torpedoes. All however missed the Bismarck. They came under a very heavy and fierce fire from the enemy and one of the aircraft was heavily damaged, the pilot and air gunner being wounded.

The two aircraft of subflight no.5 lost contact with the other subflights and then with each other in the cloud. They climbed to 7000 feet where ice began to form. When coming out of the cloud at 1000 feet aircraft 4K sighted the Bismarck down wind, she then went back into the cloud under fire from the enemy. She saw a torpedo hit on the enemy's starboard side, reached a position on the starboard bow, withdrew to 5 miles, then came in just above the sea and just outside 1000 yards fired a torpedo which did not hit. The second plane of this flight lost his leader diving through the cloud, found himself on the starboard quarter and after two attempts to attack under heavy fire was forced to jettison his torpedo.

Of the two Swordfish of subflight no.6 one attacked the Bismarck on the starboard beam and dropped his torpedo at 2000 yards without success. The second plane lost the enemy, returned to the Sheffield for a new range and bearing and after searching at sea level attacked on the starboard beam but was driven off by intense fire. The attack was over by 2125/26. Thirteen torpedoes had been fired and it was thought two hits and one probable hit had been obtained. Two torpedoes were jettisoned. The severe nature and full effect of the damage done was at first not fully realised. Actually the Bismarck had received a deadly blow. The last of the shadowing aircraft to return had seen her make two complete circles. One torpedo had struck her on the port side amidships doing little damage but th other torpedo that hit was on the starboard quarter damaging her propellors, wrecking her steering gear and jambing her rudders, it was this torpedo hit that sealed her fate.

HMS Sheffield was still shadowing astern when at 2140/26 the Bismarck turned to port and fired six accurate salvoes of 15". None actually hit Sheffield but a near miss killed three men and seriously injured two. HMS Sheffield turned away and while doing so she sighted HMS Cossack and the other destroyers from the 4th DF approaching from the westward. She then gave them the approximate position of the Bismarck. At 2155/26, HMS Sheffield lost touch with the Bismarck. The destroyers continued to shadow and eventually attack. Meanwhile HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal shaped course for the southward to keep the road clear for the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and for HMS Rodney. Also in the Ark Royal aircraft were being got ready for an attack on the Bismarck at dawn.

Bismarck, 26 May 1941.

The Bismarck could no longer steer after the torpedo hit aft. The steering motor room was flooded up to the main deck and the rudders were jambed. Divers went down to the steering room and managed to centre one rudder but the other remained immovable. She was by this time urgently in need of fuel. It was hoped by the Germans that while she was nearing the French coast strong forces of aircraft and submarines would come to her assistance.

At 2242/26, Bismarck sighted the British destroyers. A heavy fire was opened on them. Their appearence greatly complicated the situation. Before their arrival however, Admiral Lütjens seems to have made up his mind as one hour earlier he had signalled to Berlin 'ship out of control. We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.'

The fourth Destroyer Flotilla makes contact, 26 May 1941.

Just as the sun was setting, Captain Vian (D.4) in HMS Cossack with HMS Maori, HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and the Polish destroyer ORP Piorun arrived on the scene.

Shortly after 1900/26 HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal were sighted to the northward. Ark Royal was just about to fly off the second striking force. The destroyers continued on the the south-east. At 2152/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted and from her Captain Vian obtained the approximate position of the enemy.

The destroyers were spread 2.5 nautical miles apart on a line bearing 250° - 070° in the order from north-east to south-west, Piorun, Maori, Cossack, Sikh, Zulu. During the latter stages of the approach speed was reduced and the flotilla manoeuvred so as to avoid making a high speed end-on contact.

At 2238/26, ORP Piorun on the port wing reported the Bismarck 9 nautical miles distant, bearing 145° and steering to the south-eastward.

Destroyers shadowing, late on 26 May 1941.

At the time the Piorun reported being in contact with the Bismarck the destroyers were steering 120°. All were at once ordered to take up shadowing positions. Four minutes later the Bismarck opened a heavy fire with her main and secondary armaments on the Piorun and Maori. Two attempts were made by these ships to work round to the northward of the enemy but they were silhouetted against the north-western horizon making them easy to spot. The Bismarck's fire was unpleasantly accurate, through neither destroyer was actually hit. The Commanding Officer of the Maori then decided to work round to the southward and altered course accordingly.

The Piorun closed the range and herself opened fire from 13500 yards but after firing three salvoes, she was straddled by a salvo which fell about 20 yards from the ships side. She then ceased fire and turned away to port while making smoke. During this engagement she lost touch with the other destroyers and later also with the Bismarck. She remained under fire for about one hour but was not hit. She worked round to the north-east of the Bismarck but eventually lost touch with her prey at 2355/26.

The other destroyers, meanwhile, had been working round to the southward of the enemy to take up shadowing positions to the eastward of him. Soon after the initial contact it was evident the the Bismarck's speed had been so seriously reduced that interception by the battlefleet was certain, provided that contact could be held. In these circumstances Captain Vian defined his object at firstly, to deliver the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief at the time he desired, and secondly, to sink or immoblise her with torpedoes during the night but not with to great a risk for the destroyers. Accordingly at 2248/26 as signal was made to all ordering them to shadow and this operation was carried out through the night, though torpedo attacks were carried out later under the cover of darkness.

As darkness came on, the weather deteriorated and heavy rain squalls became frequent. Visibility varied between 2.5 nautical miles and half a mile but the Bismarck, presumably using radar, frequently opened up accurate fire outside these ranges.

About half an hour after sunset, the destroyers were ordered at 2324/26 to take up stations prepartory to carrying out a synchronised torpedo attack. This was subsequently cancelled on account of the adverse weather conditions and they were ordered to attack independently as opportunity offered. At about 2300 hours the Bismarck altered course to the north-westward.

At this time HMS Zulu was in touch with her and kept her under observation from the southward. At 2342 hours the Bismarck opened fire on HMS Cossack, then about 4 miles to the south-south-west and shot away her aerials. The Cossack turned away under the cover of smoke, shortly afterwards resuming her course to the eastward.

A few minutes later, at 2350 hours, HMS Zulu came under heavy fire from the Bismarck's 15" guns. The first three salvoes straddled wounding an officer and two ratings. Drastic avoiding action was taken as a result of which Zulu lost touch. HMS Sikh, however, who had lost sight of the enemy half an hour previously, had observed her firing at HMS Cossack and now succeeded in shadowing from astern until 0020/27 when the enemy made a large alteration to port and commenced firing at her. HMS Sikh altered course to port, intending to fire torpedoes, but the view of the Torpedo Control Officer was obscured by shell splashes and Sikh then withdrew to the southward.

Destroyer night torpedo attacks, 26/27 May 1941.

HMS Zulu, after her escape at 2345/26, had steered to the northward and at 0030/27 fell in with HMS Cossack. Shortly afterwards she sighted ORP Piorun. On receipt of a signal from Captain Vian, timed 0040/27, to take any opporunity to fire torpedoes, HMS Zulu altered course to the westward,and at 0100/27 sighted the Bismarck steering 340°.

Positions of the destroyers was now as follows; to the north-eastward of the enemy, HMS Cossack was working round to the north and west. HMS Maori, since losing touch, had been making to the westward. She was now to the south-west of the Bismarck. HMS Sikh was some distance to the southward, not having received any information regarding the position of the Bismarck since 0025/27. HMS Zulu was astern of the enemy and in contact. Range was only 5000 yards. Bismarck finally spotted Zulu and at once opened fire with her main and secondary armament and straddled Zulu. She fired four torpedoes at 0121/27 but no hits were observed and they are believed to have missed ahead. Zulu then ran out to the northward in order to be clear of the other destroyers. Shortly afterwards they widnessed a successful attack by HMS Maori.

HMS Maori had seen the Bismarck opening fire on the Zulu at 0107/27. Maori then closed to 4000 yards on Bismarck's port quarter apparently undetected. When abeam of the enemy, who then appeared to be altering course to starboard Maori fired a star shell to see what he was about. Two minutes later, at 0137/27, two torpedoes were fired and course was altered towards the Bismarck with the intention of attacking again from her starboard bow once the enemy had steadied on her new course. Whilst Maori was turning a torpedo hit was observed on the enemy. A bright glow illuminated the waterline of the enemy battleship from stem to stern. Shortly afterwards there appeared between the bridge and the stem a glare that might have been a second hit. The enemy immediately opened up a very heavy fire with both main and secondairy armaments and quick firing guns. As the Maori was being straddled, she turned away, and increased to full speed. Shots continued to fall on both sides of the ship until the range had been opened up to 10000 yards. Maori was not actually hit. Meanwhile HMS Cossack had been creeping up from the north-eastward and at 0140/27, only three minutes after Maori had fired two torpedoes, Cossack launched three torpedoes from 6000 yards. Bismarck stood out plainly, silhoutted by the broadsides she was firing at the Maori. One torpedo was seen to hit. Flames blazed on the forecastle of the Bismarck after this hit but they were quickly extinguished. Probably as a consequence of the torpedo hits the Bismarck stopped dead in the water, this was reported by HMS Zulu at 0148/27. After about one hour the Bismarck got underway again. On receipt of this report, HMS Sikh, who was closing the scene of the action from the southward, made an attack. Four torpedoes were fired at 0218/27 at the stopped battleship. It is believed that one hit was obtained. After this attack Sikh remained in radar contact with the enemy until 0359/27 when contact was lost.

Around 0240/27 the Bismarck was underway again, proceeding very slowly to the north-westward. At 0335/27, HMS Cossack made another attack firing her last remaining torpedo from a range of 4000 yards. It missed. HMS Cossack then came under a heavy fire. She withdrew to the northward under the cover of smoke, altering to a westerly course shortly afterwards.

At 0400/27 all destroyers had lost touch with the enemy. HMS Cossack was then to the north-west and HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and HMS Maori were between the south-west and south-east of the Bismarck. All destroyers now endeavoured to regain contact.

Touch with the enemy was not regained until shortly before 0600 hours. By that time ORP Piorun, which was running short of fuel, had been ordered to proceed to Plymouth.

Destroyers shadowing, morning twilight, 27 May 1941, final attack.

Touch was regained by HMS Maori at 0550/27 when she sighted the Bismarck zigzagging slowly on a base course of 340° at about 7 knots. Maori commenced shadowing until daylight. At 0625 hours, HMS Sikh was also in contact when the Bismarck emerged from a rain squal 7000 yards on her starboard bow. By then it was nearly full daylight but to the surprise of the crew of the Sikh she got away with it without being fired at.

Shortly before sunrise a final torpedo attack was carried out by HMS Maori, which fired two torpedoes at 0656/27 from 9000 yards. Both missed. The Bismarck opened fire and straddled Maori which escaped at 28 knots.

At daylight the destroyers were stationed in four sectors from which they were able to keep the enemy under continuous observation until the arrival of the Battle Fleet at 0845 hours.

Force H, 26/27 May 1941.

While the destroyers were shadowing the Bismarck, the pursuing forces were drawing steadily closer. To the north was the Commander-in-Chief with the King George V and the Rodney with the Norfolk closing on them. In the south HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. B.C.S. Martin, RN) was coming up, while Force H was waiting for the dawn. When Captain Vian's destroyers got in touch at 2251/26 the Renown and Ark Royal were north-west of the enemy. It was not possible to attack with aircraft during the night but all preparations were made to attack at dawn with 12 Swordfish. Course was shaped to the northward and then to the west for a time and at 0115/27 Force H turned south. Shortly afterwards instructions were received from the Commander-in-Chief to keep not less then 20 miles to the southward of the Bismarck so as to leave a clear approach for the Battle Fleet. Force H accordingly continued to the southward during the night. Bursts of starshell and gunfire could be seen during the night while the destroyers attacked. At 0509/27 an aircraft was flown off from HMS Ark Royal to act as a spotter for HMS King George V but it failed to find the Bismarck in the bad weather. The striking of force of 12 Swordfish was ready but due to the bad weather to strike was cancelled.

At 0810/27, HMS Maori was sighted. She reported the Bismarck 11 miles to the north of her. The made the enemy 17 miles to the north of HMS Renown so course was shaped to the south-west. At 0915/27 heavy gunfire could be heard and the striking force was flown off. They found the Bismarck at 1016/27. By then the battle was almost over, her guns were silenced and she was on fire. They saw her sink. At 1115/27 they had all landed back on HMS Ark Royal. A German Heinkel aircraft dropped a couple of bombs near HMS Ark Royal when they were landing on.

HMS Norfolk, 26/27 May 1941.

When the Catalina report (1030/26) came in, HMS Norfolk altered course to the south-west and increased speed to 27 knots. At 2130/26 the Bismarck was still some 160 nautical miles to the southward and speed was increased to 30 knots. At 2228/26 the report on the torpedo hit by the aircraft from Ark Royal came in and the Norfolk turned to the southward, continuing to close the enemy. At 0753/27 Norfolk sighted the Bismarck. She did not open fire and was lost to sight after ten minutes. At 0821/27, HMS King George V, was sighted to the westward, 12 nautical miles away. The position of the enemy was passed to the Commander-in-Chief. The action opened at 0847/27 at which time HMS Norfolk was then some 10 nautical miles from the Commander-in-Chief and due north of the Bismarck. HMS Norfolk had seen the beginning and was now to see the end.

HMS Dorsetshire, 26/27 May 1941.

On 26 May 1941, HMS Dorsetshire, was with convoy SL 74 proceeding from Freetown to the U.K. When she received the sighting report from the Catalina at 1056/26 she was some 360 nautical miles to the south of the Bismarck. She then left the protection of the convoy to the Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) and set course for the northward to take up the possible task of shadowing. By 2343/26 it became clear from reports that the Bismarck was making no ground to the eastward and that at 0230/27 she appeared to be laying stopped. Due to the heavy seas HMS Dorsetshire was forced to reduce speed to 25 knots and later even to 20 knots. At 0833/27 a destroyer was sighted ahead at a range of 8 nautical miles, it was HMS Cossack which reported the enemy at a range of 6 nautical miles. At 0850/27 the flashes of the Bismarck's guns could be seen to the westward. HMS Dorsetshire arrived at the scene of the action in the nick of time.

HMS King George V and HMS Rodney, 26/27 May 1941.

During 26 May 1941 the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V had been making hard to the south-east at 25 knots. He had been joined by HMS Rodney at 1806/26. They were then some 90 nautical miles north of the Bismarck. Fuel was a matter of grave anxiety. At noon on the 26th, HMS King George V, had only 32% remaining and HMS Rodney reported that she had to return at 0800/27. Speed had to be reduced on this account to 22 knots at 1705/26. In these circumstances it was no longer possible to hope to intercept the enemy, and the Commander-in-Chief decided that unless the enemy's speed had been reduced by 2400/26, he must turn at that hour. The only hope lay in the Bismarck being slowed up by the Swordfish attacking from HMS Ark Royal. A report came in that the striking force had left. Then at 2132/26, HMS Sheffield, reported that the enemy was steering 340° followed by 000° four minutes later. These reports indicated that the Bismarck was not able to hold her course and that her steering gear must have been damaged. It might still be possible to intercept her.

The Commander-in-Chief turned to the south at once hoping to make contact from the eastward in the failing light. Due to the bad weather conditions and visibility the Commander-in-Chief decided to haul off the the eastward and northward and then work round to engage from the westward at dawn. He turned eastward at 2306/26. During the night reports from Captain Vian's destroyers came in confirming the northerly course of the Bismarck. At 0236/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered Captain Vian that the destroyers were to fire star-shell every half hour, but frequent rain squalls prevented these from being seen and they tended to attrack the enemy's fire. The Bismarck was still a formidable opponent for at 0353/27 Captain Vian reported that during the last hour she had done 8 nautical miles and that she was still capable of heavy and accurate fire. The Commander-in-Chief decided not to make a dawn approach but to wait until daylight while approaching from the west taking advantage of wind, sea and light. At 0529/27 HMS Rodney reported sighting HMS Norfolk to the eastward by DF. It was light at 0600 hours. At 0820 hours HMS Norfolk was sighted on the port bow of HMS King George V. She signalled 'enemy 130°, 16 nautical miles'. At 0843/27 looming on the starboard bow there emerges out of a rain squall the dark grey blot of a large ship. 'Enemy in sight'.

Bismarck 26/27 May 1941.

The Bismarck after altering course to the north-west had been labouring along with a jambed rudder, steering an erratic course at 8 knots. During the night the attacking destroyers were met with heavy and accurate salvoes. Sixteen torpedoes were fired at her. Early in the morning a glare of star-shell burst over her, lighting her up. Three torpedoes followed from a destroyer on the port bow (HMS Maori) of which one hit on the port side amidships. Three minutes later three more came from the starboard side (these were fired by HMS Cossack) of which one hit on the starboard bow. The damage that was sustained from these torpedo hits is not known. The Bismarck lay stopped for over one hour. At 0140/27 a message was received that a large number of Junkers bombers were coming to her aid as were U-boats but the Bismarck was beyond their help besides that the aircraft did not find her. One U-boat (U-556, which was out of torpedoes) on its way back from the Atlantic joined her and was within sight during the night. Another (U-74) arrived at 0600/27 but had been damaged in a depth charge attack and could do nothing as well. In the Bismarck the crew was exhausted and men were falling asleep at their posts. It was under these conditions that at 0840/27 two British battleships were seen to approach from the westward.

Situation before the action, 27 May 1941.

A north-westerly gale was blowing when dawn broke with a good light and clear horizon to the north-eastward. Reports received during the night indicated that, despite reduced speed and damaged rudders, Bismarck's armament was functioning effectively. Given the weather conditions the Commander-in-Chief decided to approach on a west-north-westerly bearing and, if the enemy continued his northerly course, to deploy to the southward on opposite course at a range of about 15000 yards. Further action was to be dictated by events.

Between 0600 and 0700 hours a series of enemy reports from HMS Maori which was herself located by DF bearings. This enabled HMS King George V to plot her position relatively to the Bismarck which had apparently settled down on a course of 330° at 10 knots. At 0708/27, HMS Rodney, was ordered to keep station 010° from the flagship. HMS Norfolk came in sight to the eastward at 0820/27 and provided a visual link between the Commander-in-Chief and the enemy. After the line of approach had been adjusted by two alterations of course, the Bismarck was sighted at 0843/27 bearing 118°, range about 25000 yards. Both British battleships was then steering 110° almost directly towards the enemy in line abreast formation, 8 cables apart.

Commencement of action 0847/27.

HMS Rodney opened fire at 0847/27, her first salvo sending a column of water 150 feet into the air. HMS King George V opened fire one minute later. Bismarck opened fire at 0850 hours after turning to open up A arcs. The first German salvo was short. The third and fourth salvoes straddled and nearly hit, but the Rodney manoeuvered succesfully to avoid them and the nearest fell 20 yards short. At 0854/27, HMS Norfolk joined in, but the target was not clearly visible and she opened fire without obtaining a range.

Observers state that the German gunnery was accurate at first, but commenced to deteriorate after 8 to 10 salvoes. The first hit on the Bismarck was believed to be scored by the Rodney at 0854 hours with her third salvo. Both British battleships made small alterations of course away from the enemy shortly after opening fire, the King George V to increase her distance from the Rodney and the latter to open her A arcs. From then onwards they manoeuvered independently although HMS Rodney conformed to the Flagship's general movements. The Bismarck's secondary armament came into action during this phase. HMS Rodney opened fire with her secondary armament at 0858 hours.

Run to the southward.

HMS King George V deployed to the southward at 0859/27 when the Bismarck was 16000 yards distant. HMS Rodney, 2.5 nautical miles to the northward, followed suit a minute or two later. Cordite smoke was hanging badly with the following wind and spotting was most difficult. Considerable smoke interference was therefore experienced on the southerly course which was partly overcome by radar. The Bismarck had transferred her fire to the King George V shortly after the turn but except for an occasional splash the latter hardly knew that she was under fire. At 0902/27, HMS Rodney saw a 16” shell hit the Bismarck on the upper deck forward, apparently putting the forward turrets out of action. At 0904 hours, HMS Dorsetshire joined in the firing from the eastwards from a range of 20000 yards but observation of the target was difficult and she had to check fire from 0913 to 0920 hours. Between 0910 and 0915 hours the range in King George V was more or less steady at 12000 yards.

The fate of the Bismarck was decided during this phase of the action although she did not sink until later. Around 0912 hours, the Bismarck was hit on her forward control position. During the run to the south HMS Rodney fired six torpedoes from 11000 yards and HMS Norfolk four from 16000 yards. No hits were obtained. The King George V’s secondary battery came into action at 0905 hours but this increased the smoke interference and was accordingly ordered to cease fire after two or three minutes.

Run to the northward.

At 0916/27 the Bismarck’s bearing was drawing rapidly aft and HMS Rodney turned 16 points to close and head her off. The King George V followed a minute or so later and both ships re-opened fire at ranges from 8600 and 12000 yards respectively. The Bismarck shifted her target to the Rodney about this time. A near miss damaged the sluice of her starboard torpedo tube. Most of the enemy’s guns had however been silenced at this time. Only one turret from her main armament was firing at this time as was part of her secondary armament. A fire was blazing amidships and she had a heavy list to port. During the run to the north HMS Rodney obtained a very favourable position on the Bismarck’s bow from which she poured in a heavy fire from close range. She also fired two torpedoes from 7500 yards but no hits were obtained.

HMS King George V’s position, further to leeward, was less favourable. Her view was obscured by smoke and splashes surrounding the target and her radar had temporarily broken down. Mechanical failures in the 14” turrets constituted, however, a more serious handicap at this stage. ‘A’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets were out of action for 30, 7 and a unspecified short period, respectively. This resulted in reduction of firepower of 80% for 7 minutes and 40% for 23 minutes which might have had serious effects under less favourable conditions. There were also several defects of individual guns in addition to those effecting the turrets.

At 0925/27, HMS King George V, altered outwards to 150° and reduced speed to avoid getting too far ahead of the Bismarck. She closed in again at 1005 hours, fired several salvoes from a range of only 3000 yards and then resumed her northerly course. Meanwhile HMS Rodney was zigzagging across the Bismarck’s line of advance at a range of about 4000 yards firing her main and secondary armaments. She also fired four torpedoes, one of which is thought to have hit. By 1015 hours the Bismarck was no more than a wreck. All her guns were silenced, her mast had been blown away, she was a black ruin, pouring high into the air a great cloud of smoke and flame. Men were seen jumping overboard at this time and the Captain of the King George V later remarked had he known it he would have ceased fire.

End of the action.

The Commander-in-Chief was confident that the enemy could never get back to harbour, and as both battleships were running short of fuel and as further gunfire was unlikely to hasten the Bismarck’s end, the Commander-in-Chief signalled the King George V and Rodney to steer 027° at 1015/27 in order to break off the action and return to base. At 1036/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered HMS Dorsetshire to use her torpedoes, if she had any, on the enemy. In the meantime HMS Norfolk had been closing the target but due to the movements of the King George V and Rodney, had not fired her torpedoes until 1010 hours when she fired four torpedoes from 4000 yards and two possible hits were reported. The Dorsetshire was then approaching a mile or so to the southward, and anticipating the Commander-in-Chief’s signal at 1025 hours fired two torpedoes from 3600 yards into the enemy’s starboard side. She then steamed round the Bismarck’s bow and at 1036 hours fired another torpedo but now into her port side from 2600 yards. This was the final blow, the Bismarck heeled over quickly to port and commenced to sink by the stern. The hull turned over keel up and disappeared beneath the waves at 1040/27.

The Dorsetshire then closed and signalled to one of HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft to carry out a close A/S patrol while she was to pick up survivors assisted by HMS Maori. After 110 men had been picked up by both ships from the water both ships got underway again as a submarine was suspected to be in the area.

Damage to the Bismarck.

Survivors have told the story of terrible damage inflicted on her. The fore turrets seem to have been knocked out at 0902 hours. The fore control position was knocked out around 0912 hours. The after control position followed about 0915 hours. The after turrets were at that moment still in action. Then the aftermost gun turret was disabled by a direct hit on the left gun which burst sending a flash right through the turret. ‘C’ turret was the last one in action.

One survivor stated that around 0930 hours a shell penetrated the turbine room and another one entered a boiler room. A hit in the after dressing station killed all the medical staff and wounded that were in there at that moment. The upper deck was crowded with killed and wounded men and the seas surging in washed them overboard. Conditions below were even more terrible. Hatches and doors were jammed by concussion and blocked with wreckage. The air was thick with smoke and even more smoke was coming in from great holes in the upper deck. By 1000 hours all heavy guns were out of action and 10 minutes later the all secondary guns were also silent.

Commander-in-Chief returns.

As HMS King George V and HMS Rodney turned northwards they were joined by HMS Cossack, HMS Sikh and HMS Zulu at by 1600/28 more detroyers had joined the screen (HMS Maori, HMS Jupiter, HMS Somali, HMS Eskimo, HMS Punjabi, HMAS Nestor, HMS Inglefield, HMS Lance, HMS Vanquisher (Cdr. N.V. Dickinson, DSC, RN), HMCS St. Clair (Lt.Cdr. D.C. Wallace, RCNR), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr. (Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN) and HMS Ripley (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Agnew, RN). Heavy air attacks were expected that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared, one of which bombed the screen while another one jettisoned her bombs on being attacked by a Blenheim fighter. The destroyers HMS Mashona and HMS Tartar, 100 nautical miles to the southward, were not so furtunate. They were attacked in position 52°58’N, 11°36’W at 0955/28 by German aircraft. HMS Mashona was hit and sank at noon with the loss of 1 officer and 45 men. The Commander-in-Chief reached Loch Ewe at 1230/29. Vice-Admiral Somerville with Force H was on his way back to Gibraltar. HMS Renown, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Sheffield made rendezvous at 0800/29 with the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, DSC and Bar, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Wishart (Cdr. E.T. Cooper, RN). At 1605/29, HMS Forester and HMS Fury were detached to hunt a submarine further to the west. Force H, minus the two destroyers that had been detached, arrived at Gibraltar around 2030/29.

End of ‘Operation Rheinübung’.

The Bismarck’s consort, heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, was not heard off until 4 June 1941 when aircraft reported her having arrived at Brest. After leaving the Bismarck at 1914/24, the Prinz Eugen’s primary need was to replenish her fuel stock. She set course for a rendez-vous with two tankers, the Spichern (9323 GRT, built 1935, former Norwegian Krossfonn) and the Esso Hamburg (9849 GRT, built 1939) which were position to the north-west of the Azores. All next day the German cruiser made her way southwards, and at 0906/26 , some 600 nautical miles west-north-west of the Azores she sighted the Spichern and refuelled. Two reconnaissance ships had also been ordered into this area, the Gonzenheim and the Kota Pinang. On the 28th Prinz Eugen fuelled from the Esso Hamburg. She then proceeded southwards to carry out cruiser warfare against independently routed ships in the area to the north and west of the Cape Verde Islands but an inspection of her engines the next day showed that an extensive overhaul was needed. Her Commanding Officer then decided to break off the action and course was set for Brest, France where she arrived at 2030/1 June.

A German reconnaissance ship, a supply vessel and two tankers were intercepted by Royal Navy warships and sunk by their own crew or sunk with gunfire. Also two tankers were captured. These were in chronological order; tanker Belchen (6367 GRT, built 1932, former Norwegian Sysla) by gunfire from HMS Kenya and HMS Aurora on 3 June 1941 in the Greenland area in approximate position 59°00'N, 47°00'W.
On 4 June the tanker Esso Hamburg by HMS London and HMS Brilliant (Lt.Cdr. F.C. Brodrick, RN) in position 07°35'N, 31°25'W,
tanker Gedania (8966 GRT, built 1920) was captured in the North Atlantic in position 43°38'N, 28°15'W by naval auxiliary (Ocean Boarding Vessel) HMS Marsdale (Lt.Cdr. D.H.F. Armstrong, RNR), she was put into service with the MOWT as Empire Garden, reconnaissance vessel Gonzenheim (4000 GRT, built 1937, former Norwegian Kongsfjord) was scuttled by her own crew after being sighted by HMS Esperance Bay ((Capt.(ret) G.S. Holden, RN) and intercepted by HMS Nelson (Capt. G.J.A. Miles, RN) and finally ordered to be boarded by HMS Neptune in position 43°29'N, 24°04'W. The next day (5 June) supply vessel Egerland (10040 GRT, built 1940) was intercepted by HMS London and HMS Brilliant in approximate position 07°00'N, 31°00'W. On 12 June, HMS Sheffield, intercepted tanker Friedrich Breme (10397 GRT, built 1936) in position 49°48'N, 22°20'W and finally on 15 June, HMS Dunedin (Capt. R.S. Lovatt, RN), captured the tanker Lothringen (10746 GRT, built 1940, former Dutch Papendrecht) in position 19°49'N, 38°30'W which had first been sighted by an aircraft from HMS Eagle (Capt. E.G.N. Rushbrooke, DSC, RN). The Lothringen was sent to Bermuda and was put into service by the MOWT as Empire Salvage. (13)

19 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Dartmouth with two ML's and later with HMS Cossack (Capt. P.L. Vian, DSO and Bar, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. H.T. Armstrong, RN), HMS Sikh (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, RN) and HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN). (12)

20 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Dartmouth with two ML's and later she also conducted gunnery exercises on a target that was being towed by HMS Lady Rosemary (T/Lt. H. Brown, RNR). (11)

21 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Dartmouth with two ML's. (14)

22 May 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Dartmouth for her 21th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

10 Jun 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 21th war patrol at Portsmouth. (1)

24 Jun 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Portsmouth for her 22th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay. (1)

25 Jun 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) developed a crack in the pressure hull. She then returned to Portsmouth abandoning her 22th war patrol. (1)

27 Jun 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was docked for repairs at Portsmouth in No.4 dock. (15)

21 Jul 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) was undocked. (16)

26 Jul 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) departed Portsmouth for her 23th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Bay of Biscay.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

9 Aug 1941
At 0715 hours HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) made rendez-vous with her escort HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr. G.W. Dobson, RNR). They then proceeded north through the Irish Sea towards the Clyde. (1)

11 Aug 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) ended her 23th war patrol at Holy Loch. (1)

15 Aug 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) shifted from Holy Loch to Troon where she was immediately docked to be taken in hand for a refit. (17)

11 Dec 1941
With her refit completed, HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN), shifted from Troon to Holy Loch to begin a period of trials and training. (18)

13 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. (18)

14 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. (18)

15 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. (18)

16 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. (18)

17 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted D/G trials off Helensburgh. These were followed by noise trials in Loch Goil. (18)

18 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. These included night exercises. (18)

19 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted attack and gunnery exercises in the Clyde area. These inclided night exercises. (18)

20 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) returned to Holy Loch on completion of last night's exercises. (18)

23 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) conducted exercises in the Clyde area. (18)

27 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Holy Loch for Scapa Flow. She was escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (18)

29 Dec 1941
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow. (18)

1 Jan 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Polyarny, northern Russia.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(19)

11 Jan 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Polyarny, northern Russia. (19)

27 Jan 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Polyarny for her 24th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Trondheim area, Norway.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

13 Feb 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 24th war patrol at Lerwick. (1)

15 Feb 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for Holy Loch. She made the passage together with HMS Tigris (Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO and Bar, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS Beaumaris (Lt.Cdr. D.S. Campbell, RNVR). (20)

18 Feb 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Holy Loch. (20)

16 Mar 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Holy Loch for passage to Plymouth. She made the passage south through the Irish Sea together with HrMs O 23 (Lt.Cdr. A.M. Valkenburg, RNN) that is to proceed to the Far East. They were escorted by the British destroyer HMS Vimy (Lt.Cdr. H.G.D. de Chair, RN) that is en-route to Portsmouth for a refit.

During the passage through the Irish Sea extreme thick fog is encountered and the ships were delayed as they had to anchor bacause of the low visibility. (21)

19 Mar 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Plymouth. (21)

20 Mar 1942
During the night of 20/21 March 1942, HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN), conducted exercises off Plymouth together with MGB's. (21)

23 Mar 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Plymouth for her 25th war patrol. She was ordered to act as a beacon during Operation Chariot (offsite link), the British raid on St. Nazaire.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

27 Mar 1942
In the evening HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) succesfully accomplished her beacon duties. (1)

3 Apr 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 25th war patrol at Holy Loch. (1)

18 Apr 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Holy Loch for Lerwick. She made the passage together with HMS P 43 (Lt. A.C. Halliday, RN). They were escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (22)

20 Apr 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Lerwick. (22)

24 Apr 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for her 26th war patrol. She was ordered to proceed to Seidisfjord, Iceland. She was to act as close escort for convoy PQ 15.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

26 Apr 1942

Convoys PQ 15 and QP 11 and the sinking of HMS Edinburgh and HMS Punjabi.

Convoy PQ 15 from Iceland to Northern Russia and Convoy QP 11 from Northern Russia to Iceland. Also includes an account on the sinking of HMS Edinburgh and HMS Punjabi.

On 26 April 1942 convoy PQ 15 departed Reykjavik for Murmansk where it arrived on 5 May 1942.

The convoy was made up of the following merchant vessels; Alcoa Cadet (American, 4823 GRT, built 1919), Alcoa Rambler (American, 5500 GRT, built 1919), Bayou Chico (American, 5401 GRT, built 1920), Botavon (British, 5858 GRT, built 1912), Cape Corso (British, 3807 GRT, built 1929), Cape Race (British, 3807 GRT, built 1930), Capira (Panamanian, 5625 GRT, built 1920), Deer Lodge (American, 6187 GRT, built 1919), Empire Bard (British, 3114 GRT, built 1942), Empire Morn (British, CAM ship, 7092 GRT, built 1941), Expositor (American, 4959 GRT, built 1919), Francis Scott Key (American, 7191 GRT, built 1941), Hegira (American, 7588 GRT, built 1919), Jutland (British, 6153 GRT, built 1928), Lancaster (American, 7516 GRT, built 1918), Mormacrey (American, 5946 GRT, built 1919), Mormacrio (American, 5940 GRT, built 1919), Paul Luckenbach (American, 6606 GRT, built 1913), Seattle Spirit (American, 5627 GRT, built 1919), Southgate (British, 4862 GRT, built 1926), Texas (American, 5638 GRT, built 1919) and Zebulon B. Vance (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942).

Two icebrakers were also part of the convoy, these were the Krassin (Russian, 4902 GRT, built 1917) and Montcalm (Canadian, 1432 GRT, built 1904, to be transferred to the Russians)

The RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) tanker Grey Ranger (3313 GRT, built 1941) was also with the convoy.

On departure from Reykjavik the convoy was escorted by the minesweepers HMS Bramble (Capt. J.H.F. Crombie, RN), HMS Leda (Cdr. A.D.H. Jay, DSC, RN), HMS Seagull (Lt.Cdr. C.H. Pollock, RN) and the A/S trawlers HMS Cape Palliser (Lt. B.T. Wortley, RNR), HMS Northern Pride (T/Lt. A.R. Cornish, RNR), HMS Vizalma (T/Lt. J.R. Anglebeck, RNVR) and the A/P trawler Chiltern (Ch.Skr.(ret) P. Bevans, RNR).

Around 0300Z/28, ' Force Q ' a refuelling force for the convoy escorts, made up of the RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) tanker Grey Ranger (3313 GRT, built 1941) departed Seidisfiord with her escort, the escort destroyer HMS Ledbury (Lt.Cdr. R.P. Hill, RN). With them were the AA ship HMS Ulster Queen (Capt.(Retd.) D.S. McGrath, RN) and the submarine HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN). They joined the convoy during the night of 28/29 April.

Around 0500Z/29, A close cover force made up of the light cruiser HMS Nigeria (Capt. J.G.L. Dundas, CBE, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral H.M. Burrough, CB, RN), the destroyers HMS Somali (Capt. J.W.M. Eaton, DSO, DSC, RN), HMS Matchless (Lt.Cdr. J. Mowlam, RN), HMS Boadicea (Lt.Cdr. F.C. Brodrick, RN), HMS Venomous (Cdr. H.W. Falcon-Steward, RN), HNoMS St. Albans (Lt.Cdr. S.V. Storheill, RNorN) and the escort destroyer HMS Badsworth (Lt. G.T.S. Gray, DSC, RN) departed Seidisfiord to join the convoy which they did early on 30 April.

The heavy cruiser HMS London (Capt. R.M. Servaes, CBE, RN) also joined the convoy (close cover force), she had departed Scapa Flow around 1645B/28.

around 0635B/1, the submarine HMS Sturgeon parted company with the convoy to take up a patrol position in the Artic Sea. ' Force Q ', the refuelling force made up of the tanker Grey Ranger and escort destroyer HMS Ledbury also parted company with the convoy on 1 May.

Around 2220B/1, Six German Ju.88 torpedo bombers attacked the convoy but no hits were obtained. One of the attackers was shot down by AA fire.

During the night of 1/2 May, HMS London was detached to provide close cover for convoy QP 11.'

At 1000B/2, HMS Nigeria also parted company with the convoy to join convoy QP 11. The Admiralty had decided that there was no need for the cruisers to proceed further to the east as the enemy destroyers operating in Northern Norway had been sunk or damaged in action with the cover force of convoy QP 11 (see below).

At 2009B/2, HNoMS St. Albans and HMS Seagull attacked an A/S contact with depth charges in position 73°01'N, 17°32'E. The submarine was forced to the surface but turned out to be the Polish submarine ORP Jastrzab (Kpt.mar. (Lt.Cdr.) B. Romanowski). She was way out of position and in waters where German submarines were expected to be operating. No blame could possibly be taacked to HNoMS St. Albans and HMS Seagull. Five of the crew of the Polish submarine died while the others were picked up.

At 0120B/3, the convoy was again attacked by enemy torpedo bombers. Visibility was bad and the enemy planes were not sighted until it was too late. Also radar had not picked them up. The succeeded in sinking two merchant vessels, the Botavon (the ship of the Convoy Commodore) and the Cape Corso. A third merchant vessel, the Jutland was damaged and was abandoned by her crew. The drifting ship was shortly afterwards torpedoed and sunk by the German submarine U-251.

At 2230C/3, a final German air attack took place while the convoy was in position 73°00'N, 31°15'E. A bomb near missed the A/S trawler HMS Cape Palliser which sustained some slight damage. One German Ju.88 aircraft was shot down. Visibility deteriorated in the evening of the 4th and a south-easterly gale sprang up bringing heavy snow. This provided the convoy with excellent cover for the remainder of the passage. The convoy arrived in the Kola Inlet around 2100C/5.

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On 28 April 1942 convoy QP 11 departed Murmansk for Reykjavik where it arrived on 7 May 1942.

The convoy was made up of the following merchant vessels; Atheltemplar (British (tanker), 8992 GRT, built 1930), Ballot (Panamanian, 6131 GRT, built 1922), Briarwood (British, 4019 GRT, built 1930), Dan-Y-Bryn (British, 5117 GRT, built 1940), Dunboyne (American, 3515 GRT, built 1919), El Estero (Panamanian, 4219 GRT, built 1920), Eldena (American, 6900 GRT, built 1919), Gallant Fox (Panamanian, 5473 GRT, built 1918), Mormacmar (American, 5453 GRT, built 1920), Stone Street (Panamanian, 6131 GRT, built 1922), Trehata (British, 4817 GRT, built 1928), Tsiolkovsky (Russian, 2847 GRT, built 1935) and West Cheswald (American, 5711 GRT, built 1919).

On departure from Murmansk the convoy was escorted by the destroyers HMS Bulldog (Cdr. M. Richmond, OBE, DSO, RN), HMS Beagle (Cdr. R.C. Medley, RN), HMS Amazon (Lt.Cdr. N.E.G. Roper, RN), HMS Foresight (Cdr. J.S.C. Salter, OBE, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. G.P. Huddart, RN), HMS Beverley (Lt.Cdr. J. Grant, RN), corvettes HMS Campanula (Lt.Cdr. W. Hine, RNR), HMS Oxlip (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) F.B. Collinson, RD, RNR), HMS Saxifage (T/A/Lt.Cdr. R.P. Chapman, RNR), HMS Snowflake (Lt. H.G. Chesterman, RNR) and the A/S trawlers HMS Lord Middleton (T/Lt. R.H. Jameson, RNR) and HMS Northern Wave (T/Lt. W.G. Pardoe-Matthews, RNR). Cover was provided by the light cruiser HMS Edinburgh (Capt. H.W. Faulkner, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral S.S. Bonham-Carter, CB, CVO, DSO, RN).

Besides these ships there was a local escort by the Russian destroyers Sokrushitelny and Gremyashchiy until at least 30°E and by the minesweepers HMS Gossamer (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Crease, RN), HMS Harrier (Cdr. E.P. Hinton, DSO, RN), HMS Hussar (Lt. R.C. Biggs, DSC, RN) and HMS Niger (Cdr.(ret.) A.J. Cubison, DSC and Bar, RN) until the evening of the 29th.

The convoy was sighted and reported by enemy aircraft and submarines on the 29th, but no attacks took place that day. The following afternoon (30 September), however, HMS Edinburgh, then zigzagging at high speed some 15 nautical miles ahead of the convoy, in approximate position 73°09'N, 32°45'E, was struck by two torpedoes from the German submarine U-456. Her stern was blown off and her steering gear was wrecked. She was able to steam at slow speed on two shafts. The explosion was seen from the convoy and the destroyers HMS Foresight and HMS Forester were detached to her assistance, followed shortly afterwards by the two Russian destroyers. Escorted by these destroyers HMS Edinburgh started in the 250 nautical mile return passage to Murmansk.

The presence of the destroyers prevented U-456 from finishing the cruiser off. She continued to shadown and report the Edinburgh's movements. These reported tempted the German Flag Officer, Northern Waters to sent three destroyers from Kirkenes to attack convoy QP 11 with its depleted escort and the destroyers Z 7 / Hermann Schoemann, Z 24 and Z 25 put to sea and steered to the north.

Convoy QP 11, meanwhile, continued its passage. At 0540/1, being then about 150 miles to the east-south-east of Bear Island it was unsuccesfully attacked by four torpedo aircraft. At the same time an enemy submarine was sighted and forced to dive by HMS Amazon. Frequent HF/DF bearings indicated that four enemy submarines were keeping pace with the convoy on different bearings, and at 0820/1, course was altered 40° to starboard (to 320°) in an endeavour to shake them off. Then ice was sighted in large quantities ahead. This was found to extend some 20 miles to the southward of the route, and course was again altered to the westward.

The forenoon passed without incident. The weather was moderate, wind north-north-east, force 3. Frequent snow squalls caused the visibility to vary between ten and two miles.

At 1345/1, the convoy was in course 275°, skirting heavy drift ice to starboard, when HMS Snowflake reported three radar contacts bearing 185°. At the some moment, HMS Beverley, screening on the port bow, reported enemy in sight, bearing 210°. The enemy proved to be three large destroyers. In the course of the next four hours they made five separate attempts to reach the convoy, each of which wass foiled by the aggressive tactics of the escorting destroyers desipite their great inferiority in gun power to the Germans.

On receipt of the Beverley's sighting report, Commander Richmond who was on the starboard bow of the convoy, moved across to the threatened flank and ordered the destroyers to concentrate on him. The convoy (with the corvettes and trawlers) at once carried out an emergency turn of 40° to starboard, the destroyers making smoke to cover it.

At 1400/1, HMS Bulldog turned towards the enemy on a south-westerly course, with the destroyers in line ahead in the order HMS Beagle, HMS Amazon and HMS Beverley. The Germans were at this time in line of bearing formation, about 10000 yards distant, heading towards the convoy. At 1407/1, both sides opened fire, the Germans turning together to starboard to open 'A' arcs, and the British destroyers to port to a similar course. Both sides fired torpedoes but none of them found its mark, but a track was seen to pass close astern of HMS Bulldog. After three minutes (1410/1), the Germans turned away asnd the British destroyers returned towards the convoy, making smoke. In this brief engagement HMS Amazon was hit. Her steering gear, telegraphs and one gun being put out of action, but she managed to keep control and was stationed at the rear of the line.

A quarter of an hour after this action ceased, the convoy suffered its only loss, when the Russian merchant vessel Tsiolkovsky, which was staggling from the convoy, was hit by torpedo and sink rapidly. The survivors were rescued by the Lord Middleton.

Commander Richmond, meanwhile, was keeping his destroyers between the convoy and the estimate position of the enemy. At 1433/1 they were again sighted, bearing 160° about 15000 yards off, and the second attack developed. The British destroyers again steered for them and at 1440/1 fire was opened at 12000 yards range. No hits were obtained by either side, but after five minutes the enemy turned away and the British once more retired on the convoy. By this time the convoy was well within the ice and ' in order to maintain touch the destroyers were led through lanes of open water as opportunity offered, bearing in mind that sufficient sea room to manoeuvre in action must be maintained. The presented a nice problem.'

About an hour elapsed before the enemy's next attempt. Then at 1558/1, he was sighted six miles away coming in from the eastward, bearing 115°. Commander Richmond repeated his tactics, and both sides opened fire at 1600/1. HMS Bulldog was straddled several times and slightly damaged, but after ten minutes the enemy turned away under smoke to the southward and the British again closed the convoy, by then spread out over a distance of some seven miles, as it picked its way through the heavy drift ice in single line formation.

Shortly before 1700/1 the Germans were again sighted, following a radar report from HMS Snowflake, this time bearing 146°, 20000 yards. HMS Bulldog led round towards them, fire was opened at 1658/1 and after seven minutes the enemy made smoke and turned away.

Half an hour later the Germans made their fifth and last attempt to break through. Fire was exchanged between 1736/1 and 1742/1, when they once more turned away. The British held on towards them for a few minutes till the rear destroyer disappeared into the smoke to the south-east. This was the last seen of them, shortly afterwards they were ordered to attack the damaged Edinburgh some 200 nautical miles to the eastward, and altered course accordingly. Commander Richmond of course could not know this, and for the next three hours he kept his force cruising between the supposed direction of the enemy and the convoy, while the latter was breaking its way through the ice. By 2155/1, the convoy was in open water and the destroyer resumed their screening stations.

The remainder of the passage was uneventful. Convoy PQ 15 was sighted proceeding to the eastward at 1000/2. QP 11 arrived at Reykjavik at 0700/7.

In the meantime, while convoy QP 11 was being subjected to the attacks by the German destroyers, the damaged HMS Edinburgh had been making the best of her way towards Murmansk. The first torpedo had hit the starboard side forward, causing considarable flooding. The second torpedo hit right aft and virtually blew her stern off. She had lost her rudder and the two inner shafts, but could steam at about 8 knots with the outer propellers.

HMS Foresight, HMS Forester, Sokrushitelny and Gremyashchiy arrived about an hour after she had been hit. An attempt by HMS Forester to take her in tow failed, with no stern and seven feet down by the bow, she came rapidly into the wind as soon as she gathered headway, and parted the tow. Further attempts to aid her were then delayed while the destroyers hunted a German submarine that was sighted on the surface four miles away.

During the night of 30 April / 1 May some progress at about three knots was made by the Edinburgh taking HMS Foresight in tow and using her to control the steering. At 0600/1, however, the Russian destroyers reported that they had to return to harbour for fuel and parted company. German submarines were known to be about and in these circumstances Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter deemed it essential that both the remaining destroyers should be used for screeing. So HMS Foresight was cast off and HMS Edinburgh struggled on, steering as best she could with her engines. Left to her own devices, a persitent swing to port could only be countered by gathering sternway every few minutes and the speed of advance fell to two knots. Thus she proceeded for about 23 hours. That no enemy submarine succeeded in attacking during this anxious period is the measure of alterness of HMS Forester and HMS Foresight.

That afternoon the Bulldog's report of the German destroyer attacks came in. The probability of their shifting their attentions to HMS Edinburgh was at once realised and Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter and he gave the following instructions; ' In event of attack by German destroyers, HMS Forester and HMS Foresight are to act independently, taking every opportunity to defeat the enemy without taking undue risks to themselves in defending HMS Edinburgh. HMS Edinburgh is to proceed wherever the wind permits, probably straight into the wind. If minesweepers are present they will also be told to act independently retiring under smoke screen as necessary. HMS Edinburgh had no RDF or Director working.'

At 1800/1, the Russian escort vessel Rubin joined and six hours later the minesweepers Gossamer, Harrier, Hussar and Niger arrived with a Russian tug. Disappointingly, the tug was not powerful enough to tow. Eventually at 0530/2, HMS Edinburgh was again making three knots under her own power and holding a fairly steady course of 150°. She was steered by the tug fine on the starboard bow and HMS Gossamer acting as a drogue on the port quarter. HMS Niger had been detached during the night to make rendezvous with the Russian destroyers which would return after fuelling. However they did sail long after they were expected to do so and HMS Niger rejoined at 1020/2. HMS Harrier, HMS Hussar, Rubin, HMS Foresight and HMS Forester patrolled around the damaged cruiser in a circle.

The wind was north-north-east, force three. As usual there were frequent snow squalls and the visibility varied from ten to two miles. Despite the fact that enemy submarines were known to be taking up positions to intercept, and the probability of destroyer attack there seemed to be a chance of making port. But it was not to be.

At 0627/3 gunfire from HMS Hussar, then on the starboard quarter, heralded the approach of the enemy, which proved to be the three destroyers. HMS Hussar was almost immediately straddled, and fell back on HMS Edinburgh.

There ensued a series of individual actions, ships engaging whenever visibility permitted. The Germans kept about seven miles to the north-north-east of HMS Edinburgh making full use of snow squalls and smoke to get within torpedo range, and it was seldom that more than one of them was in sight at the same time.

At the first alarm HMS Edinburgh cast off the tows and went on to her maximum speed - about eight knots. Unable to steer, she circled round to port, sometimes rapidly, sometimes on a wider curve, firing with 'B' turret whenever it could be directed from the bridge on to a fleeting target. The minesweepers remained near her, engaging the enemy with their one gun salvoes whenever they appeared and looking out for enemy submarines. HMS Foresight at once steered for the gunflashes at 24 knots while HMS Forester, which was two or three miles to the westward, went on to 30 knots and steered to join her.

First blood on either side was drawn by HMS Edinburgh, which opened fire on the Z 7 / Hermann Schoemann at 0636/2. Her first salvo fell within 100 yards. The German destroyer increased speed to 31 knots, made smike and turned away, but the second salvo scored a hit, which put both engines out of action and destroyed all control instruments. This fortunate hit had a marked effect on the events of the day. She came to a stop and remained virtually out of action, while from then onwards the efforts of her consorts were largely directed towards succouring and screening her.

Meanwhile HMS Foresight had sighted an enemy destroyer, Z 24, 10000 yards off, steering straight towards her, just as HMS Edinburgh opened fire at 0836/2. At 0640/2 the range was down to 8000 yards and Commander Salter opened fire on Z 24, altering course to the eastwards to open 'A' arcs. For the next eight minutes all three enemy destroyers were playing hide and seek in the snow and their own smoke screens. Targets were engaged as and when they came into vision, ranges varying between 6000 and 8000 yards.

HMS Forester was also fighting under much the same conditions, but shestood on to the northward when HMS Foresight turned to open her 'A' arcs. At 0650/1 she fired torpedoes. almost at the same moment she received three hits. One in No.1 boiler room brought her to a standstill. One put 'B' gun out of action and killed the Commanding Officer and one on 'X' gun shattered its breech mechanism. At 0653/2, torpedoes were seen passing underneath the ship in the direction of HMS Edinburgh which was then about five miles north-west of HMS Foresight which had just, at 0648/2, altered away from the enemy to the westward, in order to close HMS Edinburgh. Seeing HMS Forester stopped and on fire, Commander Salter steered to her assistance. HMS Forester with her sole remaining gun and her 1st Lieutenant now in Command, was engaging the stationary Z 7 / Hermann Schoemann some three miles to the northward, and shifted to the other destroyers whenever they appeared from the snow. HMS Foresight had closed to within half a mile by 0700/2, and then turned to an easterly course, so as not to foul the Forester's range, and engaged on of the destroyers which had been firing on her.

Just at this time, 0702/2, HMS Edinburgh was torpedoed. The torpedoes were seen breaking surface as they approached. These was nothing she could do to avoid them but it looked as if her eccentric gyrations would take her clear. However her 'luck' was out. One torpedo, which was running deep, struck her port side amidships at a point practically opposite one of the former hits. She immediately listed to port and gradually came to a standstill. The ship was 'open from side to side'. It was clear that she might break in two and sink at any moment, and Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter ordered HMS Gossamer alongside to take off the wounded and passanger. HMS Edinburgh nevertheless continued to engage the enemy whenever they appeared. Her shooting was described by the Z 24 as 'extra-ordinarily good' and twice deterred her from going to the assistance of the Z 7 / Hermann Schoemann. However the list was increasing and when it reached 17° her guns would no longer bear. The Rear-Admiral then directed Captain Faulkner to abandon ship.

Meanwhile HMS Foresight after engaging her opponent for five minutes again turned to the westward and seeing HMS Forester being heavily straddled, passed between her and the enemy, drawing their fire. At 0714/2, Commander Salter, altered course to close the range, and a few minutes later fired a salvo of torpedoes (which missed) at the Z 7 / Herman Schoemann. Just afterwards he came under a heavy concentration of fire from Z 24 and Z 25 at 4000 yards range. He increased to full speed and tried to get away under smoke, but received four hits, one of them in No.3 boiler, which brought the ship to a standstill at 0724/2 in welter of steam and smoke with only one gun still in action.

The Edinburgh, Foresight and Forester were thus all stopped with their gun power much reduced. There seemed nothing to prevent the two comparatively undamaged German destroyers from sinking each of them separately and afterwards dealing with the slow, lightly armed minesweepers at their leisure. But though they made repeated attacks on the destroyers with heavy but fortunate inaccurate fire, they did not press home their advantage. Their main concern was with the Hermann Schoemann. Already thee attempts by the Z 24 to go alongside and take off her ship's company had been foiled by British gunfire, and they let the opportunity pass.

Ten minutes after HMS Foresight stopped, HMS Forester managed to get underway (0735/2). At the same time Z 24 and Z 25 again opened fire on her but they soon disappeared into smoke, emerging a few minutes later to concentrate on HMS Foresight. This gave HMS Forester an opportunity to repay the debt she owned for the respite HMS Foresight had afforded her earlier in the day, and, zigzagging between her and the enemy, she covered her with a heavy efficient smoke screen. This was the close of the action. Shortly afterwards Z 24 finally managed to get alongside Z 7 / Hermann Schoemann and took off about 200 survivors. The latter - already in a sinking condition - was then scuttled, and the Z 24 and Z 25 (which had received a hit in her wireless room) withdrew at high speed to the north-west and were lost to view by the British around 0820/2.

Meanwhile HMS Foresight had effected temporary repairs and by 0815/2 was proceeding slowly on the port engine. HMS Edinburgh had been abandoned by 0800/15, HMS Gossamer taking about 440 men and HMS Harrier, in which Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter hoisted his flag, about 350. Meanwhile HMS Hussar was screening them and laying a smoke screen. Attempts by HMS Harrier to sink the cruiser by gunfire and depth charges failed so HMS Foresight was ordered to finish her off with her last remaining torpedo. This she did and all ships then shaped course for the Kola Inlet where they arrived without further incident the next day.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To provide distant cover for these convoys a heavy cover force was deployed which departed Scapa Flow around 2200/28 and was made up of the battleships HMS King George V (Capt. W.R. Patterson, CB, CVO, RN, flying the flag of A/Admiral J.C. Tovey, KCB, KBE, DSO, RN, C-in-C Home Fleet), USS Washington (Capt. H.H.J. Benson, USN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral R.C. Griffen, USN), aircraft carrier HMS Victorious (Capt. H.C. Bovell, CBE, RN), heavy cruisers USS Wichita (Capt. H.W. Hill, USN), USS Tuscaloosa (Capt. L.P. Johnson, USN), light cruiser HMS Kenya (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN), destroyers HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), USS Wilson (Lt.Cdr. R.G. Sturges, USN), USS Wainwright (Lt.Cdr. R.H. Gibbs, USN), USS Madison (T/Cdr. W.B. Ammon, USN), USS Plunkett (Lt.Cdr. W.H. Standley, Jr., USN) and the escort destroyers HMS Belvoir (Lt. J.F.D. Bush, DSC and Bar, RN), HMS Hursley (Lt. W.J.P. Church, DSC, RN), HMS Lamerton (Lt.Cdr. C.R. Purse, DSC, RN) and HMS Middleton (Lt.Cdr. D.C. Kinloch, RN).

At 0600/30, they were joined by the destroyers HMS Martin (Cdr. C.R.P. Thomson, RN), HMS Marne (Lt.Cdr. H.N.A. Richardson, DSC, RN), HMS Oribi (Cdr. J.E.H. McBeath, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Punjabi (Lt.Cdr. J.M.G. Waldegrave, DSC, RN) which came from Seidisfiord. HMS Inglefield, USS Wilson, USS Wainwright, USS Madison and USS Plunkett then proceeded to Seidisfiord to refuel.

They rejoined the fleet in the afternoon. Another destroyer, HMS Eskimo (Cdr. E.G. Le Geyt, RN), had come with them. The four escort destroyers were then detached to return to Scapa Flow.

At 1550/1, in very bad visibility, HMS Punjabi ended up in front of HMS King George V which could not avoid a collision and cut HMS Punjabi in half. The aft part sank immediately and there was no time to set the ready depth charges to safe which as a result exploded also causing damage to HMS King George V. The front part of HMS Punjabi took 40 minutes to sink during which time HMS Martin and HMS Marne managed to take off 5 officers and 201 ratings.

As a result of the damage to HMS King George V, the battleship HMS Duke of York (Capt. C.H.J. Harcourt, CBE, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral A.T.B. Curteis, CB, RN, second in command Home Fleet) departed from Hvalfiord, around 2045/1, to take her place in the cover force. HMS Duke of York was escorted by the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, RN) and HMS Escapade (Lt.Cdr. E.N.V. Currey, DSC, RN). They made rendezvous with the cover force around 2330/2 after which HMS King George V parted company at 0006/3 and proceeded to Seidisfiord escorted by HMS Martin, HMS Marne and HMS Oribi. They arrived at Seidisfjord around 1100/3. HMS Martin, HMS Marne and HMS Oribi then rejoined the fleet, having also fuelled at Seidisfiord, around 0610/4.

At 1800/4, USS Washington, HMS Wichita, USS Tuscaloosa, USS Wilson, USS Wainwright, USS Madison and USS Plunkett were detached to Hvalfiord where they arrived around 0815/6.

Around 2100/5, HMS Duke of York, HMS Victorious, HMS Kenya, HMS Inglefield, HMS Faulknor, HMS Escapade, HMS Eskimo, HMS Martin, HMS Marne and HMS Oribi arrived at Scapa Flow. (23)

27 Apr 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Seidisfjord. (1)

28 Apr 1942
Early in the morning, HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Seidisfjord together with HMS Ledbury (Lt.Cdr. R.P. Hill, RN), HMS Ulster Queen and a tanker to join convoy PQ 15. In the evening they joined convoy PQ 15 but not before Sturgeon was attacked by a friendly aircraft receiving some bullet hits on her bridge. (1)

1 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) left convoy PQ 15 to take up a patrol position off northern Norway. (1)

6 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 26th war patrol at Lerwick. (1)

8 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for Holy Loch. She made the passage together with HMS P 43 (Lt. A.C. Halliday, RN). They were escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (24)

10 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Holy Loch. (24)

11 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) shifted from Holy Loch to Elderslie for repairs to her main battery. (24)

23 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) shifted from Elderslie to Holy Loch. (24)

27 May 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) was docked in AFD 7 at Rothesay. (24)

1 Jun 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) was undocked at Rothesay. She then returned to Holy Loch. (25)

22 Jun 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Holy Loch for Lerwick. She made the passage together with HMS P 54 (Lt. C.E. Oxborrow, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(Retd.) R.H. Mack, RN). (25)

24 Jun 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Lerwick. (25)

25 Jun 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for her 27th war patrol. She was ordered to provide cover during passage of convoy PQ 17.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

12 Jul 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 27th war patrol at Lerwick. (1)

20 Jul 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for Holy Loch together with HMS Trident (Lt. A.R. Hezlet, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) C.M. Norman, RN) (26)

22 Jul 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Holy Loch. (26)

1 Aug 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Holy Loch for Lerwick. She was escorted by HrMs Jan van Gelder (Lt. P.L.M. van Geen, RNN). On 3 August HMS Stella Pegasi (T/Lt. F.S. Howell, RNR) took over the escort. (27)

3 Aug 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Lerwick. (27)

4 Aug 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for her 28th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Lister, Norway.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

12 Aug 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) torpedoed and sank the German merchant Boltenhagen (3335 GRT, built 1912) off southern Norway in position 58°07'N, 06°21'E.

(All times are zone -1)
1515 hours - Sighted masts and barrage balloon of a merchant ship of about 3500 tons. Shortly afterwards an A/S trawler was seen escorting her. Also another small merchant was present. Started attack.

1548 hours - In position 58°07'N, 06°21'E fired three torpedoes from 1600 yards at the largest merchant vessel. One hit was obtained. Following this attack the A/S trawler counter-attacked with 5 depth charges between 1602 - 1609 hours, but none of these were close. (1)

16 Aug 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 28th war patrol at Lerwick. She departed later the same day for Holy Loch escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr.(Retd.) C.C. Flemming, RN). (1)

2 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for her 29th war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off the approaches to Narvik.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

3 Sep 1942
At 0610 hours (zone -1), HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN), sighted a U-boat on the surface bearing 160 degrees. Position was 62°15'N, 01°05'E. Enemy course was 260°, range 7000 yards. An attack was started but the range could not be closed. This was most likely the German U-216 that was en-route to the Atlantic for her 1st war patrol. (1)

6 Sep 1942
On board HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) the after hydroplanes malfunctioned. It was not possible to dive safely and the patrol had to be abandoned. Course was set to return to Lerwick. (1)

10 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) ended her 29th war patrol at Lerwick. (1)

14 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Lerwick for Methill. She was to proceed to the Chatham Dockyard for repairs to her after hydroplanes. She was escorted by HMS Preston North End (Lt. K.A. Vasey, MBE, RNR). (28)

15 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow to effect more temporary repairs. (28)

16 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Sheerness. She made the passage south together with HMS Otus (Lt. R.J. Clutterbuck, RN) that was to proceed to Blyth. They were escorted by HMS Loch Monteith (T/Lt. K.W. Richardson, RNR). (28)

17 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) joined southbound convoy FS 10 off Methil. (28)

19 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) arrived at Sheerness. (28)

21 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) shifted from Sheerness to Chatham. (28)

25 Sep 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. M.R.G. Wingfield, RN) was docked in No.5 dock at Chatham. (28)

16 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) was undocked. (29)

23 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) shifted from Chatham to Sheerness. (29)

24 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) and HMS H 33 (Lt. P.C. Chapman, DSC, RN) both departed Sheerness for Portsmouth. They were escorted by HMS Guillemot (Lt. H.I.S. White, RNR). (29)

25 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) arrived at Portsmouth. (29)

26 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) conducted exercises off Portsmouth. (29)

27 Oct 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) departed Portsmouth for Gibraltar. She was to join the 8th submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean temporarily during the invasion of North Africa.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(1)

6 Nov 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) arrived at Gibraltar.

Before arriving at Gibraltar she was attacked in error by a British Hudson aircraft which dropped three depth charges. Position of the attack was 36°02'N, 06°33'W. Fortunately no damage was done to Sturgeon. (1)

10 Nov 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) departed Gibraltar for her 30th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off Toulon, southern France.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this patrol see the map below.

(1)

15 Nov 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) was ordered to patrol off Naples, Italy. (1)

2 Dec 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. D.J. Beckley, RN) ended her 30th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean) at Gibraltar. (1)

20 Dec 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) departed Gibraltar for Algiers. Upon departing A/S exercises were carried out with HMS Wivern (Cdr. M.D.C. Meyrick, RN).

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(30)

24 Dec 1942
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) arrived at Algiers. (30)

12 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) departed Algiers for Mers el Kebir. She made the passage in a convoy of Tank Landing Ships.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(31)

14 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) arrived at Mers el Kebir. (31)

16 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Eskimo (Capt. J.W.M. Eaton, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Calpe (Lt.Cdr. H. Kirkwood, DSC, RN). (31)

17 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Tartar (Cdr. St J.R.J. Tyrwhitt, DSC, RN) and HMS Quality (Lt.Cdr. G.L. Farnfield, DSO, RN). (31)

18 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with ORP Blyscawica (Lt.Cdr. L. Lichodziejewski, ORP) and HMS Puckeridge (Lt. J.C. Cartwright, DSC, RN). (31)

19 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Pathfinder (Cdr. E.A. Gibbs, DSO and 2 Bars, RN), HMS Penn (Lt.Cdr. J.H. Swain, DSO, RN) and HMS Panther (Lt.Cdr. R.W. Jocelyn, RN). (31)

20 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMAS Quiberon (Capt. H.W.S. Browning, OBE, RN) and HMS Haydon (Lt. R.C. Watkin, RN). (31)

23 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Tartar (Cdr. St J.R.J. Tyrwhitt, DSC, RN) and HMS Quality (Lt.Cdr. G.L. Farnfield, DSO, RN). (31)

24 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Haydon (Lt. R.C. Watkin, RN) and HMS Puckeridge (Lt. J.C. Cartwright, DSC, RN). (31)

25 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMAS Quiberon (Cdr. G.S. Stewart, RAN) and HMS Calpe (Lt.Cdr. H. Kirkwood, DSC, RN). (31)

26 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with ORP Blyscawica (Lt.Cdr. L. Lichodziejewski, ORP) and HMS Ashanti (Lt.Cdr. J.R. Barnes, RN). (31)

27 Jan 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMAS Quiberon (Cdr. G.S. Stewart, RAN) and HMS Quality (Lt.Cdr. G.L. Farnfield, DSO, RN). (31)

1 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Westray (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Rhind, RNZNVR) and HMS Hunda (T/Lt. W.B. Brown, RNVR). (32)

2 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Shiant (T/Lt. A.C. Elton, RNR) and HMS Inchmarnock (T/Lt. C.G.V. Corneby, RNR). (32)

3 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Eskimo (Capt. J.W.M. Eaton, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Ashanti (Lt.Cdr. J.R. Barnes, RN). (32)

4 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with ORP Blyscawica (Lt.Cdr. L. Lichodziejewski, ORP) and HMS Puckeridge (Lt. J.C. Cartwright, DSC, RN). (32)

5 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Venomous (Lt.Cdr. D.H. Maitland-Makgill-Crichton, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Haydon (Lt. R.C. Watkin, RN). (32)

14 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Eskimo (Capt. J.W.M. Eaton, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Calpe (Lt.Cdr. Henry Kirkwood, DSC, RN). (32)

15 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Mers el Kebir with HMS Tartar (Cdr. St J.R.J. Tyrwhitt, DSC, RN) and HMS Ashanti (Lt.Cdr. J.R. Barnes, RN). (32)

16 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) departed Mers el Kebir for Algiers. She made the passage in convoy KMS 9.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(32)

18 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) arrived at Algiers. (32)

21 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) departed Algiers for Gibraltar.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(32)

25 Feb 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) arrived at Gibraltar. (32)

6 Mar 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted exercises off Gibraltar. (33)

10 Mar 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises off Gibraltar with three ML's. (33)

11 Mar 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted A/S exercises with HMS Laforey (Capt. R.M.J. Hutton, DSO, RN) and HMS Lookout (Lt.Cdr. A.G. Forman, DSC, RN). (33)

3 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) was docked in No.3 dock at Gibraltar. (34)

6 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) was undocked. (34)

8 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) conducted exercises off Gibraltar. (34)

12 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) departed Gibraltar for Portsmouth.

For the daily positions of HMS Sturgeon during this passage see the map below.

(1)

23 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) arrived at Portland. (1)

24 Apr 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) shifted from Portland to Portsmouth. (1)

13 May 1943
HMS Sturgeon (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN) shifted from Portsmouth to Plymouth where she was to refit at the Devonport Dockyard. Before the completion of her refit she was transferred on loan to the Royal Netherlands Navy. (35)