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27 Feb 1942

Battle of the Java Sea.

Prelude to the battle.

Japan had opened the war in the Far East on 7 December 1941 with their surprise attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour. At the same time they launched attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. These attacks were followed by attacks on the Dutch East Indies.

By the end of December 1941 the Americans decided to abandon the Philippines as a naval base and on 30 January 1942, Singapore Dockyard was closed down by the British. This was followed by the British Army retiring from the Malayan penisula towards that base.

On 3 February 1942, Surabaya and Malang on the main Dutch Island of Java were bombed for the first time. By mid-February the Japanese had conquered British and Dutch Borneo and the Dutch islands of Celebes, Ceram and Ambon. These conquests gave them sea and air control over the Makassar Strait and the Molucca Passage.

The Allies soon realised that the forces at their disposal were not able to stop the Japanese advance. The only thing they could do was to delay the Japanese advance as long as possible.

Singapore and it’s naval base fell to the Japanese on 15 February 1942. That very day the Japanese landed on Sumatra and they soon also controlled the Karimata Channel and Gaspar Strait. Later they also had more or less the control over the important Sunda Strait, the main entry channel to the Java Sea.

On 25 February 1942 the Japanese captured Bali Island, to the east of Java and this gave them also control over the eastern exits of the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean. On this day also reports were received of massive Japanese shipping movements in the Celebes Sea with the apparent objective to invade Java. Also on the 25th the Japanese landed on Bawean Island, just 85 miles north of Surabaya.

Formation of the Combined Striking Force.

Given the reports of the Japanese shipping movements and their expected arrival off Java on 27 February, the Dutch Vice-Admiral Helfrich ordered that the Eastern Striking Force at Surabaya was to be reinforced by all available cruisers and destroyers that were then at Tandjong Priok (Batavia).

At that moment the Eastern Striking Force was made up of the Dutch light cruisers HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN) and HrMs Java (Capt. P.B.M van Straelen, RNN), the Dutch destroyers HrMs Witte de With (Lt.Cdr. P. Schotel, RNN), HrMs Kortenaer (Lt.Cdr. A. Kroese, RNN) and the US destroyers USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Parrott (Lt.Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN) and USS Pillsbury (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Pound, USN). The force had been reinforced on the 24th by the US heavy cruiser USS Houston (Capt. A.H. Rooks, USN) and the US destroyers USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. J.J. Hourihan, USN), USS Alden (Lt.Cdr. L.E. Coley, USN), USS John D. Ford (Lt.Cdr. J.E. Cooper, USN) and USS Pope (Lt.Cdr. W.C. Blinn, USN) which came from Tjilatjap on Java’s south coast.

The following ships arrived at Surabaya from Tandjong Priok (Batavia) on the 26th. The British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth (Capt. H.M.L. Waller, DSO and Bar, RAN) and the British destroyers HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN), HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) and HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.P. Thew, RN). From this date the Eastern Striking Force was now called the Combined Striking Force.

Formation of the Western Striking Force.

Some ships remained in Batavia and these were formed into the Western Striking Force which comprised the Australian light cruiser HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN), the British light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Danae (Capt. F.J. Butler, MBE, RN) as well as the British destroyers HMS Scout (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) H. Lambton, RN) and HMS Tenedos (Lt. R. Dyer, RN).

HMAS Hobart had been originally intended to join the Combined Striking Force but her fuelling was delayed owning to the tanker being damaged in an air attack and she was unable to sail with HMS Exeter and the destroyers in time and was left behind.

Orders for the Combined Stiking Force

Late in the afternoon of the 26th, Rear-Admiral Doorman, was in the operations room of the naval base at Surabaya when a signal was received from Vice-Admiral Helfrich which reported 30 enemy transports in position 04°50’S, 114°20’E, this was about 18 miles north-east of Surabaya. Enemy course was 245°, speed 10 knots. Two cruisers and four destroyers were reported to be escorting these transports. The Combined Striking Force was ordered to proceed to sea to attack the enemy after dark.

Rear-Admiral Doorman then considered to possible routes to make contact with the enemy convoy;
1) By a sweep east, along the north coast of Madura, followed by a sweep west, as far as Toeban.
2) By a sweep north, to the west of Bawean, continuing north-east wards towards the Arends Islands.

Later in the afternoon of February 26th, Rear-Admiral Doorman, called a conference of all his commanding officers, where the following decisions were taken;
1) The Combined Striking Force was to prevent, at all costs, a Japanese landing on Java or Madura.
2) The Japanese transports were to be attacked, preferably by night.
3) After the attack the Combined Trask Force was to proceed to Tandjong Priok (Batavia).
4) A formation for the night was ordered as follows; A screen of British and Dutch destroyers ahead, the five cruisers in line and four US destroyers in rear.

Also a plan for a night attack was made;
1) The British and Dutch destroyers were to carry out a torpedo attack as soon as the enemy was sighted and were to follow up their torpedo attack by an attempt to run straight into the enemy convoy and to cause as much damage as possible. The cruisers were to remain out of the convoy and were to fire on it. Finally the US destroyers were then to also make a torpedo attack.
2) If contact was made near the coast, special precautions were to be taken because Dutch mines had been laid off the north coast of Madura and also in the Toeban bight. After an attack in coastal waters the Allied ships therefore had to turn north.
3) After a possible night action the formation would be broken up and it was not considered possible to make definite plans for any subsequent action.

Departure from Surabaya.

The Combined Striking Force put to sea from Surabaya at 1830 hours. It had been decided to make a sweep to the east along the coast of Madura as far as the Sapoedi Strait and if the enemy were not sighted to sweep west and search the bight of Toeban. The Force sailed throught the western channel towards the Java Sea. The ships of the force were disposed in line ahead as follows;
1) Two Dutch destroyers, HrMs Witte de With and HrMs Kortenaer. This last ship had a speed limitation of 25 knots, due to one boiler being out of service.
2) Three British destroyers HMS Electra, HMS Encounter and HMS Jupiter.
3) The five Allied cruisers, HrMS de Ruyter, HMS Exeter, USS Houston, HMAS Perth and HrMs Java.
4) Four US destroyers, USS John D. Edwards, USS Alden, USS John D. Ford and USS Paul Jones.

Around the time the Combined Task Force sailed from Surabaya, US Army bombers found and attacked the enemy convoy in position 05°30’S, 113°00’E, which is about 25 miles north-east of Bawean Island. No report was however made to Rear-Admiral Doorman until nearly four hours later. And four hours after that another report was sent regarding this convoy. It is not known if Rear-Admiral Doorman actually received these reports.

At about 2200/26 the whole Combined Strike Force was clear of the Dutch minefields in the approaches to Surabaya and after proceeding 8 nautical miles to the north course was changed to the east, They were now in night formation and proceeding at 20 knots. They continued eastward as planned towards Sapoedi Strait as planned which they reached shortly after 0100/27. Rear-Admiral Doorman then altered course to 284° and maintained a westerly course throughout the remainder of the night.

Japanese air attack on the Combined Task Force.

At dawn on 27 February 1942, the Combined Task Force, was approximately 10 nautical miles north-west of Surabaya. They had not sighted the enemy during the night so day formation was assumed.

At 0700 hours, HMS Exeter, reported RDF contact on a group of aircraft in a south-westerly direction. Rear-Admiral Doorman hoped they were Allied aircraft but around 0800 hours he had to report to the ships in his force that the promised fighter cover would not be forthcoming. At 0855/27 aircraft were heard overhead and shortly afterwards three 100-lb bombs fell close to HMS Jupiter. Five minutes later a stick of four bombs fell about three cables on her starboard quarter. All these bombs were tumbling and at least three failed to explode. USS Houston opened fire on these aircraft which retreated behind clouds. From this time on, enemy aircraft continued to shadow the Allied force but they remained out of range.

Rear-Admiral Doorman reported this incident to Vice-Admiral Helfrich, and at 0930 hours he altered course from 270° to 115°. At 1000 hours, Vice-Admiral Helfrich signaled that Rear-Admiral Doorman had to proceed eastwards to search for and attack the enemy to which Rear-Admiral Doorman replied at 1200 hours with ‘proceeding eastwards after search from Sapoedi to Rembang. Success of action depends absolutely on receiving good reconnaissance information in time which last night failed me. Destroyers will have to refuel tomorrow.’

A Japanese force located.

At 1400/27 the Allied force was proceeding towards the Westervaarwater (northern entrance to Surabaya). The force passed through the swept channel in the minefields in the following order; the Dutch destroyers, the British destroyers, the US destroyers and then the cruisers. At 1427 hours the force was entering the harbour when Rear-Admiral Doorman received the following important information from Vice-Admiral Helfrich.
1) At 1340/27 (GH), Twenty ships with an unkown number of destroyers were in position 04.45’S, 112.15’E (approx. 65 miles north-west of Bawean), course 180°.
2) At 1345/27 (GH), one cruiser was reported in position 04°40’S, 111°07’E (approx.. 135 miles north-west of Bawean), course 220°.
3) At 1350/27 (GH), two cruisers, six destroyers and twenty-five transports were reported 20 miles west of Bawean, course south. Of this force one cruiser and four destroyers proceeded south at full speed The transports, one cruiser and two destroyers stayed behind.

The combined striking force proceeded to intercept.

Rear-Admiral Doorman immediately proceeded back to sea again with the intention to intercept the enemy force that was reported 20 miles west of Bawean. After leaving the minefield the British destroyers were ordered to proceed at full speed. The Dutch destroyers were on the port quarter of the cruiser line. The US destroyers were astern. Course was set to 315°, speed 20 knots but this was later increased to 25 knots, the maximum speed of HrMs Kortenaer.

At 1529 hours enemy aircraft appeared, they dropped a few bombs at random. USS Houston fired on the planes. Meanwhile the Allied force scrattered. By 1550 hours the force had reformed and was again on course 315°, speed was now 24 knots.

At 1600 hours, Rear-Admiral Doorman asked for fighter protection but the commander Air Defence Surabaya did not comply because he needed his eight remaining Brewster Buffalo fighters to protect the four dive-bombers in a projected dive-bombing attack on the Japanese transports.

Contact with the enemy.

Shortly after 1600/27, three float planes were sighted to the northward. Some minutes later smoke was sighted, bearing 358°. At 1612 hours, in approximate position 06°28’S, 112°26’E. The Combined Striking Force was still on course 315°. The first report, which came from HMS Electra was ‘one cruiser, unknown number of large destroyers, bearing 330°, speed 18 knots, enemy course 220°. At 1614 hours the Allied fleet, then about 30 miles north-west of Surabaya, increased speed to 26 knots and HMAS Perth reported seeing a cruiser on the starboard bow. At 1616 hours, HMS Exeter reported a cruiser and four destroyers bearing 330°, range 14 nautical miles.

At 1616 hours, the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro opened fire from 30000 yards. Their main targets were HMS Exeter and USS Houston. Around the same time the Japanese light cruiser Naka opened fire on the British destroyer HMS Electra which was immediately straddled. Later salvoes fell astern, short and over. She was not hit. HMS Electra and HMS Jupiter fired ranging salvoes at the western (leading) enemy force at a maximum range of 15700 yards but all fell short.

The Allied force was still on course 315° and closing the enemy when HrMs De Ruyter altered course 20° to port (to 295°) to bring the starboard broadsides to bear. This brought the Allied fleet on an almost parallel course with the enemy heavy cruisers. The Allied cruisers were still in line ahead with HMS Electra and HMS Jupiter bearing 280°, four nautical miles from HrMs De Ruyter. The US destroyers were astern of the cruiser line and the two Dutch destroyers were about two nautical miles to port of the cruiser line. The position of HMS Encounter at that moment is not mentioned in any of the reports but she appeared to have been ahead of the Dutch destoyers and abeam of HMAS Perth.

HMS Exeter opened fire at 1617 hours followed by USS Houston one minute later. Range was 26000 to 28000 yards. This range was maintained for some time so the enemy was only under fire from the two heavy cruisers in the Allied cruiser line. Shortly after the action commenced the US destroyers took station about 3000 yards on the disengaged side of HrMs Java and maintained this relative position throughout most of the action. Enemy salvoes almost continuously straddled HrMs De Ruyter and HMS Exeter. All the time three float planes were spotting for the enemy.

First Japanese torpedo attack, 1633 to 1652 hours.

At about 1625 hours, the rear enemy destroyer flotilla appeared from the Allied line to prepare to attack. HMAS Perth opened fire on the right-hand destroyer (this was the Asagumo. She was hit by the second salvo just before she launched torpedoes. Her steering was affected and she was able to fire only three torpedoes.

The first enemy torpedo attack was a coordinated attack made by the two heavy cruisers, two flotilla leaders (light cruiser) and the six destroyers from the 4th destroyer flotilla. As the attack was developing, the Allied fleet, at 1629 hours, altered course from 295° to 248°, speed 25 knots and at 1631 hours, HrMs De Ruyter was hit in the auxiliary motor room on the starboard side by an 8” shell. A petrol fire was started but it was quickly extinguished. One of the crew was killed and six were wounded.

The enemy account of the torpedo attack is as follows; About 18 minutes after starting the gun engagement, the Naka followed by the Jintsu fired torpedoes. The 9th and 2nd destroyer flotilla’s then fired in succession. About 40 minutes after the start of the engagement the Haguro fired torpedoes. The Nachi also intended to fire torpedoes but due to a failure in drill did not do so. In 19 minutes, 43 torpedoes were fired at the Allied ships but none hit.

The Japanese 4th destroyer flotilla made smoke immediately following after the torpedo attack, and after the Perth’s second salvo hit, retired behind the smoke, which also concealed the enemy heavy cruisers from view. The Perth fired several follow up salvoes into the smoke screen which became so dense that the Japanese temporarily lost sight of the Allied fleet. The Electra and Jupiter had by this time closed the US destroyers and took op a position abeam the cruiser line on the disengaged side.

At 1635 hours, HrMs De Ruyter led in again towards the enemy on course 267°. Also about this time the rear enemy heavy cruiser, the Haguro was hit, apparently in the boiler room, as she emitted billowing clouds of black smoke, though continuing to fire her guns.

As the enemy smoke screen cleared, a Japanese destroyer was seen to be on fire. This may have been the Minegumo. By then the Nachi was firing at HMS Exeter and the Haguro at the and HMAS Perth.

Allied air attack

Around 1645 hours, splashes of heavy bombs were seen near the enemy ships, though no hits were observed. The Nachi and Haguro were still in line ahead about half a mile apart at a range of over 26000 yards. At this range they could only be engaged by the two Allied heavy cruisers. At this time the Haguro was seen to be on fire.

Second Japanese torpedo attack, 1700 to 1714 hours.

Shortly after 1700 hours, the Japanese delivered a second torpedo attack. It was made by the two heavy cruisers, the flotilla leader (light cruiser) Jintsu and six of the eight destroyers from the 2nd destroyer flotilla.

Between 1700 and 1706 hours, the enemy heavy cruisers commenced, unobserved by the Allied ships, a second torpedo attack. At 1707 hours, the foremost enemy destroyer flotilla, the 2nd, led by the Jintsu was seen to launch a long range torpedo attack and the Allied cruisers turned away to avoid the torpedoes and no torpedoes hit.

HMS Exeter hit by enemy gunfire

The Allied cruisers had ceased firing at 1707 hours, when they had turned away to avoid the torpedoes. The enemy was still firing but his shots fell short but at 1708 hours HMS Exeter was hit by an 8” shell from the Nachi and her speed rapidly decreased. She turned away to port, hauling out of the line and the cruisers astern of her turned with her. HrMs De Ruyter continued on her course for a short time but then turned to port as well. The Dutch and US destroyers also turned to port thus taking up a position ahead of the cruisers. The new mean course of the fleet then was about 180°.

As a result of this manoeuvre the Allied fleet was in disorder. At 1714 hours, HMS Exeter came to a stop and signaled that she had been hit in the boiler rooms.

HrMs Kortenaer torpedoed.

By this time the torpedoes that had been fired during the second Japanese torpedo attack reached the area the Allied ships were in and at 1715 hours, the Dutch destroyer HrMs Kortenaer was hit and blew up in approximate position 06°25’S, 112°08’E. She was hit amidships on the starboard side and broke in two. The forepart remained afloat for about five minutes but the stern part sank immediately. Five hours later HMS Encounter came across survivors and picked up 113 of them from the water and took them to Surabaya following the battle.

Also at 1715 hours, a torpedo track passed closely by HMS Jupiter and a moment later one was seen to pass astern of HMS Exeter. The US destroyers John D. Ford and John D. Edwards both had to use helm to avoid torpedoes.

HMS Exeter ordered to Surabaya.

Shortly after having come to a halt, HMS Exeter was underway again but her speed was limited to 15 knots. Rear-Admiral Doorman ordered her to proceed to Surabaya at 1740 hours and ordered the sole remaining Dutch destroyer HrMs Witte de With to escort her to there. HMAS Perth had also closed the Exeter and covered her with smoke from her funnel and smoke floats. She soon however rejoined the cruiser line when Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled ‘All ships follow me’.

The Allied fleet reforms.

At 1720 hours, in accordance with the above mentioned signal, and under cover of smoke which the US destroyers had started to lay, the De Ruyter proceeded on a course to the south-east. Altering almost immediately to north-east, at 1725 hours, the De Ruyter led the Allied cruisers between the enemy and the Exeter presumably to cover the latter and draw the enemy’s fire, for that in effect was the result of the manoeuvre. About this time an air attack developed and bombs fell 1000 yards to port of the US destroyers and two more sticks of bombs were dropped near them a few minutes later. No damage was caused by these air attacks. The Allied cruisers then proceeded on a course to the east.

British destroyers attack the enemy, 1725 hours and subsequent sinking of HMS Electra.

It was just about 1725 hours when Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled ‘British destroyers counter-attack’, whereupon Cdr. May, RN in the Electra ordered the Jupiter and the Encounter to follow. Circumstances were not favourable, for the smoke was very thick, and visibility over the battle area was not more then half a mile. Moreover, as the British destroyers were too far apart to make a divisional attack they attacked independently. The Encounter attacked through a clearing in the smoke. It is not known if she fired torpedoes or not. The Jupiter found no suitable target for torpedoes and therefore remained in the vicinity of HMS Exeter. She was able to drive off two enemy destroyers with gunfire near her which had come out of the smoke screen with the intention of making a torpedo attack on the Exeter. When the Encounter retired from her attack she was ordered to take up a position astern of HMS Jupiter and both destroyers remained near the Exeter as a covering force. The Dutch destroyer HrMs Witte de With was also near the damaged Exeter, she exchanged gunfire with an enemy destroyer around 1745 hours at a range of 9300 yards. The enemy replied and both ships fired around eight or nine rounds. The enemy was thought to have been hit twice. The Witte de With was hit once but the only damage sustained was that it destroyed her aerial. HMS Exeter and HrMs Witte de With arrived off the Surabaya defensive minefields at 2000/27.

Meanwhile HMS Electra had attacked through the smoke astern of the Exeter. As she cleared the smoke a formation of three enemy destroyers from the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was sighted on an opposite course entering the smoke at a range of 6000 yards. HMS Electra immediately engaged them and claimed hits with four salvoes on the leading ship. She did not fire torpedoes. As the three enemy destroyers disappeared into the smoke a shell hit the Electra Two of these enemy destroyers went on through the smoke to attack the Exeter with torpedoes and must have been the ships driven off later by HMS Jupiter. The third destroyer returned to engage the Electra which had been hit on the port side in No.2 boiler room. This hit brought the Electra to a stop. When the enemy destroyer came put of the smoke she was immediately engaged b all 4.7” guns in local control as communication with the bridge was dead. The enemy hit the Electra with it’s second salvo silencing the Electra’s guns one by one and causing a fire forward and a list to port. With only ‘Y’ gun still firing the order was given to abandon ship. The enemy continued to fire and closed so that he could use his machine guns. The Electra listed heavily to port and started to settle by the bows. She then turned over and started to sink slowly until about only 6 feet of her quarter deck was out of the water. She finally sank completely around 1800 hours. At 0315/28, 54 survivors were picked up out of the water by the US submarine S 38. One of these survivors subsequently died aboard the submarine.

Allied fleet reformed and a third Japanese torpedo attack.

By 1745/27 the Allied cruisers, less HMS Exeter, had reformed in single line ahead in the order HrMs De Ruyter, HMAS Perth, USS Houston and HrMs Java and had emerged from the smoke screen on an opposite course to the Nachi and Haguro which were about 19500 yards distant.

Also in sight, having emerged from the north-west out of the smoke, on approximately a parallel course, was the Naka leading five destroyers from the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. At 1750 hours the retiring HMS Exeter fired a salvo at the Naka. At 1752 hours the five enemy destroyers were seen to move in for a torpedo attack. HMAS Perth opened fire on them as they came into view in gaps -through the smoke. They returned the gunfire and then retired through the smoke. They had fired 24 torpedoes but all missed the Allied ships.

Around this time Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled to Vice-Admiral Helfrich that HrMs Kortenaer had been sunk and that HMS Exeter was damaged and ordered to return to Surabaya under escort by HrMs Witte de With. That the fight with the Japanese was ongoing and that his position was 06°15’S, 112°17’E.

US destroyers attack.

About 1758 hours, when the Allied fleet was on course 190°, Rear-Admiral Doorman ordered the four US destroyers to counter-attack but almost immediately this ordered was cancelled and ordered the US destroyers to make smoke. While the US destroyers were doing so Rear-Admiral Doorman altered course to 090° and then signaled to the US destroyers ‘cover my retirement’. When they received this order the four US destroyers were between the Allied cruiser line and the enemy. It was getting dark and visibility was now 15 nautical miles. Commander Binford, the commander of the 58th Destroyer Division decided that the most effective way to do so was a torpedo attack. Thereupon the US destroyers altered course to starboard, in order to break clear of the smoke that they had just laid. The enemy heavy cruisers were about 20000 yards away to the north-west on a westerly course. The US destroyers closed the range to about 14000 yards and then fired their starboard torpedoes at 1814 hours. The destroyers then turned around and fired their port torpedoes five minutes later. The enemy heavy cruisers were seen to turn to the north shortly afterwards.

At 1831 hours Rear-Admiral Doorman signaled to the US destroyers ‘follow me’. The US destroyers then turned under the cover of smoke, crossed under the stern of the Allied cruiser column and took up a position on its disengaged quarter on a course between east and north-east. Commander Binford then reported to Rear-Admiral Doorman that all his destroyers torpedoes had been fired.

Around 1815 hours gunfire between the Allied cruisers and the Japanese heavy cruisers was again exchanged. It was around this time that a hit was observed on the Haguro. Shortly afterwards the enemy heavy cruisers were seen to retire westwards. This information was signaled to Vice-Admiral Helfrich. Rear-Admiral Doorman also requested information about the position of the enemy convoy of transports.

The enemy was now no longer in sight and Rear-Admiral Doorman led his force to the north-east presumably to work round the enemy escort and find the enemy convoy of transports. Speed was set to 22 knots.

By 1856 hours, the Allied fleet was on course 290° altering gradually to the north. It was a bright moonlight night.

Night action, 1927 hours.

After dark, the enemy force was augumented by two other heavy cruisers, the Mogami and Mikuma. Also the light cruiser Natori leading three destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla. The Naka and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla appears the have retired from the battle area.

At 1927 hours the Allies sighted four ships on the port beam. These were the light cruiser Jintsu and three destroyers of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. About the same time an enemy aircraft dropped a flare on the disengaged side of the Allied ships. Both British destroyers (HMS Jupiter and HMS Encounter) were now ahead of the cruiser line.

Fourth Japanese torpedo attack, 1936 hours.

Shortly afterwards the Japanese launched yet another torpedo attack. At 1933 hours, HMAS Perth opened fire on them with her main armament. He then fired starshell but these fell short. USS Houston also opened fire. At 1936 hours a row of explosions was seen on one of the enemy’s ships which were thought to be torpedoes being launched and HMAS Perth turned away to evade and the other ships followed. Japanese records confirmed that at this time the Jintsu indeed fired torpedoes and that the turn by HMAS Perth most likely saved Allied ships from being hit.

The Allied cruiser then again formed up in line ahead and were lead on various course by HrMs De Ruyter to intercept the enemy. Around 1945 hours the course of the Allied fleet was 170°.

Night action, 2000 hours.

The Allied cruisers continued on course 170° and at 2000 hours, Rear-Admiral Doorman, evidently unaware that HMS Electra had been sunk signalled to her, HMS Jupiter and HMS Encounter, ‘Report your position, course and speed’. At 2023 hours, what appeared to be four enemy destroyers were observed on the port bow attempting a torpedo attack and the Allied cruisers altered course to port. At 2043 hours it was again thought that destroyers had delivered another torpedo attack, this time from starboard and course was altered to 175°. Neither time torpedoes or their tracks were observed and Japanese records does not mention torpedoes being fired by destroyers around this time. Around 2100 hours the Allied ships turned west to a course of about 280°.

Shortly after 2100 hours, the US destroyer, now out of torpedoes and with fuel getting low retired towards Surabaya. They were off Surabaya when they received a signal from Admiral Doorman that they were to proceed to Batavia to fuel and receive orders where to obtain new torpedoes. Course was then set for Batavia. Off Surbaya they had ben joined by the USS Pope which had been repairing there. However it was soon decided that it would be impossible to proceed to Batavia and the five destroyers entered Sourabaya instead.

After the departure of the US destroyers the remaining ships of the Allied fleet proceeded westwards along the north coast of Java. They were in single column in the order HMS Encounter, HrMs De Ruyter, HMAS Perth, USS Houston, HrMs Java and HMS Jupiter.

HMS Jupiter sunk, 2125 hours.

At 2125 hours HMS Jupiter is reported to have been torpedoed in position 06°45.2’S, 112°05.5’E. She stopped immediately and sank in 8 fathoms of water at 0130/28 approximately in the position she was hit. The explosion killed twelve ratings and wounded seven of whom two subsequently died. Five officers and seventy-eight rating managed to land on the coast of Java. The ships Commanding Officer, one other officer and ninety-five ratings were captured by the Japanese. Four officers and sixty-six ratings were missing.

It is now known that HMS Jupiter was not hit by a torpedo but hit a mine of a Dutch minefield.

After the Jupiter had been mined the fleet proceeded more or less northwards. They were shadowed by enemy aircraft which dropped flares every time the Allied ships went on a new course.

Around this time the sole remaining destroyer, HMS Encounter lost contact with the Allied cruisers. She later, around 2330 hours, picked up 113 survivors from the water from the Dutch destroyer HrMs Kortenaer that had been torpedoed earlier in the battle. HMS Encounter then proceeded towards the west to make for Batavia but this was soon changed for Surabaya.

Fifth Japanese torpedo attack, 2245 hours.

Contact was now made again with the Japanese heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro. These ships had not been seen after 1830 hours but the Japanese were apparently well aware of the position of the Allied ships and had been laying an ambush. Fire was now opened from both sides. Unknown to the Allies the Japanese had already launched their deadly torpedoes against the Allied cruiser line. The De Ruyter was hit by an enemy shell on the quarter deck and turned away. HMAS Perth followed as her Commanding Officer thought that the flagship was turning away to avoid torpedoes that she might have sighted. While the Allied cruiser line was halfway through the turn, at 2250 hours, the whole after part of HrMs Java, the last cruiser in the line, was seen the blew up and she stopped, heavily on fire. Shortly afterwards HrMs De Ruyter also blew up with an appalling explosion and settled aft, also heavily on fire. The two Dutch light cruisers had been torpedoed by the Japanese 5th Cruiser Division. HMAS Perth just managed to avoid the heavily damaged De Ruyter. USS Houston hauled out to starboard. The crew of the De Ruyter was seen to assemble forwards as the after part of the ship, as far as the catapult was a mass of flames. Ammunition began to explode and the ship had to be abandoned and she sank in a few minutes. The position in which the Dutch cruisers were hit was approximately 06°11’S, 112°08’E.

HMAS Perth now took the USS Houston under her orders and both cruisers now turned for Batavia, some 300 nautical miles distant, at high speed. Both cruisers were running low on ammunition. The Perth reported the sinking of both Dutch cruisers by W/T. From Surabaya the Dutch sent out the hospital ship Op ten Noord to sea to search for survivors. The Japanese however soon intercepted this ship and captured her.

After the battle.

HMAS Perth and USS Houston arrived at Batavia at 1400/28 and quickly commenced fuelling. They left at 2120 hours to try to escape through the Sunda Strait. The Dutch destroyer HrMs Evertsen was ordered to sail with them but was not ready in time and sailed about two hours later. Around midnight the Evertsen reported a sea battle going on in the Sunda Strait. Shortly afterwards she reported that she herself had been intercepted by the Japanese as well and that she had beached herself off the south coast of Sumatra.

The sea battle reported by the Evertsen was between the Perth and the Houston that had come across a Japanese landing force that were landing troops on the coast of Java in the Sunda Straits. The Allied cruisers had no chance against the Japanese forces and were soon sunk after being hit by multiple torpedoes each.

In the evening of 28 February 1942, the damaged British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter and two destroyers, the British HMS Encounter and the American USS Pope departed Surabaya to try to escape to Colombo through the Sunda Strait. After they cleared harbour they proceeded to the east along the coast of Madura for about 20 miles and then they proceeded northwards passing to the east of Bawean Island. They were then to steer north-east before making a run for the Sunda Strait. Soon after leaving Surabaya though the ships were discovered by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. At about 1000 hours on March 1st, HMS Exeter reported that three enemy heavy cruisers were approaching her. In fact four of them were closing her to finish her off. After about 1,5 hours the Exeter had been hit many times. She was then finished off by a torpedo from the Japanese destroyer Inazuma. HMS Encounter was also sunk by gunfire while USS Pope was brought to a stop by damage received from aircraft bomb near misses.

The only ships that had participated in the Battle of the Java Sea that managed to escape were the four US destroyer. The USS John D. Edwards, USS John D. Ford, USS Alden and USS Paul Jones left Surabaya in the late afternoon of the 28th. They went out through Madura Strait and the proceeded to the Indian Ocean though the Bali Strait. They encountered and were engaged by patrolling Japanese destroyers but managed to escape. They arrived safely at Fremantle, Australia in the afternoon of March 4th.

Two Dutch destroyers at Surabaya, HrMs Witte de With and HrMs Banckert were damaged and unable to escape. Both were scuttled by their crews.

Japanese ships involved in the battle..

In late February 1942 the Japanese set in motion movements to land troops on the island of Java, the main island of the Dutch colony of the Dutch East Indies. two landing forces went to sea, the Western invasion force and the eastern invasion force.

The western invasion force was made up of 56 transports. These ships were escorted by the 5th Japanese Destroyer Flotilla. This was made up of the light cruiser Natori (Flotilla leader) and the destroyers Asakaze, Harukaze, Hatakaze, Matsukaze (5th Destroyer Division), Satsuki, Minazuki, Fumizuki, Nagatsuki (22th Destroyer Division) and the 3th Japanese Destroyer Flotilla which was made up of the Japanese light cruiser Sendai (Flotilla leader) and the destroyers Fubuki, Hatsuyuki and Shirayuki (11th Destroyer Division), Murakumo and Shirakumo (12th Destroyer Division). Furter ships that were part of the escort force were the light cruiser Yura, the minelayer Shirataka, mineweepers W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 and several submarine chasers.

Cover for the western invasion force was provided by the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral Kurita) which was made up of the heavy cruisers Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami, Suzuya and the destroyers Isonami, Shikinami and Uranami (19th Destroyer Division). Air cover was provided by the aircraft carrier Ryujo, seaplane tender Chiyoda, auxiliary seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru and the destroyers Amagiri, Asagiri and Yugiri (20th Destroyer Division).

The eastern invasion force was made up of 41 transports. These ships were escorted by the 4th Japanese Desroyer Flotilla. This was made up of the light cruiser Naka (Flotilla leader) and the destroyers Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo (9th Destroyer Division), Murasame, Harusame, Samidare, Yudachi (2nd Destroyer Division) and the Umikaze. The light cruiser Jintsu (Flotilla leader), destroyers Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze (16th Destroyer Division). Further ships that were part of the escort force were the light cruiser Kinu, minelayer Wakataka, minesweepers W 15 and W 16, submarine chasers Ch-4, Ch-5, Ch-6, Ch-16, Ch-17 and Ch-18.

Cover for the eastern invasion force was provided by the 5th Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral Takagi) with the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro and the destroyers Sazanami, Ushio, Kawakaze and Yamakaze. The 16th Cruiser Squadron with the heavy cruisers Ashigara and Myoko and the destroyers Akebono and Inazuma. Air cover was provided by land based aircraft and the seaplane tender Mizuho and the auxiliary seaplane tender Sanyo Maru.

South of Java operated the Japanese 1st Carrier fleet that had left Kendari (Celebes) and proceeded south through Stait Sape. This force consisted of the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, battlecruisers Kongo, Haruna, Hiei, Kirishima, heavy cruisers Chikuma, Tone, Atago, Maya, Takao, light cruiser Abukuma, destroyers Tanikaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Urakaze (17th Destroyer Division), Shiranuhi, Kasumi, Airake, Yugure (18th Destroyer Division), Arashi, Hayashio and Nowaki (4th Destroyer Division). (1)

18 Mar 1942
HMAS Adelaide (Capt. H.A. Showers, RAN) departed Melbourne around 1620L/18, escorting the transport Monterey (American, 148017 GRT, built 1932) to Fremantle.

Around 1530I/21, the destroyers USS Parrott (Lt. J.N. Hughes, USN) and USS Paul Jones (Lt. C.R. Herms, USN).

Around 1945I/21, they all arrived at Fremantle. (2)

23 Apr 1942
At 2008H/23, on board USS Searaven (Lt. H. Cassedy, USN) a fire was reported in the maneuvering room when she was in position 28°51'S, 112°55'E (west of Geraldton, Australia). That room and the after torpedo room had to be evacuated.

At 2100H/23, a signal was sent to ComSubs Asiatic Fleet requiring assistance.

At 2300H/23, a signal was sent to ComSubs Asiatic Fleet that the fire had been extinguished and that only the batteries could be used for propulsion.

At 2358H/23, a signal from ComSubs Asiatic Fleet was received stating that the submarine USS Snapper (Lt.Cdr. H.L. Stone, USN) would come to our assistance and later also the patrol yacht USS Isabel (Lt. J.W. Payne, Jr., USN).

At 0735H/24, USS Snapper was sighted and at 0845H/24, Snapper took Searaven in tow.

Around 1000H/24, the tow line parted. A new tow could be astablished and towing resumed around 1300H/24.

At 1615H/24, the minesweeper HMAS Maryborough(A/Cdr. G.L. Cant, RAN) joined.

At 1700H/24, the destroyers USS Parrott (Lt. J.N. Hughes, USN) and USS Paul Jones (Lt. C.R. Herms, USN) joined as escorts.

Around 1745H/24, the tow parted.

At 1755H/24, USS Snapper. parted company to proceeed to Fremantle.

At 1800H/24, HMAS Maryborough passed a towline.

The tow and its escort arrived at Freemantle on the 25th. (3)

23 Dec 1943

Attempted interception, as part of Operation Stonewall, of the German blockade breaker Osorno, interception of the German blockade breaker Alsterufer and subsequent action on 28 December 1943, between HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise and German destroyers and torpedo boats.

During the latter half of November and beginning December 1943, movements of vessels considered to be possible blockade breakers along the French coast of the Bay of Biscay, together with reports received that these ships were fully loaded and likely soon to start for the Far East, gave reason for intensifying operation Stonewall. The long winter nights also would probably be used by the enemy to bring back from the Far East some of the ships which had managed to evade the blockade at the end of 1942 beginning of 1943.

The surface forces available to the C-in-C, Plymouth for the operation were two light cruisers; HMS Glasgow (Capt. C.P. Clarke, RN) and HMNZS Gambia (Capt. N.J.W. William-Powlett, DSC, RN). These were reinforced by the arrival of HMS Enterprise (Capt. H.T.W. Grant, RCN) at Plymouth on 23 December 1943 on completion of her post refit working up period at Scapa Flow.

The initial dispositions for the upcoming period were basd on the following considerations;
A) It was desirable to locate inward bound blockade breakers as far west as possible and that main reliance on this must be based on air patrols.
B) The density of these air patrol, owing to various causes, were always somewhat uncertain.
C) It was anticipated that the presence of outward bound blockade runners would be revealed at the earliest possible moment due to the aircraft on anti-uboat patrol over the Bay of Biscay.
D) Cruiser patrols should be as close as possible to the air patrol line to ensure that the earliest possible use is made of air sightings, and to reduce the likelihood of contact being lost owing to the exhaustion of fuel in the aircraft (as had happened before).
E) It was not considered desirable to maintain constant cruiser patrol east of 25°W due to the presence of German HE 177 long range bombers in Bordeaux.
F) It was considered desirable that no cruiser should have less then 3-4 days endurance remaining when the enemy would be sighted.

Arising out of the above considerations great importance was attached to the air patrol to the northward of the Azores (patrol H, between positions NN (42.05'N, 31.18'W) and OO (48°58'N, 34°04'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line and later patrol L, between positions QQ (43.10'N, 30.00'W) and OO (49°50'N, 30°00'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line).

This was backed up by the cruiser patrol from the Azores. HMS Glasgow and HMNZS Gambia relieving one other at 3 to 4 day intervals.

The endurance of HMS Enterprise, on the other hand, made her unsuitable for operations from the Azores so she was kept at Plymouth where she could be dispatched immediately on receipt of definite information regarding the enemy.

Passage of the German blockade breaker Osorno.

On 23 December 1943, HMNZS Gambia was operating on patrol line G (between positions LL (42°15'N, 30°10'W) and MM (49°10'N, 35°52'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line) having relieved HMS Glasgow which had returned to Horta to fuel on 22 December 1943. At 1911A/23, HMS Glasgow was informed that she was to leave Horta at 1100 hours on the 24th to relieve HMNZS Gambia on patrol G and that HMNZS Gambia was to return to Horta to fuel at 1300 hours on the 26th.

At 2035A/23, the C-in-C Plymouth, received a telephone call from the Admiralty that an aircraft from USS Card (T/Capt. A.J. Isbell, USN) had sighted an unknown vessel in position 47°45'N, 18°53'W at 1539 hours on the 23rd. This ship had been steering a course of 110° at 10 knots. This vessel could not be identified as being Allied and was therefore most probably a German blockade runner. This vessel must have passed patrol line H at some time on 21st December but had not been detected.

At the same time, reports were beginning to come in from aircraft flying patrols over the Bay of Biscay of A.S.V. (airborne surface vessel - radar) contact with surface vessels. The first of these indicated that some 12 ships were proceeding on a westerly course in position 45°38'N, 06°18'W and that their speed was 20 knots. Subsequent reports during the night gave various positions and composition of the enemy force, but all agreed that their course was westerly and that there were destroyers and also a merchant ship or ships present.

In fact there was no German outward blockade runner present. Six destroyers of the 8th German destroyer flotilla had left the Gironde around 0530B/23. These were the destroyers Z 27 (Senior Officer), Z 23, Z 24, Z 32, Z 37 and ZH 1. Half an hour before, at 0500B/23, the German 4th torpedo boat flotilla had left Brest. These were the torpedo boats T 22, T 23, T 24, T 25, T 26 and T 27. They were to join company around 1700B/23 in approximate position 45°33'N, 04°46'W (grid BF 8323) and then proceed to make rendezvous with the incoming blockade breaker.

At 2340A/23, HMS Enterprise was ordered to raise steam immediately and at the same time the Admiralty requisted the C-in-C Mediterranean to place one cruiser under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Gibraltar forthwith for anti-blockade runner duty. HMS Mauritius (Capt. W.W. Davis, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral C.H.J. Harcourt, CBE, RN) was selected for this duty and the C-in-C Mediterranean requested the Vice-Admiral Malta to sail her with all despatch. She departed Malta around 1715A/23, the Rear-Admiral having quickly stuck his flag and left the ship with his staff.

HMS Enterprise left Plymouth around 0200A/24 with orders to proceed through position 180° - Wolf Rock - 10 nautical miles and then on course 258° at 25 knots. Further instructions would be signalled later.

At 0240A/24, the Admiralty signalled to all ships and authorities in the area a resume of such information as was known at the time. It was obvious that the ship seen by the aircraft of USS Card, if she was indeed an enemy blockade breaker, had successfully eluded the Allied air and surface patrols, and no surface forces now could cut her off or overtake her before she was well under the protection of enemy shore base aircraft. There remained the possible outward bound vessel and any other inward bound ship which might be following the first one sighted. In order to catch these, and especially the former, new patrols J and K were instituted, J being longitude 24°30'W between 46°12'N and 47°50'N, and K being longitude 23°00'W between 48°12'N and 49°50'N and one more L, further out, on longitude 30°00'W between 43°10'N and 49°50'N.

At 0628A/24, orders were signalled to HMS Glasgow to establish patrol J by 1000 hours on the 25th and to HMNZS Gambia to establish patrol K at the same time. If nothing had been sighted by HMS Glasgow by 1900 hours on the 25th and by HMNZS Gambia by 2000 hours on the 25th they were to leave as to establish patrol L within 60 miles from 30°00'W by daylight on the 26th. HMNZS Gambia, who would be the first that needed to refuel at Horta, taking the part to the south of 46°30'N, and HMS Glasgow taking the part north of 46°30'N. Air patrol were ordered to cover the areas to the east of these patrols.

Reports from aircraft shadowing the enemy destroyer force in the Bay of Biscay continued to come in and at daylight a report by aircraft R of 105 group, a USN Liberator, gave the composition as 7 merchant ships and 4 destroyers still on a westerly course.

At 0852A/24, however, the situation was complicated by a report from Liberator H from 53 group that two destroyers some 60 miles to the southward of previous reports had been sighted. These were steering 138° at 18 knots. It was first thought these may be Spanish but as no destroyers of that nationality were known to be in that position it seems that that these must be part of the enemy force turned back for some reason and returning along the Spanish Coast.

During the forenoon, the positions reported by various aircraft which were shadowing varied considerably, but the latitudes were all between 45°N and 46°N, and the course given was west. The speed varied between 15 and 20 knots. The composition of the force was very difficult to assess but the majority of the reports indicated 10 or 11 units, of which one or two were merchant ships.

By 1100A/24 it was quite obvious that blockade running was in full swing, and the Admiralty ordered the destroyers HMS Caldwell (Lt.Cdr. F.D. Stacpoole, RD, RNR) and HMS Chelsea (Lt.Cdr. J.E.R. Wilford, RNR), which had been in position 42°30'N, 27°01'W around 0800 hours that morning, proceeding at 15 knots to the U.K. from Horta, to come under the orders of the C-in-C, Plymouth, but their state of efficiency and the amount of fuel on board was too low for them to be effective and the orders were subsequently cancelled. The Admiralty also requested the C-in-C, Mediterranean to sail HMS Mauritius to the Azores with despatch, and to replace her at Gibraltar with another cruiser so two cruisers were now requested from the Mediterranean.

At 1127A/24, the C-in-C, Plymouth promulgated to all ships and authorities concerned his estimate of the situation, giving 9 enemy destroyers with 2 merchant ships, possibly tankers in position 45°35'N, 10°56'W steering 270° at 15 knots and two destroyers in the vicinity of Cape Ortegal, eastbound, and the inward bound blockade breaker not yet located.

Air searches were meanwhile ongoing to locate the inward bound blockade breaker and at 1220A/24, a Beaufighter of 143 Squadron reported a large merchant ship of about 5000 tons with funnel amidships and a large superstructure round the funnel. She was sighed in position 46°00'N, 11°30'W proceeding on course 090°. The enemy force had meanwhile been reported as consisting of 5 destroyers and 4 merchant vessels.

By 1245A/24, the rendezvous had been made and the enemy had turned onto an easterly course, this being reported by Beaufighters of 235 Squadron. They reported the force as consisting of 2 merchant vessels, 5 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats.

According to German files the rendezvous with the incoming blockade breaker was made at 1246B/24 in approximate position 45°33'N, 12°15'W (grid BE 9322)

Up to this time it had seemed fairly certain that there was at least one outward bound blockade breaker and possibly two, in company with the enemy destroyer force. Now doubt began to arise.

However as the enemy force was now continuously being shadowed by British aircraft, it was appreciated that the enemy would be unlikely to detach an outward bound blockade runner alone and unescorted and it was also appreciated that the enemy would attach the greatest importance to the inward bound blockade breaker.

Consequently there remained two possibilities with regard to outward bound blockade breakers (if these were indeed present);
A) That the enemy had abandoned the attempt and were returning to France with the incoming blockade breaker and the escort.
B) That they would part company with the escort after dark then to proceede once more to the westward.

HMS Enterprise was therefore ordered after passing 09°30'W to steer for position 46°20'N, 15°40'W. She altered course to comply at at 1455A/24.

During the afternoon aircraft continued to shadow the enemy convoy on its easterly course but their signals on its composition failed to resolve the doubt about the presence of outward bound blockade breakers. It seemed that there were now 12 ships in all but the number of merchant ships reported varied from 2 to 7.

Around 1600A/24, 8 Halifax aircraft from 502 Squadron arrived near the enemy convoy and attacked it with 500 lb bombs. Few were able to report the results. Flak was heavy and evasive action by the enemy prevented any accurate observation. One however reported a hit on the larger merchantman who she assessed at 5000 tons. Another aircraft claimed a very near miss on another ship. Aircraft of 19 Group continued to shadow but any attack on the convoy, except by aircraft, was now out of the question.

Besides the possibility of an outward bound blockade breaker turning to the westward after dark there was the further possibility of a second inward bound blockade breaker closely following the first.

In order to guard against these contingencies, the C-in-C, Plymouth, requested at 1624A/24, the Senior British Naval Officer, Azores to arrange for an air search at maximum density, to be carried out during daylight on the 25th in the area between longitudes 18°45'W and 22°55'W, south of latitude 50'N as far towards latitude 42°N as resources would permit, the northern part of the area being the most important. This was to be instead of patrol H. HMS Glasgow and HMNZS Gambia had been ordered to patrol on J and K to the west of this area. Subsequently to commence on the 26th December, air patrol L was instituted between (QQ) 43°10'N, 30°00'W and (RR) 49°50'N, 30°00'W and was to be maintained daily.

At 1837A/24, a further situation report was issued, informing all forces and authorities that it was estimated that an inward bound blockade breaker had joined the enemy force at 1225A/24, in position 45°42'N, 11°45'W, and that the whole force of enemy vessels had turned to the westward at about 1300A/24 in position 45°35'N, 12°08'W and that it was considered all the enemy vessels were now eastbound, though it was possible that any outward bound blockade breaker might turn to the westward after dark.

HMS Enterprise was ordered, at 2012A/24, to establish a patrol on longitude 15°W between 46°50'N and 46°01'N until 0630A/25, when she was to proceed to take up patrol in the vicinity of position 47°50'N, 19°01'W until last light on the 25th after which she is to return to Plymouth. She reached the north end of the patrol line at 0023A/25.

during the night of the 24/25 December aircraft of 19 Group maintained contact with the enemy convoy, the reports of which continued to vary on it's composition but agreed on it's easterly course. At 0255A/25 an aircraft reported that two destroyers were 15 miles astern of the main convoy. Bombs were dropped by 9 aircraft between 0100 and 0500 hours, but no apparent result was achieved.

The weather on the morning of the 25th was unfavourable for flying and shadowing of the enemy convoy could no be kept up after 1140A/25. A striking force of 14 torpedo carrying Beaufighers and two special cannon Mosquitoes, escorted by 29 Beaufighters and 12 Mosquitoes was organised, but their departure had to be delayed owing to the unfavourable weather forecast. They did however, leave in time to arrive in the area around 1530A/25 but were unable to find the enemy.

By 1200A/25, it seemed certain that the enemy had not sent out any ship, and that the inward bound vessel would reach the Gironde, unless stopped by Beaufighters. HMS Enterprise was therefore ordered to return to Plymouth forthwith so that she might be refuelled as soon as possible to be ready for the next incoming blockade breaker. At 1255A/25, HMNZS Gambia was ordered to return to Horta to arrive before dark on the 26th and fuel with despatch. HMS Glasgow was also ordered to leave the northern end of patrol J at 2000A/25 and proceed to patrol L north of 46°50'N.

The Osorno and her escorts arrived in the Gironde in the early hours of the 26th where the blockade breaker hit the wreck of the sunken Sperrbrecher 21 and started to sink. To prevent this the ship was beached. The cargo was successfully salvaged though.

During the passage, at 1850B/24, T 27 suffered a rudder failure and dropped behind for some time before she was able to rejoin. She had to be steered on the engines.

At 0927B/25, ZH 1, which was suffering from engine trouble, requested to be taken in tow for which purpose T 25 was detached. She towed the damaged destroyer to the Gironde where they arrived late in the afternoon of the 26th.

Also, around 1945B/25, T 22, T 23, T 24 and T 26 were detached to proceed to Brest where they arrived around 1015B/26.

Interception of the German blockade breaker Alsterufer.

Attention was now very much directed to the possibility, and indeed the probability, that there was a second inward bound blockade breaker in the offing. It was appreciated that the Germans would wish to meet her and escort her in as much as they had done with the Osorno, and that the rendezvous might well be in much the same vicinity. This could be achieved by the German destroyers in a minimum time of 3 days, but this would involve a very quick turn around after reaching harbour with Osorno. 4 days was considered more likely and proved in the end to be correct. A still stronger interval was by no means out of the question. On the 3 day cycle the inward bound blockade breaker might be expected to have passed patrol line H on 24 December when patrol H was not flown and on the 25th for the 4 day cycle. Also on the 25th the patrol could not be flown due to other the commitments that had been made.

A gap had thus been left in the outer reconnaissance areas, through which a blockade runner might have passed on the 25th. To guard against this, the C-in-C, Plymouth asked Headquarters Coastal Command for an air search on 26 December, in the area between 50°N and 46°N, and 19°W and 22°W, adding that he attached the greatest importance to this. He also asked that patrol L should be flown on the 26th and daily thereafter, so as to ensure early air sighting if the enemy had not passed 30°W longitude on the 25th and to allow for interception by surface vessels as far to the westward as possible, the portion of the patrol line north of 46°30'N, being considered the more important.

Headquarters Coastal Command replied at 1640A/25, that 2 Liberators and 2 Sunderlands of 15 Group would patrol the area asked for from dawn on the 26th and that aircraft from 247 Group in the Azores would fly L patrol.

The general situation was further cleared up by photographic reconnaissance of La Pallice and the Gironde on the 25th which established that none of the possible outward bound blockade breakers had moved with the possible exception of the Himalaya whose berth at Brest had not been covered.

On the 28th photographic reconnaissance showed that the Osorno was at Le Verdon, apparently aground, but being unloaded. The identity of the ship was thus established without a doubt as the Osorno.

An alteration to the patrol ordered for HMS Glasgow was made at 1732A/25 when she was ordered to leave patrol J at dark on the 25th and establish patrol M between 47°25'N, and 48°05'N, and between 20°W and 22°30'W. She was ordered to be at eastern end of this patrol at about 1400A/26 and to leave the western end at dark on that day so as to commence patrol L north of 46°31'N, at daylight on th 27th. This patrol had to be given a general east/west line on account of the U-boat situation.

On the 26th, HMS Enterprise arrived at Plymouth at 1330A/26 and immediately fuelled. The fast minelayer HMS Ariadne (Capt. Lord Ashbourne, RN) left Gibraltar at 0930A/26 for passage to the U.K. HMNZS Gambia arrived at Horta at 1830A/26. HMS Mauritius, on arrival at Gibraltar, was found to have boiler defects. Therefore at 1952A/26, HMS Penelope (Capt. G.D. Belben, DSC, AM, RN) departed Gibraltar for Horta, Azores in her place.

During the afternoon of the 26th, further modifications were made to the patrol arrangements for the following and subsequent days. HMNZS Gambia was to leave Horta as soon as she had completed fuelling and then proceed at 22 knots to patrol L north of 46°31'N. HMS Glasgow was, at dusk onn the 26th, to search westward along 47°30'N and then to establish patrol N between 46°40'N and 47°20'N and between 23°04'W and 26°02'W at daylight on the 27th. The presence of U-boats in the area made it necessary again to establish patrol in an east/west line and further west then desired. HMS Enterprise was to leave Plymouth at 2200A/26 and proceed towards position EB which was in 48°26'N, 15°01'W at speed of advance of 21 knots.

In the evening news was received from the Senior British Naval Officer, Azores that the French large destroyer Le Malin (Cdr. J.E.C. Hourcade) had arrived at Horta on that day from Bermuda and that the French Naval authorities had placed her under British command. Her sister ship, Le Fantasque (Capt. C.Y.F.M. Perzo), currently at Algiers had also been ordered to proceed to Horta via Gibraltar.

Headquarters 19 Group arranged for 8 Liberators to carry out a search in an area bounded by the following points;
49°17'N, 20°26'W,
48°35'N, 17°40'W,
46°05'N, 19°03'W,
46°50'N, 21°50'W.

This area was based on the assumption that the next rendezvous with the destroyer escort and the inward bound blockade breaker would be in roughly the same position as that which had taken place on the 24th and be timed for noon on the 28th which, was now estimated to be the earliest possible date which the enemy destroyers could keep. In case the aircraft of 19 Group would be grounded on account of the weather aircraft from 15 Group were arranged as backup.

The stage was now set for the final act and the hoped for victim made his entry on the morning of the 27th. At 1015A/27, Sunderland T of 201 Squadron, attached to 15 Group, reported a medium seized merchant vessel in position 46°40'N, 19°30'W, steering a course of 120°. HMS Glasgow was thus to the west and HMS Enterprise to the east of the enemy. At 1036A/27, they were both ordered to steer towards position 45°00'N, 15°00'W at best speed. At 1000A/27, the estimated position of HMS Glasgow was 46°59'N, 26.35'W and that she would be on course 090° at 18 knots. On receipt of the signal at 1130 hours she altered course to 100° and increased speed to 27 knots and ten minutes afterwards speed was increased to 30 knots and course was adjusted as necessary to intercept the blockade runner.

Meanwhile Sunderland V of 201 Squadron went to the position given by T/201 and from then on contact was maintained and positions, courses and speed of the enemy were sent in by shadowing aircraft. As usual positions varied considerably, but the course of the enemy was consistently reported as a little south of east, and her speed was apparently high. At 1140A/27, a description of the ship was received from T/201 which fitted rather well with Alsterufer, an expected inward bound ship of about 2730 tons and 15 knots speed.

Shadowing aircraft were ordered not to attack until they had reached their prudent limit of endurance and at 1230A/27 the first attack was made, but it was not successful. After this several more attacks were carried out as aircraft reached their endurance limit but no hits were scored. Homing procedure for aircraft worked well and the enemy was kept under constant observation.

At 1124A/27, HMNZS Gambia who had left Horta at 2344O/26 and HMS Penelope who was on her way to Horta were ordered to steer at best possible speed towards position 45°00'N, 15°00'W. HMNZS Gambia was ordered to keep south of 42°N until west of 20°W, to avoid U-boats. They were also ordered to report their position, course and speed.

The weather over the English Channel and most of France was poor with light winds, drizzle, low cloud and fog patches. Some bases in the south were available for flying but it was probable that by nightfall all the British southern bases would be out of action due to weather. The Admiralty therefore requested the help of USS Block Island (T/Capt. L.C. Ramsey, USN) with her aircraft and her escorting destroyers (USS Paul Jones (T/Lt.Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, with COMDESDIV 58, T/Capt. R.B. Ellis, USN, on board), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN) and USS Parrott (T/Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN)) which were operating in the vicinity of 45°01'N, 22°00'W on anti-submarine work, to co-operate in shadowing and attack if opportunity offered.

At 1241A/27, the C-in-C, Plymouth ordered HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise to intercept and sink the enemy blockade breaker and gave her position as reported by aircraft as 46°50'N, 19°25'W at 1030A/27 steering 090° at 15 knots. The cruisers were to act on aircraft reports and were told that aircraft would be homing on 385 kc/s.

Le Malin was ordered to fill, the gap left by the chase of this blockade breaker, in the outer reconnaissance area, and to leave Horta forthwith to establish patrol L north of 46°30'N.

At 1254A/27, HMS Ariadne, on passage from Gibraltar (which she had left around 1815A/26) to the U.K., was placed under the command of the C-in-C, Plymouth. She was at that time in position 36°30'N, 16°00'W and she had to reduced her speed to 15 knots owing to the weather conditions.

At 1300A/27, HMNZS Gambia had been in position 41°50'N, 29°25'W, steering 090° at 27 knots.

At 1317A/27, the C-in-C, Plymouth organised the cruisers HMNZS Gambia, HMS Glasgow, HMS Penelope and HMS Enterprise into 'Force 3', under command of the Commanding Officer of HMNZS Gambia which was the most senior.

In the meantime, a striking force of 8 Halifaxes of 502 Squadron carrying bombs, was organised by Headquarters 19 Group and took off between 1300A/27 and 1330A/27, expecting to arrive over the enemy blockade breaker at about 1800A/27, being homed to her by the shadowing aircraft.

As a result of the shadowing reports, an estimate of the enemy's position at 1500A/27, was signalled by the C-in-C, Plymouth at 1554A/27 to the cruisers of Force 3, giving the position as 46°40'N, 18°14'W, mean course 115° with a speed of 15.5 knots maximum. Shortly afterwards Force 3 was told that it was estimated, from previous experience, that the enemy might have sailed 5 or 6 destroyers and about 6 torpedo boats to rendezvous, possibly before daylight on the 28th, with the incoming blockade breaker. Ships were also given the position of the previous rendezvous on the 24th which was estimated as being 45°40'N, 12°00'W.

At 1615A/27, Liberator H of 311 Squadron, manned by Czechs, arrived over the enemy to take over shadowing and at once attacked with bombs scoring a direct hit on the target on her after part. A heavy explosion occurred, the ship caught fire, and on the arrival of the striking force of 502 Squadron around 1800A/27, she was seen to be abandoned, heavily on fire and sinking. Excellent photographs were obtained of the attack by H of 311 Squadron which left no doubt that the ship sunk was the Alsterufer.

Action against the enemy destroyers and torpedo boats.

With the incoming blockade runner now satisfactory being dispatched there remained the possibility, if the enemy were not forewarned, of bringing the action to the escort force who would almost certainly be on their way to the rendezvous with her.

The enemy were indeed en-route in the same composition that had brought in the Osorno (see above) except for ZH 1 which was out of action due the engine trouble she had suffered.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were therefore ordered at 1817A/27, to continue their present sweep, reducing speed at their discretion in order to save fuel. An hour later, at 1926A/27, further orders were sent to these two ships to rendezvous in position (SS) 45°14'N, 15°23'W at approximately 0200A/28. They were then to leave this position at 0300A/28 and to sweep on a course of 105° to latitude 45°N and then on a course of 090° so as to reach the meridian of 12°W at 0900A/28. If no information had been received by then, they were to sweep north as far as 45°30'N, and thence on a course of 270°. This approach was designed to bring the cruisers in south of, and out of radar touch of the westbound enemy destroyers / torpedo boats, and then to move them north between the enemy and his base.

It now seemed probable that HMNZS Gambia was too far to the west to be able to make a rendezvous on the next day with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise so she was therefore told, at 1945A/27, to reduce speed to 23 knots. This was done with the object of saving fuel in case an outward bound enemy blockade runner accompanied the expected escort force coming from the French coast, and evaded HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise while they were dealing with the escort. In such an event, HMS Gambia would be well placed to intercept, but might have to do some hours of high speed steaming.

At this time also there arose some question as to HMS Penelope's state of repair, however, in reply to a signal asking her what maximum speed she could attain, and whether she had still normal endurance, a reassuring answer was received that she could steam 30 knots, her endurance was normal, and that she had 76% of fuel remaining. She took the opportunity to give her position, course and speed as 38°50'N, 13°32'W, 350° at 19 knots. The weather being cloudy with an easterly wind force 5. She was, therefore, likely to be out of the hunt.

In order to locate the enemy force as soon as possible, Headquarters 19 Group intended to send off 2 Liberators of 224 Squadron at 2145A/27, to carry out a modified patrol on the longitude of 10°W, and the cruisers were informed of this at 2300A/27. In the event, this patrol could not leave, due to weather, and it was not until 0630A/28 that the first two Liberators of USN Squadron 105 left to patrol between latitudes 45°N and 47°N and longitudes 12°W and 13°W. the second followed at 0830A/28.

Owing to the suspected presence of U-boats ahead of her, HMNZS Gambia at 2326A/26, was ordered to pass through position 41°20'N, 20°59'W, and then as previously ordered.

About midnight, the Admiralty broadcast a signal to all forces in the area that a suspicious merchant ships, probably an inward bound blockade runner, had been sighted by aircraft in position 47°20'N, 30°15'W at 1030Z/27, on a course of 135°. This ship was subsequently identified as a straggler from an Allied convoy, but this fact was not known for several hours.

At 0022A/28, HMS Ariadne was ordered to proceed so as to reach position 45°00'N, 15°00'W at 0900A/28 if practicable, and to patrol in that area until 1200A/28, when she was to leave and steer towards position 49°00'N, 17°00'W. She should thus have been in a good position to shadow and land what assistance she could to HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, though to arrange a definite rendezvous with them was impossible without impending their freedom of action on the 28th.

The movements of HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise on the 28th would certainly take them within easy range of enemy shore based aircraft and though the weather forecast, which indicated probable easterly winds force 4 and low cloud over north-west France and the northern half of the Bay of Biscay, was favourable for the Allies, it was considered advisable to inform the cruisers of the C-in-C, Plymouth's intentions, and to arrange to withdraw them if necessary before the danger of concentrated air attack should be accepted subject to the following factors;
A) If no news had been received by the enemy by 1200A/28, the cruisers were to withdraw to withdraw to the westward without further orders, and ... B) If in contact with the enemy, the decision whether and then to break off action would rest with the Senior Officer present, taking into consideration the hours of daylight remaining, conditions for aircraft and the prospects of achieving decisive results.

The news mentioned above of another possible blockade runner approaching made necessary some provision to deal with her, if she evaded the outer patrols. After the expected movements on the 28th, it was certain that HMS Glasgow, HMS Enterprise and HMNZS Gambia would need refuelling and it was by now means certain here they might be. It was decided, therefore, to order HMS Penelope to proceed to Plymouth at best speed so as to be ready fur future commitments, and a signal was made to her to inform her of this. The Vice-Admiral, Gibraltar was also requested to sail HMS Mauritius, whose defect was now repaired, forthwith to reach position (NN) 46°01'N, 25°30'W by 1200 hours on the 30th December.

At 0317A/28, HMNZS Gambia was ordered to proceed at best speed. She increased to 28 knots for about an hour, but the state of the sea forced her to reduce to 27 knots, which speed she was able to maintain without sustaining damage. Meanwhile HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise had affected their rendezvous at about 0300A/28, by the help of radar, and were continuing their sweep, as ordered.

In order to clarify the position to Force 3, the C-in-C, Plymouth gave them his estimate of their positions at 0900A/28. They were HMS Penelope in position 42°28'N, 14°14'W, course 353° at 22 knots. HMS Ariadne patrolling near position 45°00'N, 15°00'W until 1200A/28 and then proceeding on course 342° at 20 knots. HMNZS Gambia in position 42°32'N, 18°45'E, course 050° at 20 knots. Of these positions, Ariadne's was the only oone to be considerably in error. She had been on position 40°01'N, 17°30'W at 0100A/28, thence steering north at 17.5 knots, her speed being necessitated by the adverse weather. Her Commanding Officer, states that although it was impracticable to carry out the instructions to reach 45°N, 15°W at 0900A/28, he did not break W/T silence to say so, since he had intercepted a signal sent by HMS Penelope which mentioned the weather in the area HMS Ariadne was also in. HMS Mauritius departed Gibraltar around 0915A/28 to take up the position as ordered (see above).

The first definite news of the hoped for quarry arrived at 0927A/28, when Liberator V of 105 Squadron (USN) sighted and reported 4 destroyers on a course of 270° at 14 knots. This seemed to indicate the Germans were still unaware of the sinking of the Alsterufer. A further signal from the same aircraft at 0940A/28 gave the position and course of three enemy ships as 46°48'N, 11°57'W, 270°. This appeared to be the most promising at Area Combined Headquarters at Plymouth. HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were to the southward of the enemy and HMNZS Gambia was approaching from the south-west. Unless the enemy retired to the east again at high speed almost at once, the chances of contact appeared good. It was thought, moreover, that HMS Ariadne and HMS Penelope were nearer than, in fact, they were.

To facilitate enemy reports, two reference positions XX (45°00'N, 15°00'W) and YY (45°00'N, 10°00'W) were established and promulgated to Force 3 and HMS Ariadne. HMS Glasgow was ordered to take HMS Ariadne under her orders when action was joined. HMS Ariadne at 1031A/28, was ordered to proceed to patrol in the vicinity of position 45°12'N, 13°20'W her primary object being reconnaissance and shadowing.

Headquarters 19 Group at once arranged for shadowing to continue throughout the day, detailing for this purpose two Sunderlands and two Liberators. A striking force of 6 Liberators of 105 Squadron (USN) was also get ready.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, who had turned north around 0900A/28, had meanwhile received the enemy report and at 0952A/28, increased speed to 28.5 knots and altered course to 010° to make further ground to the east of the enemy. The wind in the area of the cruisers was south-east force 5.

Further enemy reports from aircraft V/105 came in, indicating that there were probably at least 8 enemy destroyers / torpedo boats in the force sighted. This aircraft was ordered by 19 Group at 1031A/28 to carry out homing procedure, and aircraft X of 105 Squadron was ordered to listen for the homing signals.

In order to provided cover for the cruisers against enemy aircraft a force of 29 Beaufighters and 8 Mosquitoes were ordered to take off as soon as possible so as to rendezvous with with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise in the vicinity of 46°32'N, 10°28'W. The cruisers were informed of this force by signal and the aircraft actually left between 1330 and 1530 hours.

At 1100A/28, V/105 reported that the enemy had reversed course and were proceeding to the eastward. Their position was 46°48'N, 11°47'W and the number of destroyers / torpedo boats was 10.

At 1130A/28, HMS Glasgow estimated the enemy's furthest on and furthest north probable position was that based on this report, which placed the enemy 45 nautical miles the the north of him, and steering east at 15 knots. This was not too good, as it meant that contact could only just be made. HMS Glasgow therefore altered course to 030°. However at 1120A/28, Sunderland Q of 10 Squadron obtained contact and made the enemy position 46°33'N, 12°30'W. This placed the enemy some 35 miles to the westward of the estimate previous given by V/105. Both shadowing aircraft were attacked by enemy aircraft but managed to beat off the attacks and were able to continue to shadow.

The situation was appreciated by the C-in-C, Plymouth and a signal made at 1155A/28, informing HMS Glasgow that it was estimated the position of 10 enemy destroyers at 1120A/28 was 46°33'N, 12°30'W, steering 090° at 20 knots. More weight was given to the report of the Sunderland owing to the greater expercience of the crew and the fact that she had not been in the air so long as the other aircraft.

It now appeared probable that an action would take place in the afternoon, HMNZS Gambia and HMS Penelope were therefore ordered, at 1215A/28, to proceed to position 46°N, 13°W and it was now intended to sent HMS Penelope back to Gibraltar for fuel on completion of the operation.

By 1230A/28, another Liberator, X of 105 Squadron, was in contact with the enemy force. It reported 11 destroyers in position 47°05'N, 12°40'W, steering 140° at 14 knots, indicating that the enemy had turned onto a new course to the south of east.

HMS Glasgow's movement during the forenoon were unknown at Area Combined Headquarters, Plymouth, but it had been assumed that she had been making ground to the eastward on the strength of the enemy reports received. HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were therefore told at 1244A/28, that if no further information had been received and if nothing had been sighted by 1430A/28, they should then sweep to the north-west, their estimated position at that time being signalled as 46°31'N, 10°38'W. Before receipt of this signal, however, HMS Glasgow at 1309A/28, had decided that they had passed within radar range of any enemy to the north and decided to turn south-east to intercept the enemy. The enemy's movements were based on the estimate given by the C-in-C, Plymouth corrected for subsequent alterations of course as reported by shadowing aircraft.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise had been sighted by enemy aircraft at 1224 hours and again at 1330 hours, so it can be assumed that the enemy were aware of their presence. This was not known at Plymouth at the time.

While turning to the south-east at 1338A/28, HMS Enterprise reported that she had heard homing signals bearing 243° and 146° or reciprocal. HMS Glasgow therefore steadied on a course of 220° in the hope of hearing more and getting a plot, but no further D/F bearings were obtained or received.

At 1306A/28, the C-in-C, Plymouth, ordered HMS Ariadne to shift her patrol to the vicinity of 46°15'N, 12°15'W. On receipt of this signal, Ariadne appreciated that the fact that she was not in a position being unknown, might effect the tactics of HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, who were obviously about to engage the enemy, and decided to break wireless silence and give her position, course and speed. There was also now no need to fear that her signal might give away to the enemy that fact that cruisers were to the south-west of them, as this fact must be already known. Her signal was timed 1400A/28, and gave her position as 43°30'N, 16°34'W, course 282°. Owing to a beakdown in her W/T transmitter her speed was not signalled.

At 1332A/28, HMS Glasgow sighted the masts of two vessels bearing 238° and simultaneously obtained radar contact on the same bearing at a range of 16 nautical miles. Three minutes later she made her first enemy report ' Enemy in sight, bearing 240°, range 12.5 nautical miles, 325° - Point YY - 118 nautical miles.

It was the Commanding Officer of HMS Glasgow's intention to fight the action from outside the enemy's effective range, which he took to be 13000 yards, and to engage any destroyer / torpedo boat which looked like reaching it. If more then one attained this range he proposed to turn away to reduce the closing rate.

HMS Glasgow opened fire at 1346A/28 with 8 enemy ships in sight at a range of 18500 yards. At 1350A/28, HMS Enterprise joined in. The enemy returned fire at 1358A/28.

HMS Enterprise acted under the following general instructions which had been passed when she joined company;
A) Keep on a line of bearing approximately at right angles to the enemy.
B) Keep within supporting distance of Glasgow.
C) Act independently to avoid possible torpedo fire from the enemy.

The action commenced with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise on a southerly course, the enemy bearing 234° from them. The details of the action are best read in the action report of HMS Glasgow which we will put online on her page as well as on the page of HMS Enterprise. During the action it appeared that the enemy made much use of smoke floats, retiring behind the screen as fire upon them became effective, and in consequence the movements of the enemy are impossible to follow in detail.

In broad outline, the enemy appeared to have kept together on a south-south-easterly course for about three quarteers of an hour, during which time HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise engaged various ships among them as smoke allowed at long range. The cruisers fire appears to have been effective, and probably damaged several of the enemy during this time.

At 1400A/28, a Focke Wolf 200 aircraft released a glider bomb but effective AA fire from HMS Glasgow caused the enemy aircraft to take evasive action and the bomb fell harmlessly into the sea.

The enemy fired torpedoes with considerable accuracy at about 1420A/28, but their tracks were successfully evaded.

At 1428A/28, the enemy divided his force, four ships turning to the north-west. This was noticed by both cruisers, and though it seems that HMS Glasgow, who was forced to turn away at 1435A/28 to avoid torpedoes, fell out of the action for a few minutes. HMS Enterprise turned away to the westward after the northbound enemy, with whom she maintained contact.

HMS Glasgow soon came in touch again with the same force, the southern remnant of the enemy by now having turned away under smoke and disappeared before 1500A/28. The four remaining enemy ships which were now engaged appeared to be heavily hit and by 1515A/28, of the four one was damaged and stopped, one was damaged and retiring under smoke, one was being engaged by HMS Enterprise and one by HMS Glasgow from a range of 10000 yards.

These last two (T 25 and T 26) were sunk around 1540A/28 and as soon as the third (Z 27, stopped and damaged since around 1430A/28) had been sunk, the Commanding Officer of HMS Glasgow reviewed the situation. HMS Glasgow had fired most of her ammunition, and HMS Enterprise, whose electric gun firing circuits were out of action, was making repairs to these. Under these conditions it was not considered justified in chasing an enemy already out of sight. So therefore line ahead formation was formed and course was altered on 275°, speed 25 knots.

Meanwhile, at Area Combined Headquarters, Plymouth, the C-in-C, Plymouth had, at 1341A/28, ordered Force 3 and HMS Ariadne to close the enemy and at 1400A/28, 4 Halifaxes of 58 Squadron and 15 Liberators of the (USN) Squadrons at Dunkeswell (5 of 110 Squadron, 4 of 103 Squadron and 6 of 105 Squadron) had been despatched to the scene of the action, the cruisers being warned to expect them around 1630A/28.

At 1500A/28, the escort destroyers HMS Tanatside (Cdr. B.J. de St. Croix, RN), HMS Wensleydale (A/Lt.Cdr. W.P. Goodfellow, RNVR) and HMS Brissenden (Lt. D.D.E. Vivian, RN), were ordered to anchor in the Plymouth Sound and remain at 1/2 hour notice. Also 5 MTB's of the 23rd Flotilla from Dartmouth left at 1700A/28, to lie in wait of Brest for the returning enemy force. The rescue tug HMRT Dexterous (?), at Falmouth, was also brought to immediate notice and the M/S trawler HMS Lindisfarne (Skr. S.G. Jinks, RNR) proceeded from Plymouth to Falmouth to escort the tug if required.

The shadowing aircraft, X/105, had reported the six enemy destroyers who had escaped to the south-eastwards, and continued to shadow until reaching prudent limit of endurance at 1610A/28. Although she carried out homing procedure, no other aircraft appear to have received her homing signals.

In the dusk, several of the USN Liberators of the striking force made contact with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, and of these, one, P of 105 Squadron attacked Glasgow at 1933A/28. The ships, unable in the half light to distinguish friend from foe, were putting up a heavy barrage of AA fire, but this did not deter the USN, who happily scored a miss about 100 yards of Glasgow's port bow. Four others of the same squadron located and attacked an enemy squadron of destroyers on an easterly course at about 1800A/28, but no hits were claimed. The remainder of the striking force failed to find the target.

Shadowing aircraft re-gained touch after dark, and the movements of the enemy forces (it was not clear how many were together) were reported on an easterly course until midnight, when touch was finally lost.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were ordered to return to Plymouth by the C-in-C, Plymouth signal timed 1825A/28. HMS Ariadne was also ordered to resume her passage home and HMS Penelope was ordered to proceed to Gibraltar to fuel.

HMS Glasgow reported the general result of the action as two destroyers sunk as well as a torpedo boat. Glasgow's casualties were 2 killed and 6 slightly injured, with some minor damage to the ship. HMS Enterprise had no casualties and minor damage to the ship. The losses of the enemy were later ascertained to be 1 destroyer and 2 torpedo boats and not as initially reported by Glasgow. The remainder of the cruisers passage to Plymouth was uneventful and on arrival they were taken in hand at the Devonport Dockyard for action repairs.

On the 29th a lone German destroyer was sighted off the north coast of Spain, proceeding towards Bordeaux at 25 knots. She was shadowed for a short time, but bad weather conditions prevented a striking force from being sent to deal with her. Subsequent photographic reconnaissance of Brest and the Gironde established that four torpedo boats and four destroyers had returned to those ports respectively. One destroyer was subsequently seen in dock in La Pallice.

The outer cruiser patrol was maintained by HMNZS Gambia and HMNZS Mauritius, and the outer and inner air patrols maintained by aircraft of 247 Group in the Azores and 19 Group, until news was received on the th January that all the remaining inbound blockade breakers had been sunk in the South Atlantic by forces of the United States Navy. HMNZS Gambia and HMS Mauritius were then recalled to Plymouth.

Following the battle, Z 24, T 23, T 24 and T 27 proceeded to Brest. Z 32 and Z 37 proceeded to the Gironde and Z 23 and T 22 proceeded to St. Jean de Luz. (4)

15 Mar 1944

Convoy GUS 34.

This convoy departed Port Said on 15 March 1944.

On departure from Port Said the convoy was made up of the transports / tankers; Anglo-African (British, 5601 GRT, built 1929), Baron Inchcape (British, 7005 GRT, built 1917), Eli Whitney (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), George B. Selden (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), John W. Mackay (British, 4049 GRT, built 1922), Ocean Vestal (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942), Samdee (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), San Eliseo (British (tanker), 8042 GRT, built 1939) and Tanafjord (Norwegian, 5922 GRT, built 1921).

They were escorted by the sloops HMS Amethyst (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN) and HMS Deptford (Lt.Cdr. H.R. White, RN).

On 16 March 1944, the following transports / tankers departed Alexandria and joined the convoy; Bantria (British, 2407 GRT, built 1928), Billy Mitchell (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Brand Whitlock (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles A. Warfield (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), City of Rangoon (British, 6635 GRT, built 1914), David Thompson (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Edward Canby (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Fort Capot River (British, 7128 GRT, built 1943), Hoegh Silvercloud (Norwegian, 5287 GRT, built 1943), James B. Hickox (American, 7194 GRT, built 1943), James C. Cameron (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Makedonia (Greek, 7044 GRT, built 1942), Mark Hopkins (American, 7194 GRT, built 1943), Neuralia (British, 9182 GRT, built 1912), Ocean Trader (British, 7178 GRT, built 1942), Ole Bull (Norwegian, 7176 GRT, built 1943), P.T. Barnum (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Samvannah (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), Samwater (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), San Venancio (British (tanker), 8152 GRT, built 1942) and Stephen T. Mather (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943). They were escorted by the destroyer HMS Active (Lt.Cdr. P.G. Merriman, DSC, RN), sloop HMS Black Swan (Cdr.(Retd.) R.C.V. Thomson, DSC, RN) and the frigate HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau (Cdr. A. de Booy, RNethN) which also joined the convoy. The Commanding Officer of HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau was the Senior Officer of the escort.

On 20 March 1944, the following transports / tankers departed Augusta to join the convoy; Andrew Furuseth (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Daniel H. Hill (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Duncan U. Fletcher (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Elbridge Gerry (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Empire Heath (British, 6643 GRT, built 1941), Empire Heritage (British (tanker), 15702 GRT, built 1930), F. Marion Crawford (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Fort Jasper (British, 7125 GRT, built 1943), Fort Michipicoten (British, 7152 GRT, 1943), George E. Hale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Guinean (British, 5205 GRT, built 1936)), Hardingham (British, 7269 GRT, built 1942), Henry L. Benning (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), James Gunn (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Norman Monarch (British, 7005 GRT, built 1943), Philander C. Knox (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Rugeley (British, 4985 GRT, built 1936), Samspring (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Simon Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Staffordshire (British, 10683 GRT, built 1929), Starstone (British, 5702 GRT, built 1938), Thomas Cresap (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Thomas R. Marshall (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), West Point (British, 4999 GRT, built 1920), William G. Fargo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) and Zane Gray (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943).

On 21 March 1944, the following transports / tankers arrived at Augusta after having parted company with the convoy; Anglo-African, Bantria, Baron Inchcape, City of Rangoon, Fort Capot River, Ocean Trader, Samwater, San Eliseo and San Venancio.

On 21 March 1941, the transports Makedonia and Neuralia escorted by HMS Active arrived at Malta after having parted company with the convoy while the RFA tankers / landing ships Dewdale (8265 GRT, built 1941) and Ennerdale (8280 GRT, built 1941) as well as the Neuralia and HMS Active (re)joined the convoy.

On 22 March 1944, the following transports / tanker joined the convoy coming from Tunis; Caleb Strong (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Houston Volunteers (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942) and Neocardia (British (tanker), 8211 GRT, built 194).

On 23 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Bizerta; Tanafjord and Thomas R. Marshall while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Bizerta; Abangarez (American, 4538 GRT, built 1909), Atle Jarl (Norwegian, 1173 GRT, built 1919), Dunelmia (British, 5207 GRT, built 1929), Egda (Norwegian (tanker), 10050 GRT, built 1939), Empire Harbour (British (tanker), 797 GRT, built 1943), Good Gulf (Panamanian (tanker), 7805 GRT, built 1938), Horace H. Lurton (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Murena (Dutch (tanker), 8252 GRT, built 1931), Pan-Delaware (American (tanker), 8128 GRT, built 1918), Pellicula (British (tanker), 6254 GRT, built 1936) and Robert Dale Owen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943). Also joining from Bizerta was the AA cruiser HMS Colombo (Capt. H.W. Williams, RN).

On 23 March 1944, the following transports / tankers were detached to Bone; Atle Jarl, Empire Harbour, Fort Jasper and Hardingham while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Bone; Fort Frederick (British, 7135 GRT, built 1942), Framlington Court (British, 4888 GRT, built 1924), Sagittaire (French, 7706 GRT, built 1929) and Samholt (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943). Also joining from Bone was the rescue tug HMRT Vagrant.

On 23 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Philippeville; Fort Michipicoten and Norman Monarch while the transport Thistleford (British, 4781 GRT, built 1928) joined the convoy coming from Philippeville.

On 23 March 1944, the RFA tankers / landing ships Dewdale and Ennerdale arrived at Bougie after having been detached from the convoy.

On 24 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Algiers; Guinean, Neuralia, Sagittaire and West Point while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Algiers; Arthur P. Davis (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Alliance (British (tanker), 9909 GRT, built 1943), Felix Grundy (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Frans Hals (Dutch, 6626 GRT, built 1941), Harry A. Garfield (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James G. Blaine (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), James M. Wayne (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James Turner (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Kobad (French (tanker), 7329 GRT, built 1930), Louis McLane (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Nicholas Gilman (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Nicolaos Michalos (Greek, 4342 GRT, built 1913), Norholm (Norwegian (tanker), 9813 GRT, built 1941), Peregrine White (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Rhea (French (tanker), 7813 GRT, built 1928), Salawati (Dutch, 6643 GRT, built 1920), Samtampa (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Winslow Homer (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942). Also the boom carrier HMS Leonian (5424 GRT, built 1936) (A/Cdr.(Retd.) R.W. Lundy, OBE, RNR) joined the convoy. HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau and HMS Active also briefly entered Algiers before rejoining the convoy.

On 25 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Oran; Daniel H. Hill, Dunelmia, Fort Frederick, Framlington Court, Horace H. Lurton and Houston Volunteers while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Oran; Charles Nordhoff (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), China Mail (American, 8616 GRT, built 1942), Culebra (Panamanian, 5260 GRT, built 1919), Daniel H. Lownsdale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Emma Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Stour (British, 4678 GRT, built 1930), Esso Concord (American (tanker), 7698 GRT, built 1940), Exanthia (American, 6533 GRT, built 1941), Fort Venango (British, 7166 GRT, built 1943), Frances E. Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George F. Patten (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Hannis Taylor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), John Murray Forbes (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Joseph Warren (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Leland Stanford (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Midnight (American, 8258 GRT, built 1944) and William R. Davie (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942).

On 26 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Gibraltar; Empire Heath, Empire Stour, John W. Mackay, Rugeley, Staffordshire, Starstone and Thistleford as were HMS Colombo, HMS Leonian and HMRT Vagrant. The transport Homer Lea (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) joined coming from Gibraltar as did the corvette Commandant Detroyat.

On 26 March 1944, the transports / tankers Alexander Ramsey (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), British Tradition (British (tanker), 8443 GRT, built 1942), Chief Joseph (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Magdala (Dutch (tanker), 8248 GRT, built 1931), Robert T. Hill (American, 7244 GRT, built 1943), Samtroy (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Teucer (British, 9079 GRT, built 1906) as well as the naval tanker USS Cowanesque (Cdr. L.S. McKenzie, USNR) departed Casablanca to join the convoy. They were escorted by the destroyer escorts USS Eldridge (Lt.Cdr. C.R. Hamilton, USNR), USS Neunzer (T/Lt.Cdr. J.E. Greenbacker, USN) and the patrol vessels USS PC-472 (Lt.Cdr. P.A. Dallis, Jr., USNR) and USS PC-475 (Lt. W.W. Devine, Jr., USNR). They joined the convoy around 1140Z/27. On these ships joining the transports Culebra and Nicolaos Michalos parted company to proceed to Casablanca escorted by Commandant Detroyat, USS PC-472 and USS PC-475. They arrived at Casablanca on 28 March 1944.

On 27 March 1944, the destroyer Le Triomphant departed Gibraltar to join the convoy. She was to proceed to Boston, USA where she was to refit. She joined the convoy around 1410Z/28.

Around 1000A/27, the American Task Force 62 relieved the Mediterranean escort in position 35°32'N, 07°47'W. The Mediterranean escort then set course for Gibraltar where they arrived later the same day. The American escort was made up of the cutter USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), destroyers USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), USS Parrott (T/Lt.Cdr. E.F. Rye, USN) and the destroyer escorts USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Hetherington, 2nd, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll ( T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN) and USS Cooner (T/Cdr. J.M. Stuart, USN).

On 28 March 1944, two transports, the Baron Cawdor and Linda were unable to keep up with the convoy. They were ordered to proceed to Casablanca.

Around 1600Z/31, in position in position 36°49'N, 24°42'W, Le Triomphant parted company with the convoy to fuel at Horta, Azores.

Around 2105Z/1, the tanker Iroquois (British (tanker), 8937 GRT, built 1907) and the transport Pocahontas (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942) joined the convoy in position 37°01'N, 32°33'W coming from Horta, Azores. They had been escorted to the rendezvous by the A/S trawler HMS Mazurka (A/Skr.Lt. J. Baxter, RNR).

Around 0945Z/3, Le Triomphant rejoined the convoy in position 36°41'N, 28°02'W after having fuelled at the Azores.

Also on 3 April 1944, USS Barker and USS Bulmer were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 4 April 1944, USS Paul Jones, USS Parrott and Le Triomphant were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 8 April 1944, USCGC Spencer, USS Conner and Le Triomphant were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 10 April 1944, USS Bulmer was fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

Around 0100Z/11, in position 34°51'N, 61°09'W, Le Triomphant was detached to proceed to Boston independently.

Around 2345Z/11, in position 35°05'N, 65°01'W, USS Cowanesque was detached to Bermuda for which the destroyer escorts USS Durik (T/Lt.Cdr. K.B. Smith, USN) and USS Hayter (Lt.Cdr. H.J. Theriault, USNR) had come over to escort her to that place. They arrived at Bermuda the following morning.

Around 0730Z/13, while in position 36°30'N, 70°55'W, the convoy split into the New York / Delaware section and Chesapeake Bay section

The New York / Delaware section section was escorted by USCGC Spencer, USS Paul Jones, USS Barker, USS Bulmer, USS Parrott, USS Cooner and USS Neunzer. Around 2030Z/13, in position 38°03'N, 71°05'W, the transport Homer Lea parted company to proceed independently towards Delaware Bay. The New York section of the convoy arrived at its destination in the evening of 14 April 1944.

The Chesapeake Bay, escorted by USS Amick, USS Atherton, USS Booth, USS Carroll and USS Eldridge had meanwhile arrived at its destination in the morning of 14 April 1944.

3 May 1944

Convoy UGS 41.

This convoy departed Hampton Roads on 3 May 1944.

It was made up of the following transports / tankers; Albert C. Ritchie (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Andrew Briscoe (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), Andrew Furuseth (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Andrew Pickens (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Brand Whitlock (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Caleb Strong (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Calvin Coolidge (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles Crocker (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles Scribner (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Daniel H. Lownsdale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Daniel Huger (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Eastgate (British, 5032 GRT, built 1940), Edward H. Crockett (American, 7176 GRT, built 1944), Edward Rutledge (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Elbridge Gerry (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Emma Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Collins (British (tanker), 9796 GRT, built 1942)), Empire Dickens (British (tanker), 9819 GRT, built 1942), Empire Emerald (British (tanker), 8032 GRT, built 1941), F. Marion Crawford (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Felix Grundy (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Fort Coulonge (British, 7136 GRT, built 1943), Francisco Coronado (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George F. Patten (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George W. Campbell (American, 7180 GRT, built 1943), Hannis Taylor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Henry Bacon (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Henry D. Thoreau (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Henry George (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Jacob Perkins (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), James McCosh (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James Turner (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), John Murray Forbes (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), John S. Casement (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Johns Hopkins (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Jose J. Acosta (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), King Stephen (British, 5274 GRT, built 1928), Kong Haakon VII (Norwegian, 7073 GRT, built 1942), Lawrence J. Brengle (American, 7209 GRT, built 1944), Leland Stanford (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Levi Woodbury (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Louis McLane (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Mary Lyon (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Miguel Hidalgo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Nonsuco (American, 5212 GRT, built 1938), Norden (Norwegian (tanker), 8440 GRT, built 1931), Norfjell (Norwegian (tanker), 8129 GRT, built 1942), Norsol (Norwegian (tanker), 8236 GRT, built 1941), Nueva Granada (Norwegian (tanker), 9968 GRT, built 1937), Ocean Vestal (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942), Ole Bull (Norwegian, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Pocahontas (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), President de Vogue (Norwegian (tanker), 9320 GRT, built 1935), Richard H. Alvey (American, 7191 GRT, built 1942), Robert Dale Owen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Robert Howe (American, 7177 GRT, built 1943), Robert Luckenbach (American, 8152 GRT, built 1919), Samdee (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), Samhope (British, 7210 GRT, built 1944), Samjack (British, 7210 GRT, built 1944), Samtampa (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Samtroy (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Samuel Johnston (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Thomas Cresap (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Thomas Nelson Page (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Thorstein Veblen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Timothy Dwight (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), William Coddington (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), William M. Eastland (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), William R. Davie (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), William W. Mayo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) and Woodbridge N. Ferris (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943).

The naval tanker USS Chepachet (Cdr. H.R. Adams, USNR), stores ship USS Merak (Lt.Cdr. J.W. Cawthon, USN), attack cargo ship USS Betelgeuse (T/Cdr. J.F. Grube, USN) and the LSI(L)'s USS LCI(L)-562 (Lt.(jg) S.M. Ruffin, USNR), USS LCI(L)-563 (Ens. P. App, USNR), USS LCI(L)-581 (Lt.(jg) R.P. Mulligan, USNR), USS LCI(L)-582 (Lt.(jg) D. Radford, USNR), USS LCI(L)-583 (Lt. W.J. Sharp, Jr., USNR), 21649 584 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Smagala, USNR), USS LCI(L)-585 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Thomas, USNR), USS LCI(L)-586 (Lt.(jg) J.S. Murtha, USNR), USS LCI(L)-664 (Lt.(jg) J. Kennedy, USNR), USS LCI(L)-665 (Lt.(jg) O.E. Neidlinger, USNR), USS LCI(L)-666 (Ens. J.E. Earls, USNR), USS LCI(L)-667 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Dowd, USNR), USS LCI(L)-668 (Lt.(jg) J.B. Snapp, USNR), USS LCI(L)-669 (Lt.(jg) I.S. Bookman, USN), USS LCI(L)-670 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Hoban, USNR) and USS LCI(L)-671 (Lt.(jg) J.H. Carmona, USNR).

On departure from Hampton Roads the convoy was escorted by Task Force 62 which was made up of the cutter USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), destroyers USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), and the destroyer escorts USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. E.L. Barsumian, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll (T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN), USS Cooner Lt.Cdr. T.L. Bergen, USNR), USS Eldridge (Lt. W.K. Vanallen, USNR) and USS Neunzer (Lt. V.E. Gex, USNR).

Around 0930Z/6, the Norden was detached to Bermuda as she was unable to maintain the convoys speed.

Around 0030Z/7, in position 32°40'N, 61°18'W, the Felix Grundy was detached to Bermuda with defects. She was escorted by USS Paul Jones and USS Bulmer. The destroyers rejoined the convoy around 1400Z/8 in position 33°17'N, 55°18'W.

Around 0730Z/16, in position 36°34'N, 26°40'W, the transport Charles A. Wickliffe (American, 7218 GRT, built 1943) joined the convoy coming from the Azores. She had been escorted to the rendezvous by the auxiliary A/S trawler HMS Kingston Amber (T/Lt. R. Adams, RNR) which then proceeded to return to the Azores taking the transport Pocahonatas with her.

Around 1700Z/17, in position 34°20'N, 19°53'W, the transports Elbridge Gerry, F. Marion Crawford and Levy Woodbury were detached to proceed ahead of the main convoy to Oran where they were to disembark troop which they had on board after which they were to rejoin the convoy. They were escorted by USS Amick, USS Cooner and USS Bulmer. they arrived at Oran on 21 May before the main convoy passed. after having disembarked the troops they rejoined the convoy later on 21 May.

At 0551B/20, the transports Robert Howe and Nonusco collided in position 35°36'N, 07°38'W. The Robert Howe lost a man overboard and sustained damage in such a nature that she had to part company with the convoy. The Nonusco was holed well above the waterline and would be able to continue with the convoy in normal weather conditions.

Around 0830B/20, the Casablanca section of the convoy joined. This was made up of the following transports; Charles Schiaffino (French, 3664 GRT, built 1930) and Gouverneur General Lepine (French, 3509 GRT, built 1923). They had been escorted to the rendezvous by the patrol vessel / sloop Amiral Mouchez and the patrol vessels USS PC-473 (Lt. A.W. Silverstein, USNR) and USS PC-474 (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Hummer, USNR).

On these ships joining the following transports / tankers parted company to proceed to Casablanca with the same escort that had escorted the Casablanca section; Edward Rutledge, Empire Dickens, President de Vogue, Robert Dale Owen and Timothy Dwight.

Around 1045B/20, USS Barker parted company with the convoy to proceed to Gibraltar to pick up paperwork and a liason officer and then rejoin the convoy which she did around 1455B/20.

Around 1500B/20, the rescue tug HMRT Athlete joined the convoy to assist the damaged Robert Howe during the remainder of the passage to Gibraltar. The transport Charles A. Wickliffe also parted company for Gibraltar shortly afterwards.

Around 1645B/20, the AA cruiser HMS Colombo (Capt. C.T. Jellicoe, DSO, DSC and Bar, RN), submarine HMS Vox (Lt. J.M. Michell, RN) and rescue tug HMRT Nimble joined the convoy coming from Gibraltar. Also joining the convoy were the transports City of Keelung (British, 5186 GRT, built 1919) and Palermo (British, 2797 GRT, built 1938).

On 21 May 1944 (around 1945B/21), the following ships were detached to Oran; Andrew Furuseth, Caleb Strong, Calvin Coolidge, Edward H. Crockett, George F. Patten, John S. Casement, Kong Haakon VII, Leland Stanford, Palermo, William R. Davie, USS Chepachet, USS Merak, USS Betelgeuse while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Oran; Cushing Eells (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Dux (Norwegian, 1590 GRT, built 1934), Edwin L. Godkin (American, 7198 GRT, built 1943), Esso Charleston (American (tanker), 7949 GRT, built 1938), Henry Ward Beecher (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Laura Keene (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Levi Woodbury (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Robert H. Harrison (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942) and William A. Graham (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942). Also the destroyers USS Madison (T/Cdr. D.A. Stuart, USN) and USS Hilary P. Jones (T/Cdr. F.M. Stiesberg, USN) joined the convoy for jamming duty against German radio controlled guided bombs.

Around 0800B/22, the Eastgate was detached from the convoy to proceed ahead to Algiers to pick up a new (British) Commodore for the convoy. She was escorted by USS Bulmer. They were to rejoin the convoy in the evening when the convoy would pass Algiers.

On 22 May 1944 (around 1930B/22), the following ships were detached to Algiers; Andrew Pickens, Charles Schiaffino, Cushing Eells, Gouverneur General Lepine, John Murray Forbes, Louis McLane and Norsol while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Algiers; Barfleur (French, 3259 GRT, built 1938), Empire Noble (British, 7125 GRT, built 1944), Empire Unicorn (British, 7067 GRT, built 1943), Fort Carlton (British, 7131 GRT, built 1942), Fort Chesterfield (British, 7100 GRT, built 1943), Fort Cumberland (British, 7134 GRT, built 1943), Fort Frobisher (British, 7134 GRT, built 1943), Sambre (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Samphire (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943).

Around 2200B/23, USS Madison and USS Hilary P. Jones were detached.

On 23 May 1944 (around 2300B/23), the Samphire and HMRT Nimble were detached to Bone while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Bone; Empire Marlowe (British, 6768 GRT, built 1941), Fort Lennox (British, 7149 GRT, built 1943), Fort Pembina (British, 7134 GRT, built 1942), Harlesden (British, 7273 GRT, built 1943) and Sampford (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943).

On 24 May 1944 (around 1100B/24), the following ships were detached to Bizerta; Andrew Briscoe, Barfleur, Nueva Granada, Robert H. Harrison and all the LCI(L)'s while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Bizerta; Empire Lass (British (tanker), 813 GRT, built 1941), Empire Spartan (British, 7009 GRT, built 1942), Empire Stalwart (British, 7045 GRT, built 1943), Henry Groves Connor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Lawrence D. Tyson (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), North Devon (British, 3658 GRT, built 1924) and Ocean Valour (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942).

Also the current escort, was replaced by a new escort which was made up of the sloops HMS Fleetwood (Cdr. W.B. Piggott, DSC and Bar, OBE, RD, RNR), HMS Amethyst (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN), minesweeper HMS Hazard (Lt.Cdr. L.C. Smith, RN), minesweeping sloop Commandant Bory (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN) and the corvettes HMS Anemone (Lt. J.B. Sparkes, RNR) and HMS Convolvulus (A/Lt.Cdr. R.F.R. Yarde-Buller, RNVR).

On 25 May 1944, the Empire Lass and HMS Vox were detached to Malta while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Malta; Elise (Norwegian (tanker), 7910 GRT, built 1931) and Polartank (Norwegian (tanker), 6356 GRT, built 1930).

On 26 May 1944, the following ships arrived at Augusta after having been detached from the convoy; Daniel H. Lownsdale, Daniel Huger, Dux, Edwin L. Godkin, Elbridge Gerry, Emma Willard, Empire Collins, Empire Emerald, Empire Noble, Empire Stalwart, Empire Unicorn., F. Marion Crawford, Fort Carlton, Fort Chesterfield, Fort Cumberland, Fort Frobisher, Fort Lennox, Fort Pembina, George W. Campbell, Hannis Taylor, Harlesden, Henry George, Henry Groves Conner, Henry Ward Beecher, James McCosh, James Turner, Johns Hopkins, King Stephen, Laura Keene, Levi Woodbury, Mary Lyon, Norfjell, North Devon, Sambre, Samhope, Sampford, Samuel Johnston, Thomas Cresap, Thomas Nelson Page, William A. Graham, William M. Eastland and Woodbridge N. Ferris.

On 28 May 1944, HMS Amethyst parted company with the convoy to return to Bizerta. The corvette HMS Bergamot (A/Lt.Cdr. W. McInnes, RNR) joined the convoy on 28 May 1944.

On 29 May 1944, the following ships arrived at Augusta after having been detached from the convoy; City of Keelung, Empire Spartan, Miguel Hidalgo, Polartank, Richard H. Alvey, Samtampa and Thorstein Veblen. Also HMS Fleetwood, HMS Anemone, HMS Convolvulus and Commandant Bory arrived at Alexandria.

The remainder of the convoy arrived at Port Said on 30 May 1944 escorted by HMS Bergamot.

24 May 1944
HMS Colombo (Capt. C.T. Jellicoe, DSO, DSC and Bar, RN), USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. E.L. Barsumian, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll (T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN), USS Cooner Lt.Cdr. T.L. Bergen, USNR), USS Eldridge (Lt. W.K. Vanallen, USNR), USS Neunzer (Lt. V.E. Gex, USNR), USS LCI(L)-562 (Lt.(jg) S.M. Ruffin, USNR), USS LCI(L)-563 (Ens. P. App, USNR), USS LCI(L)-581 (Lt.(jg) R.P. Mulligan, USNR), USS LCI(L)-582 (Lt.(jg) D. Radford, USNR), USS LCI(L)-583 (Lt. W.J. Sharp, Jr., USNR), 21649 584 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Smagala, USNR), USS LCI(L)-585 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Thomas, USNR), USS LCI(L)-586 (Lt.(jg) J.S. Murtha, USNR), USS LCI(L)-664 (Lt.(jg) J. Kennedy, USNR), USS LCI(L)-665 (Lt.(jg) O.E. Neidlinger, USNR), USS LCI(L)-666 (Ens. J.E. Earls, USNR), USS LCI(L)-667 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Dowd, USNR), USS LCI(L)-668 (Lt.(jg) J.B. Snapp, USNR), USS LCI(L)-669 (Lt.(jg) I.S. Bookman, USN), USS LCI(L)-670 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Hoban, USNR) and USS LCI(L)-671 (Lt.(jg) J.H. Carmona, USNR) all arrived at Bizerta from convoy UGS 41.

16 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR).

17 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR) and USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR).

18 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR) and USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR).

1 Jan 1945
USS Chub (Cdr. C.D. Rhymes, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR).

12 Jan 1945
USS Sailfish (T/Lt.Cdr. L. Marcy, USN) arrived at Balboa, Panama Canal Zone. She had been joined in the evening of the 11th by USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) which then escorted her in. (5)

14 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

15 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

16 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

17 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR) and USS Paul Jones.

18 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) S.N. Stearns, USNR), USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

19 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) S.N. Stearns, USNR), USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

20 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Rockaway (T/Cdr. James Herve Mills, Jr., USN).

30 Jan 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS PC-1185 (Lt.(jg) B.M. Wall, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) J.A. Loof, USNR) and USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR).

31 Jan 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS PC-1185 (Lt.(jg) B.M. Wall, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR) and USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) J.A. Loof, USNR).

1 Feb 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) J.A. Loof, USNR), USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) J.F. Malo, USNR).

2 Feb 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) and USS Trutta (T/Cdr. A.C. Smith, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR).

3 Feb 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR) and USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) J.A. Loof, USNR).

4 Feb 1945
USS Lionfish (T/Lt.Cdr. E.D. Spruance, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR) and USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) J.A. Loof, USNR).

5 Feb 1945
USS Bullhead (Cdr. W.T. Griffith, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR).

6 Feb 1945
USS Bullhead (Cdr. W.T. Griffith, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS SC-684, USS SC-986, USS SC-996 and USS SC-1017.

7 Feb 1945
USS Bullhead (Cdr. W.T. Griffith, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS SC-684, USS SC-986, USS SC-996 and USS SC-1017.

8 Feb 1945
USS Bullhead (Cdr. W.T. Griffith, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS SC-684, USS SC-986, USS SC-996 and USS SC-1017.

6 Mar 1945
USS Bumper (Cdr. J.W. Williams, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS PC-592, USS PC-1191 (Lt. J.W. Garnant, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

7 Mar 1945
USS Bumper (Cdr. J.W. Williams, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-1191 (Lt. J.W. Garnant, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

8 Mar 1945
USS Bumper (Cdr. J.W. Williams, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-592, USS PC-1191 (Lt. J.W. Garnant, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

9 Mar 1945
USS Bumper (Cdr. J.W. Williams, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-592, USS PC-1191 (Lt. J.W. Garnant, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

11 Mar 1945
USS Bumper (Cdr. J.W. Williams, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR) and USS PC-592.

20 Mar 1945
USS Capitaine (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Friedrick, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-1221 and USS USS SC-980.

21 Mar 1945
USS Capitaine (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Friedrick, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR) USS PC-1215 and USS USS SC-1299.

22 Mar 1945
USS Cabezon (Cdr. G.W. Lautrup, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR) and USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR).

22 Mar 1945
USS Capitaine (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Friedrick, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR) USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-1215 and USS PC-1221.

23 Mar 1945
USS Capitaine (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Friedrick, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

23 Mar 1945
USS Cabezon (Cdr. G.W. Lautrup, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

24 Mar 1945
USS Capitaine (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Friedrick, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

24 Mar 1945
USS Cabezon (Cdr. G.W. Lautrup, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR) and USS USS SC-1299.

25 Mar 1945
USS Cabezon (Cdr. G.W. Lautrup, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-1215, USS PC-1221 and USS SC-1299.

26 Mar 1945
USS Cabezon (Cdr. G.W. Lautrup, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR), USS PC-1215, USS PC-1221 and USS SC-1299.

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